




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

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
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
MENTAL
AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY A CANADIAN CLERGYMAN.

TORONTO:
PRINTED BY C. BLACKETT ROBINSON, 5 JORDAN STREET.
1882.



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128127

PREFACE.

IN presenting to the reading public this little work, and the one on "Knowledge by Perception and Reasoning," which is intended to accompany it, we are not aware that any apology is either due or necessary.

They are got up in the form of Tracts, for the simple reason that we were unable to publish them in any other,—seconded by the consideration that if not found worth reading in this form, they would not be worth publishing in a more expensive one. Their method of presentation to the public, then, is modest enough.

In regard to the matter of both Tracts,—as it was evolved from the study of the human mind itself, rather than from the mere servile study of the text-books on the subject,—it is probable that some of the principles maintained, as well as their methods of treatment, will be found to differ from those of other works on the same subject. Though we have read other works freely, we have a persuasion that the human mind itself, ever at hand, is the best of all text-books on this subject; and we have studied it closely; yet we are far from pretending to infallible accuracy in our knowledge of all that this text-book teaches.

Be this as it may—as all students of a subject wish to know one another's opinions—we submit the results of our study to their examination with all cheerfulness.

We are aware that there is very much in both the matter and its treatment which is imperfect; but having now on our hands a pastoral charge that requires very much of our time and attention, we have concluded to consign both Tracts in their present state to the public. The Tract on "Knowledge by Perception and Reasoning," which is intended to accompany this one, is really the elder of the two by several years. It was, at one time, our intention to make some alterations in its matter and method; but with some few additions in the form of notes, etc., it goes to the public in its original shape.

As to the style in which both Tracts are written, all that has been chiefly cared for has been just to convey clear ideas respecting the subjects which we have discussed.

In conclusion, we commit both to the public, in the hope that they may be useful, asking no other favour than just a careful and candid reading of their contents.

ALEX. NICOL.

Ayton, 1882.

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INDEX.

	PAGE
Brief Sketch of Plan of the Work.....	1

SECTION I.

Consciousness with its Modifications.....	1
Active Consciousness	1
Latent Consciousness	2
Definitions and Explanations... ..	3
Attention	3
Conception	3
Memory.....	4
Imagination	4
Constitution of the Human Mind.....	5
Objective Physical Sensation	5
Subjective Physical Sensation	5
Perception	5
Knowledge	8
Inception—Reasoning and Imagination	9
Subjective Senses or Feelings.....	11
Synoptical Sketch of Subjective Feelings.....	14
Excitement of Subjective Feelings.....	15
Subjective Senses in Activity.....	15
Their Abatement, etc.	16
Subjective Feelings arising from a Physical Source	16
Subjective Senses of Second Division ...	17
Table A.—Subjective Feelings of Taste—Excitement, Activity, Subsidence.....	20, 21
Subjective Feelings of the Heart.....	18
Means whereby Excited.....	19
In a State of Activity.....	22
Their Abatement, etc.	22
Table B.—Synoptical Table of some of the Subjective Feelings of the Heart, with their Characteristics.....	to face 22
Subjective Feelings of the Conscience.....	23
Means whereby Excited.	23
In a State of Activity	25
Their Abatement, etc.	26
Table C.—Subjective Feelings of Conscience, Rectoral, and pertaining to Positive and Negative Duty, as preceding, attending, and following it.....	to face 26
Subjective Feelings of the Will	27
Subjective Feelings of the Intellect.....	27
The Will.	28
Introductory Analysis	28
Retrospect	37
Instincts.....	37
Habit	38
Memory	39

SECTION II.

	PAGE
Simplest Analysis of Man's Mental and Moral Powers.....	40
Possible Modes of Thought, Tactual and Non-tactual.....	40
Modification of Thought	41
Process of Thought in Originating New Conceptions from Contents of Others	41
Synoptical Sketch of Conceptions.....	42
Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Intellect ...	43
Possible Uses of the Intellect.....	44
Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Subjective Feelings.....	44
Uses of the Six Classes of Subjective Feelings.....	44
Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Will.....	45
Synoptical Sketch of the Mutual Relations of the Intellectual and Moral Powers.....	45
Miscellaneous.....	46
Acts and States of the Mind	46
Things Unthinkable or Inconceivable, Contradistories, etc.	46
Things Thinkable as Knowable, etc.	47
Origin of Ideas or Conceptions.....	48
Methods in which some of the more important Fundamental Primary and Secondary Ideas or Conceptions are formed.....	48
Extent and Perfection of our Knowledge.....	50
The External Relations and Surroundings necessary to bring all the Powers of Man's Intellectual and Moral Nature fully into Play.....	52
Effects of Man's Fall in Eden, as they are at present found in our Intellectual and Moral Nature	53
Conscience	55

	PAGE
.....	40
.....	40
.....	41
.....	41
.....	42
the Intellect ...	43
.....	44
the Subjective	44
.....	44
the Will.....	45
.....	45
.....	46
.....	46
.....	46
.....	47
.....	48
ondary Ideas	48
.....	50
Man's Intel-	50
.....	52
l and Moral	52
.....	53
.....	55

MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PLAN OF THIS WORK.

Recognising the prevailing popular division of the mental and moral powers of man, our plan is to discuss the subjects embraced in this work under the following heads:—I. The Head, or Intellect; II. The Heart (including Taste, the Heart proper, and Conscience); and III. The Will. This division also generally agrees with the following propositions:—(1) Man is a knowing creature; (2) Man is a sensuous or feeling creature; and (3) Man is a voluntary creature.

A more simple elementary division might still be made; but probably the above is, for general purposes, the most suitable.

The discussion of the functions of the Intellect, commencing the work, and comprehending latent consciousness, conception, perception, inception, reasoning, imagination, knowledge (equal to a correct conception with the subjective feeling of assurance), and other powers, terminates on page 14.

The functions of the Heart (comprehending Taste, the Heart proper, and the Conscience) then follow in order, and may be regarded as fully discussed under the three heads of the Subjective Feelings of Taste, of the Heart, and of the Conscience.

The functions of the Will, also composed of subjective feelings (though of a different character), together with the subjective energy, follow in due order, their discussion terminating near the close of the first section of the work.

In the second section of the work, these functions pertaining to the various departments are again taken up, and set forth still more concisely and clearly, both in respect to their own character and in their relations to one another. The second section closes with subjects of a miscellaneous character.

SECTION I.

Consciousness with its Modifications.

Consciousness is that state of the mind, in which it is awake and active.

Consciousness manifests itself in two phases:—(1) actively, through the attention; and (2) latently, behind, or outside of the attention, but with immediate power to lay hold on it. In other words, we may be conscious in two degrees, the active and the latent.

Active Consciousness.

Every mind awake is continually thinking; and thinking, or active consciousness, is just the turning of the attention upon any of the conceptions that lie in our minds like furniture.

All the objects of thought present themselves either from the memory or from the outward or inward field of perception; and their action on the mind, so occupied, is the cause of continued fluctuations or modifications of feeling, some pleasant and some otherwise, but together making up the sum of sentient existence.

Then the mind itself exercises a power over these conceptions or objects of thought, modifying the old ones, or framing new combinations from them, looking at all in their various phases, as well as forming fresh resolutions respecting them.

All this is done through the medium of the attention, which is kept continually on the move.

Our minds are so constituted that we can turn the full light of the attention on only one

thing at a time. We may widen its field of vision, or we may narrow it; still this field never presents itself but as a unit. This field of view may have diverse elements in it; and when we look at all, we have one vision of all; the attention is spread over all. But the moment we turn the attention to any one element, the others are lost sight of, or they sink into the latent consciousness.

Latent Consciousness.

Latent consciousness is that intermediate state or phase of the mind between the active consciousness and insensibility, and is ever contemporaneous with active consciousness.

While we are actively conscious through the medium of the attention, latent consciousness acts behind the attention; and while capable of laying hold on the attention, it may also be influenced by it.

The latent phase of mind differs from the active, in being capable of comprehending more than one thing at a time.

A man may be actively conscious, having his attention occupied with some object of thought, and yet, at the same moment, be latently conscious of a thousand others. For instance, on calling on an intimate relative, while my attention is engaged with the object of my visit, I am latently conscious of myself, of all I know, my surroundings, and also of him as my relative, his late bereavement, and all his circumstances. To mention any of the facts of which I am latently conscious, would cause me no surprise, because I am latently conscious of them. The theme of conversation between him and me, or that which engages my attention or active consciousness at the time, is the great object of my mental picture; and all of which I am latently conscious at the same moment, lies diffused around, like the background or surroundings of a portrait. The object of attention glows before me in the actively conscious light; the surroundings are dim and indistinct in the latently conscious shadow.

The object of active consciousness is as the central figure in a landscape, on which I may specially fasten my eyes, while at the same moment I am latently conscious of all the hills, trees, etc., that surround it. I do not specially notice any surrounding feature of the country, but were a wonted hill or tree wanting, I would instantly miss it.

A workman, carrying his tools, goes forth to his work, with a companion with whom he may be actively discussing politics, turning all the street corners, and finally stopping at the right place, yet all the while with scarcely an actively conscious thought aside from the object of discussion.

The truth is, the walking, the carrying of the tools, the turns, and the final stopping, are all mainly the result of the latent conscious power which is insensibly controlling him.

A tradesman may have his whole attention actively engaged with a piece of work, but why does he hurry so much in doing it? Because, all the while, he is latently conscious that he promised to have it done in an hour.

A bereaved son has his actively conscious thoughts closely occupied with his work all the day; but why is he so unceasingly sad? Because all the while he is latently conscious of the death of his father. The shadow of this bereavement lies continually on his spirit, while his attention may be otherwise engaged.

In learning a complicated art (music, for example) it requires all our attention first to learn to play the piece; but when learned enough, the latent powers can accomplish it themselves, and we play from habit.

We can be actively conscious of but one thing at a time; yet the skilful musician may, by latent conscious power, play all the parts of a piece of music on his instrument, sing the air, and have his attention free to read the words.

It is the latent conscious power that enables a man to walk, play, or work, as we say, mechanically, leaving his attention free to converse with a friend. The moment a hitch occurs in the work, the latent becomes active, and commands the attention.

The latent conscious power not only retains ideas of things at the elbow of the attention, so as insensibly to make them act on, or be acted on, by it; but through it also, in precisely the same way, the common feelings and instincts insensibly prompt the attention, or are influenced by it.

The latent conscious power, though not memory, is an important sphere or medium of memory. Here memory lays up her stores, ready at the behest of the will, and from which near neighbourhood she prompts attention to them. Here habit deposits her skill and readiness. Through this medium memory flashes forth from the shadow ideas in their stereotyped shape to the full blaze of the attention, and imagination extorts from its twilight new comparisons and fresh and rare contrasts.

In the case of the writer or orator, the ideas in their latently conscious form cast their shadows before, and he becomes actively conscious of them the moment they pass to the pen or the lips.

To the latent consciousness all the suggestive, associative, and inventive powers of the mind are infinitely indebted.

This latent power, strong and active, and under the control of the will, cannot fail to give its possessor great facility in dealing with ideas, whether as an artist or a scholar, a poet or an inventor, a politician or a pulpit orator.

In perfect obedience to the will, it gives great readiness and presence of mind, flashing up rapidly the right idea at the right time; and no doubt its power and facility are increased by those operations of the mind, that call it into frequent and vigorous exercise.

Volition, backed by strong feeling, has ever great suggestive and controlling power over the latently conscious ideas that lie in the shadow behind them.

In short, all the operations of a day, that are not the direct results of our conscious attention, are the product of this latent power; and we are regulated in the performance of every act that requires our attention, by all the knowledge and the experience that stand immediately by in the shadow.

Lastly, it must be remembered that latent consciousness is altogether a distinct thing from memory. For though we may be latently conscious of things stored away in memory, yet we may be latently conscious of many things that have never reached the memory. Thus, in looking at a castle in a landscape which I have never seen before, though my active attention has never been turned from the castle towards its surroundings at all, I am latently conscious of these surroundings nevertheless; and if there is any peculiarity in any of them, or any movement, it at once arrests my active attention.

In passing through a country which I have never seen before, I am latently conscious of many things that never engage my attention actively. Anything peculiar, however, which thus passes through the latent consciousness, is sure at once to attract active attention to it.

The chief difference between Active consciousness and Latent consciousness is, that in the first case, the consciousness of things is so concentrated or great, that it reaches the degree of active attention; while, in the second case, the consciousness of things is so diffused or small, that it does not reach the degree of active attention. Active consciousness is possible to only one thing; latent consciousness, even with active consciousness at the same moment, is possible to many things.*

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

Attention.—Definitions and Explanations.

Attention is that faculty which the mind possesses of concentrating its active thinking or perceptive powers upon an object of thought; in other words, of bringing them to a focus upon it. It is just the eye of the mind, through which it must look in order to know or become sensibly conscious of any thing.

Attention can be directed to only one thing at a time; if attention is directed, in one act, to more things than one, it must be diffusively to them as one aggregate; if special attention is to be given to the individuals of an aggregate, it must be by successive acts, surveying separately every individual of the aggregate. Briefly, we can think of only one thing in one act of the attention. The wider the field of attention in one act, the more diffused is the attention; the narrower the field, the more concentrated is the attention; but the field is always a unity.

Conceptions.—Definition and Explanations.

A Conception is just what we think a thing to be—a kind of mental photograph of external phenomena. We cannot take up matter into the mind and carry it about with us; but we can make a mental transcript or copy of it, and then carry it about with us for ever. But this mental transcript differs from other transcripts, in that the mind never recognizes it apart

* The Latent conscious power is thus the complement and the helpmate of the Active conscious power; the latter works in the light, the former in the shadow, and both operate together in harmony. The Active consciousness possesses powers of control over the Latent conscious sphere, and can bring the light of the attention to bear on things within it; and things in the Latent conscious sphere are also able, to a certain extent, to arrest the attention of the Active consciousness, or, otherwise, to affect the mind. The one, the Active consciousness, is just the full light of the attention; the other, the Latent consciousness, is just that obscure twilight that reveals nothing definite or distinguishable, but at the same time enough to influence our mental operations, or prompt us to turn our full attention towards it.

I am aware that my use of the term "Latent consciousness" to denote this phase of mind may be objected to by some as not being altogether the best term to employ. It is difficult, however, to get a term more suitable; and there is little danger of any ambiguity, or of being misunderstood, through my employment of it.

from the original. The mind is just like a gallery, hung full of conceptions or pictures of things; some of them drawn from the imagination, and some of them drawn from nature, and true to it. A conception, thought of as a mental idea, is a known conception, when it is correct, and we are assured that it is correct. A Known Conception consists thus of two parts, (1) conception, and (2) subjective assurance. This is strictly the philosophical definition.

A Known Conception, thought of merely as a proposition representative of a mental idea, is composed of words, part of which represent the conception, and one of which, the affirmative verb or copula, represents the subjective assurance; thus, as corresponding with the mental idea, it has also two parts. When the verb "to be" or the copula is used, assurance alone is expressed in it; as "John (is) striking James." But the assurance of the proposition may also be expressed in a verb which, at the same time, is also descriptive of the conception; as, "John strikes James." "John striking James" would be the conception alone, without the assurance. The assuring force which is wanting in "striking," is found in "strikes."

An Unknown Conception, of course, is one which we have no subjective assurance of being correct.

An incorrect or Unknown Conception, expressed in a proposition, consequently should never have assurance expressed with it.

A conception may be divided into as many parts as there are words used in expressing it; for each of these words expresses a separate idea. But a very common division is what is called the logical, that which divides the conception into subject and predicate; the subject being the thing spoken of, and the predicate being that which describes or which is affirmed of it. It should not be forgotten, however, that as many things are spoken of in a proposition (any one of which may be used to describe another), you may, in most cases, make anything in the sentence the subject, and put all else in the predicate, and the general conception affirmed, will to all intents and purposes be the same. In truth, it matters but little what division may be made, provided the two philosophical elements, a correct conception and assurance, be properly expressed within it.

Memory.—Definition.

Memory is that power which the mind possesses of retaining, within itself, conceptions and facts within easy reach of the will, so that they may be brought before the attention at our pleasure at any time.*

Imagination.—Definitions and Explanations.

Imagination is that power of the mind by which we are able to inceptively create† either new ideas or new modifications of ideas, differing from those already in the mind. In other words, it is the power of inventing ideas not already existing in the mind. These definitions are general; and the latter is the one mostly used in popular language. It just means the power of inceiving either new thoughts or new combinations of thought, irrespective of the truth or error which these thoughts may represent.

As these definitions are much too general and indefinite for use in a work of this kind, we give a technical definition of imagination, and to which we shall adhere in our treatment of mental phenomena in the subsequent pages.

Imagination is that power of the mind by which we inceptively create or originate conceptions, not contained in known conceptions already existing in the mind. In other words, it is that power of the mind by which we originate conceptions which we do not know to be correct.

Having given these preliminary definitions and explanations of some of the simpler principles of our mental nature, we shall introduce other definitions as we find most convenient during our discussion on man's mental and moral constitution.

* We may not always be latently conscious of everything that is stored up in memory. Memory is not identical with latent consciousness. We may be latently conscious of the present as well as of the past; and the imagination, the feelings, etc., have as much to do with latent consciousness as actually influence it, without its being consciously sensible of its presence. An idea in the memory may often be so dormant as to produce no sensible effect whatever. In the sphere of latent consciousness,—imagination, the subjective feelings, etc., often do their most important work in suggestion, invention, etc.

† To inceptively create an idea, is to originate it in the mind without actual perception. See Definition of Inception on page 9.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN MIND.

We are so constituted that when an object is brought within the scope of any of the five senses, a vivid mental presentation or appearance from it, through the operation of our nervous organization in conjunction with the mind, is flashed up within reach of the perceptive powers. We call this appearance an objective physical sensation—objective, because it occupies the same relation to the perceptive powers as the object which it presents; and physical, not because it is physical, but because it comes from a physical source. The sensation and the perception are by no means identical; the former occupies the place of the perceived, and the latter that of the perceiver. Both coexist together; and we can be conscious of the sensation only in the act of perception. External objects, in an act of perception, thus invariably present themselves to the attention on a bed of sense, or as objects or impressions in the bosom of a picture. Sensation is just that lap of colour, lap of sound, or of touch, which, bearing the object of scrutiny on its surface, intrudes itself, in the act of seeing, hearing, etc., on the notice of the perceptive powers. This kind of sensation occupies the same relation to the perceiving mind as the object which it introduces to the attention. It is, or it belongs to, the thing perceived, rather than it is, or belongs to, the perceiver. It is an object of sight rather than of feeling.

Definition.—We may then briefly define "Objective Physical Sensation" as that vivid mental presentation or appearance of or from things which, through the operation of the nervous organization or five senses, in conjunction with the mind, flashes up before the perceptive powers.

There is, however, another phase of sensation intimately associated with this, which requires to be distinguished from it, and which we call, for want of a better name, "Subjective Physical Sensation," because, though not physical, it is from a physical source. In looking, for example, at an object of sight, the objective sensation which presents it has more to do with the object than with myself. I see an object on the sense-bed of colour, but it gives me neither pain, pleasure, nor subjective sense of any kind. This sense-bed of colour is an objective physical sensation. The moment, however, that I touch a rough, hot iron, there flashes up before my attention the objective sensation rough-hot-ness, which on perception produces in myself the sensation of pain. The latter kind of sensation associates with myself the subject, rather than with the object; for it is the objective physical sensation, perceived, that produces this subjective physical sensation in myself, the perceiver. The one stands in the relation of cause, and the other of effect; but both are perceived, at the same moment, in the act of perception, the object in the first kind of sensation flashing up in perception, swathed in the feeling of the second kind of sensation. Thus, I just perceive rough-hot-ness with pain, all as one mental conception.

Definition.—We may now define Subjective Physical Sensation as that peculiar sensory or emotive state of the mind which is produced in the perception of particular objects, or objective physical sensations; and which is always perceived coexistently with these objects.*

As we have already seen, sensation and perception, though intimately associated, are very different things.

Definition.—Perception may be briefly defined as that act of the mind by which, directing its cognitive powers, through the attention, to presentations of outward things by the physical senses, or to that inwardly pertaining to itself, a correct conception of that presented is created, with assurance that it is correct.

It must be borne in mind that the thing perceived does not mean the outward object from which a presentation may come, but the very thing, in the sensation or presentation itself. Thus, I may touch a rough, hard object outside of me with my fingers; the thing that I perceive in this case is the sensation of rough-hardness, not the rough, hard thing from which the sensation comes. Again, in seeing the figure of a man before me, I do not pretend that my perception actually touches the man outside of me, but only the figure in the presentation or sensation of colour, which flashes up before my attention. So far, then, as the object perceived is concerned, there can be no ambiguity. The figure actually perceived is the one in the sensation in the mind; and therefore the object that we mean is the one actually perceived in the sensation or presentation in the mind; and being actually perceived, there can be no question that a correct conception of it is formed. It is correct, and we are so constituted that we cannot help being assured that it is correct.

Every man in the act of perception is convinced that he perceives an object, or a sense appearance in a presentation; also, that his conception of that individual appearance or object

* Objective and Subjective Physical Sensation will be discussed more fully at a more advanced stage of this work.

is correct: and he cannot be otherwise than convinced of both. Perception is, in fact, the one grand inlet of self-evident truth: because everything truly perceived is self-evident.

The perceptive powers of the mind are directed to two different fields of vision—to outside phenomena, and also to internal acts and states of the mind itself. The mind is thus made conscious of all that is transpiring in the outside world, and also of all that is going on within itself, whether in doing, feeling, or wishing.

That the senses do not cheat in the act of perception, by making false presentations of external objects, will be evident on a little inspection. What they do say may be easily proved to be correct; and we can never be led astray by them, unless we assume them to imply more than they do. To a mind glancing at the subject superficially, there might appear to be something uncertain or deceitful in the method of presenting external objects through the medium of objective physical sensation, but this uncertainty will instantly be dispelled on a closer examination. For instance, in the sensation of sight, why do I see an object which appears to be outside of me, while I know it to be really within me? In the first place, if nature had intended to cheat me here, she would never have given me a chance to know that these seemingly outside appearances were really within me; and, secondly, the real use of these sense appearances is not to present themselves and their whereabouts to my attention, but only the objects outside of me and their whereabouts; and while not obtruding themselves obstructively as a medium, they just shew enough of themselves to shew me that they exist.

Taking the sensation of sight as an illustrative example of the senses in general, the presentation which appears before the mind is reflective, precisely as a mirror, wherein we look and see a reflected object appearing to be somewhere else. The object actually seen is in the mirror before our face, but the object reflectively seen is somewhere else, either in the room or outside. The perfect mirror itself is barely, or rather not seen at all; and this is what it should be as a perfect medium of reflection. Sense presentations, then, are merely perfect mirrors, wherein we see reflected objects; and the reason why they are so is that they cannot be otherwise in order to do their particular work. Sense is a medium, and all perfect mediums must be perfect reflectors, otherwise they obtrude their own identity, so as to completely hide what they are intended to reflect. Lastly, to these things add the fact, that without the use and assistance of mediums, perception or knowledge of the outside world would be an impossibility. To see a mountain, a tree, or a lake, man would have to take each of these objects alternately, and put it into his brain in cognitive contact with his mind. This, all will agree, were it even possible, would be a tiresome and a tedious process.

Perception without a medium would be equivalent to making a man shut up in a house see objects outside without a window, or to making our perceptive minds touch the sun, moon, stars, and other distant objects, without being omnipresent.

A conception in the mind is precisely like a sensation, in being reflective. My mind looks in reality at the conception, but thinks only of the object it reflects; it thinks only of one thing.

Now, that the senses make no false representations of eternal things may easily be proved by the evidence of one another; and it is impossible that we can be deceived by them, unless we assume them to say something which they do not. For example, in the sensation of sight, in a bed of colour, I perceive an object which appears in that sphere in space, which I call outside of me. That it is really outside of me is confirmed by the fact that I can put my hand towards it. My hand and it are both in the same place.

If I imagine that this object represented is merely colour, I go beyond the testimony of sight. I also assume more than I am entitled to if I conclude the object to have that colour in darkness. I then put forth my hand and touch it. I see my hand go against it; and the sensation of resistance coming by touch shews me that it has material existence. Then, it is not a mere colour appearance only, but substantial matter—matter as I know it, and not a conjectural something never in my experience. I also see that it is of a large size, and occupies certain relations of position in regard to other objects. This I also confirm by touch. The appearance has also square sides; and still looking around it, I perceive that it has six sides, all alike. It is a cube in appearance. By touch, feeling the corners, etc., the sensations I receive from it convince me that it is so in fact. I take a tool and chip the outside. By the sensation of resistance in touch I perceive it is hard. I chip it all through in like manner, and finding no vacuity, I know that it is solid, not a shell. I take it in my hands and weigh it; from the sense of resistance in lifting, I find it heavy. The brilliant fracture appearance is that which I perceive in iron alone. As the sensation of weight, which it gives me, also agrees with that of iron, therefore I conclude that it is iron.

We might go on multiplying examples of this process, but they are not necessary. The whole process is a succession of perceptions through sensation; and we go on joining together the conceptions or ideas obtained by the separate perceptions, until we have formed them into one whole conception in our minds, corresponding to the original from which they came.

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This junction of the separate ideas is in reality a process of reasoning; only, in this case, the conceptions which we unite are not drawn from the memory, but acquired immediately by perception.

None of the senses reflect all the qualities of an object at once, although some of them reveal more than others. Sight may give size, form, etc.; but only touch,—hardness, temperature, etc.

The amount of reasoning mixing up with the perceptions necessary to the knowledge of one object alone, is sometimes very great. It is emphatically important, at all times, to bear in mind that in every separate act of perception, the conception created is exactly what appears in the sensation: that is, we conceive of the appearance precisely as it is reflected. But even when these simple conceptions are obtained, reasoning is generally necessary to separate in the sensation what belongs to ourselves and what belongs to the external object, to compare the testimony of the one sense with the testimony of the others, and to conjoin in one all the conceptions or ideas thus interpreted as a truthful transcript of the outside whole. It is not at all necessary to suppose that the sense object is an exact likeness of the external one reflected; for the object seen in vision is but mere colour, not matter, like the outside one. It is quite true that the sense object stands in the relation of an effect on our sensitive organism, from the external object which is the cause. But every effect reflects the properties of the cause; and this is pre-eminently the case in physical sensation. Thus, in touching a hot object I have a sensation of heat swathed in pain. The object is in a hot state, but it is not pain. If I form the idea that the object is pain, I go beyond the testimony of the senses. The true conception of it is that it is an object in that warm state capable of producing the sensations heat and pain. The conceptions obtained thus by perception are not obtained by the testimony of one sense alone, but of all. The one sense asserts and confirms the evidence of the others; for the senses never contradict one another or lead us astray, unless we assume them to say more than they actually do. Thus, in touch I press my finger against a solid object. The sense of sight shows me that the object resists it by the point of my finger becoming flat against it; at the same moment I have a sensation of resistance from it in touch which I ever afterwards know as the sensation of resistance. Any object afterwards giving me that sensation I know to be unyielding or hard.

Also, in sight, I perceive an objective appearance of a certain size and form. I apply to it my fingers, and by touch ascertain that its evidence corresponds to that of sight, teaching me, in addition, that it is also a material solid. Afterwards, I know all objects of such visual appearance to be material solids. So also in regard to the sense of hearing. I hear a sound seemingly proceeding from a person in front of me. By the concurrent testimony of the senses, in connection with reasoning, I know that the sound is merely an effect, produced in me by the oscillation of the air, of which the man's voice is the cause. Also, in the same way, I know what the sound effect in my mind represents in the act of the man who is the ultimate cause. Thus, we should ever bear in mind that the senses are just the reflecting instruments by which we test and come to know the objects in the outside world and form a mental transcript of them. And in all this process, though there would be a great deal of reasoning, the constant reiteration of the process would invariably lead to ellipses and the shortest methods. And as constant, correct practice invariably tends to correct habit, through habit we come to possess what is called acquired perceptions, which are illustrated by the fact, that when we see an object in a bed of colour, we never think of it being else than matter, just because experience teaches us that all such appearances are material.

In acquired perception, all that experience has invariably educed in the past from particular sensations, suggests itself to the mind in the moment of perception, though not literally a part of the actual sense conception. As the use of the senses is generally acquired in childhood, the child is guided, no doubt, in their meaning by what is called rational instinct; but it is well to know that the reliability of the method pursued by this instinct will bear the closest scrutiny of human reason. So also experience gives important aid in promoting acquired perceptions, because it corrects false reasoning and perception.

It is important, then, with reference to perception by sense presentations, to bear in mind the following important facts:—That though the conception created in each separate act of perception is exactly that of the sense presentation, yet in forming a conception of the outside thing presented by it the mind invariably goes beyond the sense presentations which reflect it, and forms its conception of the outside thing, not out of a conjunction of the sense presentations which come from it, but out of a conjunction of facts obtained from them by processes of reasoning confirmed by experience. The sense presentations are infallible and transparent mediums; so the mind forms its conception of outside things correctly and quickly through these mediums, and never makes the mistake of taking the conception of the medium to be that of the thing which it reflects.

In these paragraphs we have devoted some care in illustrating and explaining perception

through the medium of the senses, which are the connecting link between it and the outer world; while it may seem that we have not said enough about internal perception, that is, the perception of the states and acts of the mind itself. The field of the internal perceptions is really larger and more important than that of the external; and our internal perceptions are really the more numerous of the two classes. But our reasons for not introducing more here about internal perceptions are, that they do not reflect material objects behind them in the outer world, of the communication with which we are here chiefly speaking, and that they perceive the states and acts of the mind directly without the intervention of a sense medium, and are incapable of error.

Before taking up the subject of Reasoning, it may be most suitable to discuss Knowledge, and what constitutes it.

Definition.—Knowledge is a correct conception of things in the mind, with assurance that it is correct.

We have already seen that an act of perception creates this knowledge. An incorrect conception, even with assurance, would not be knowledge, but error; and even a correct conception, without assurance of its correctness, would not be knowledge. I can, for example, form a conception in my own mind of "John sawing wood;" but this would be but a mere picture of my own imagination, so long as I have no assurance in my mind that it is correct. I can conceive it, but I do not know it. John may indeed be sawing wood, but unless I have assurance that he is, I cannot know it as a fact.

Then, our very language, which is a reflex of the mind itself, exactly corresponds to this definition of knowledge. The copula, or predicate verb, always expresses this assurance in every proposition which expresses a fact. Thus, "John (is) at home," expresses both the conception and the assurance; but "John at home" expresses merely the conception; there is no assurance expressed with it to make it a fact. "John writes" expresses both the conception and the assurance; but "John writing" is merely a conception: assurance is not asserted in the phrase.

Locke defines knowledge as "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas." We must confess that we think this definition exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory. Take, for example, "John is sawing firewood." According to Locke, "John" would be one idea, and "sawing firewood" would be the other idea. But if we are to cut up a conception into parts in this way, why not divide it into the number of parts which are actually in it: for "John" is one idea, and "is sawing firewood" are four, making in all five. Far better, instead of reducing the conception into parts, to leave it whole, and give assurance the distinct place in the definition to which it is entitled. Thus, "John sawing firewood" is the correct conception, and "is," the sign of assurance, gives it the true knowledge form. This is both simpler and, philosophically, more correct.

Exactly parallel to this is the practice of logical writers to divide a "judgment" in the same way. They say, "an act of judgment is an attempt to reduce to unity two ideas;" and they cut up the conception into two parts, in the same unwarrantable or rather unphilosophical way, no matter how many parts it may actually contain. "John," the one idea, has to be reduced to unity with "is sawing firewood," which they call the other idea—a misnomer surely.

Now, instead of all this, what they actually do, it seems to us, would be more correctly explained by separating the elements of a judgment or perception (for such it really is), as these fragments as one part, and the assurance of its correctness the other: "John sawing firewood" is the one; "is," the sign of assurance, is the other.

An act of judgment, then, is an act of perception or reasoning by which we obtain assurance that a certain conception is correct.

Conceptions may be subdivided into as small parts as we please, only there should never be more conceptions in a proposition than there are affirmative verbs, expressed or implied, to give to each the sign of assurance.

The principle, however, which may be regarded as justifying the division of a judgment into subject and predicate, is the fact that any part of a conception may be used to modify or describe any other part of it, and that any part of a conception may be regarded a subject of description. The part usually made the subject is the one which at the time we make the chief object of consideration.

It is time now to call attention to the fact that all our attainable knowledge is derived from two sources: (1) We can know by actual perception; and (2) we can know by reasoning. The latter we shall define after some explanations.

There are only two modes of thought possible: first, the remembrance of conceptions as they already exist in the mind; or, second, the formation of conceptions, either entirely new as to their contents, or as containing some new combination or modification of old conceptions.

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Now, the only possible ways in which conceptions, new in any sense, can be formed or created, are either by perception, in which the mind originates a conception from outside the mind itself by perceiving the object, or by inception, in which the mind originates a conception of the object from within the mind itself without perceiving the object.

As perception always creates a conception entirely new as to its contents, without any reference to old conceptions, and has already been defined and explained, we shall now prepare the way and proceed with the discussion of Inception.

A conception to be created must be in some sense new, not a mere remembrance or repetition of one or more old ideas, but as conceiving of things in a form or combination different from that hitherto existing in the mind.

It is deserving of attention, however, that we cannot modify or combine old conceptions into a new shape without forming a new conception, because the conception thus originated has an existence different and distinct from any hitherto existing in the mind.

It is of importance to notice that a new conception can never be created as contained in only one old conception: because the one attempted to be thus framed would be but a mere repetition of the original. Neither can a conception be created as separately contained in two or more original conceptions: because that also would be merely a strict reproduction of the separate old ideas—not a combination or modified form of them.

The conception, to be really new or created, must be created as unitedly contained in the original conceptions. This gives it a new and distinct existence.

With these preparatory hints as to the method in which conceptions may be created by inception, we now proceed with its

Definition.—Inception, then, is the creation of a conception, either entirely new as to its contents, or as contained in combinations of old conceptions, by the internal powers of the mind, from within the mind itself, without perception.

It follows that Perception and Inception are the two only possible modes in which conceptions can be created—that is, the conception is created either from outside of the mind by perception, or from inside of the mind without perception. Inception thus stands in contradistinction to perception. Perception forms its conception by actual mental vision of the object itself. Inception forms its conception, in the absence of actual mental vision of the object, by its own inherent powers, either from old conceptions of the object existing in the mind, or vaguely, in utter disregard of them.

Now, all conceptions of things already existing in the mind must be either known conceptions or unknown; that is, they must either be correct conceptions, and which we are assured are correct, or they must be otherwise.

If a conception, therefore, is inceptively created as contained in a combination of known conceptions, we call it an act of reasoning; but if a conception is inceptively created as not contained in a combination of known conceptions, or vaguely in utter disregard of them, we call it an act of imagination.

It follows, then, that reasoning and imagination are the only two ways in which conceptions can be created or formed by inception.

The only means, then, in accordance with which the imagination may frame a conception are unknown conceptions, or its own self-originating power.*

Now, it is very evident that we cannot obtain knowledge by an act of imagination: because, in the first place, if a conception is formed as not contained in known conceptions, or independently of previous conceptions of any kind, we know that it is more likely to be incorrect than otherwise; and, secondly, as we know that it is most probably incorrect, we cannot be assured that it is correct: therefore it fails to give us the two elements of knowledge—viz., a correct conception, with assurance that it is correct.

Definition.—An act of Imagination, then, is the creation of a conception of things as not contained in known conceptions.

Its Powers.—We cannot obtain knowledge by it.

Definition.—An act of Reasoning, on the contrary, is the creation of a conception of things as unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions.

Its Powers.—We can obtain knowledge by it.

* It is, however, very doubtful how far the imagination really possesses the power of purely self-originating the materials of its conceptions, although it certainly possesses vast powers of modifying and combining the materials that have entered it from experience.

Known and unknown conceptions may alike suggest or furnish materials out of which it may create its conception; but if it should modify its conception in accordance with known conceptions, it would become Reasoning; if it moulds its conception in accordance with unknown conceptions, or otherwise, it remains Imagination. It is an act of imagination in whatever way the conception may be inceptively originated, provided it be not created as contained in known conceptions—in other words, if it be not created as in Reasoning.

To make clear the fact that we obtain knowledge by reasoning, we have only to show that by reasoning a correct conception is created with assurance that it is correct. It is evident that if the known conceptions, from which the new conception is formed, be separately correct, the conception formed as unitedly contained in them must be correct; and as we are assured that everything in the original conceptions is correct, we are assured that everything in the conceptions exactly formed in accordance with them is correct. Thus, in reasoning, not only is a correct conception formed of a thing, but also assurance that it is correct; and these are what constitute knowledge.

Here perhaps it is scarcely necessary to reiterate the fact, as noted before, that a conception can never really be created (or new) as contained in only one original conception, as it would be simply a reproduction; also, the same thing may be said of it if created as separately contained in two or more known original conceptions; because this also would be a mere reproduction of the separate original conceptions. To be a new conception at all, it must be created as unitedly contained in two or more original conceptions. The conception, then, has originality of its own.

As some examples now of reasoning, let us adduce the following:—

Thus, I remember (1) that this British pensioner served at the battle of Waterloo; and (2) that Wellington was the British commanding general at Waterloo. Then forming a conception of this soldier's relation to Wellington, as contained in these two remembrances or facts, I conceive and know that this pensioner has served under Wellington.

Again, I remember (1) that I gave John twenty-one shillings for a hat; and (2) that twenty-one shillings are a guinea. I then conceive that the hat cost a guinea; and from this, and the remembrance that Somerville's hat cost the same price as my own, I conceive and know that Somerville's hat cost a guinea.

In cases like these, I first conceive from two known conceptions, and then from the newly created conception, and the other known conceptions, one at a time, continue to conceive till I know all that is wanted.

Instead, however, of comparing only two conceptions at a time, we may compare three or four, when the original conceptions are simple enough to permit our creating a conception from all at once. Thus (1) this animal chews the cud; (2) it has cloven hoofs; (3) an animal having both these characteristics was accounted clean by the Jewish law: therefore, this animal is clean according to Jewish law.

We need care no more for putting our conceptions in syllogistic form than is conformable to sound philosophic principles.

Reasoning and perception are often so intimately mixed up together in the acquisition of knowledge that it requires close watching to mark the part each performs in the process; and this, too, may be the case in perception by the senses. Thus, for example:—

I see a round objective appearance before my face.

1. Fact known by perception I know then that this appearance exists.

I touch it with my fingers and get the sensation of resistance.

2. Fact known by perception I know then that this appearance gives the touch of resistance.

3. Fact known in memory I remember that whatever exists and gives the touch of resistance is material.

Therefore by creating a conception as unitedly contained in these three facts—

4. Fact obtained by reasoning from the other three. I conceive and know that this appearance is material.

1. Fact known by perception I perceived in my first look at it, that it was round and before my face.

5. Fact obtained by reasoning from 1 and 4. Therefore this material is round and before my face.

6. Fact obtained by perception I put my fingers to it again, and get the sensation of hardness and sphericity (I can take the latter, however, with the educated eye).

7. Fact obtained by reasoning from 5 and 6. Therefore this material before my face is a round, hard ball.

8. Fact obtained by perception I split it into two and perceive by either sight or touch that it is hollow.

9. Fact obtained by reasoning from 7 and 8. Therefore the known conception obtained by all this process is that this material before my face is a round, hard, hollow ball.

This process, however, is facilitated as our perceptive faculties become more educated and acquired; and experience is ever at hand to correct our mistakes.

It is evident, then, that all knowledge must be obtained by either perception or reasoning, and from no other sources. Then, as all knowledge obtained by reasoning is derived from known conceptions or facts already existing in the mind, the primary source of all knowledge is pure perception, either external or internal. The only alternative then of acquiring knowledge, is to be able either to actually perceive the object itself or to evolve the fact inceptively from the known conceptions containing it already existing in the mind—that is, by reasoning.

The various processes of perception and reasoning are so fully set forth in the subsequent part of this book, that it is needless here to enlarge more on the subject, except to point out some differences in our views from those of others who have written on the same subject.

Some maintain, for example, that the fact that two straight lines cannot enclose space, is obtained in the absence of actual visual perception by an act of primary judgment. We assert, on the contrary, that we obtain it by an act of reasoning. We take (1) the conception of one straight line; and (2) the conception of another straight line, and putting them mentally in all possible relations to one another, inceive (3) in conclusion, that two straight lines cannot enclose space. We regard, then, what is called an act of judgment to be merely an act of reasoning, except in those cases where the term judgment is misapplied to what is properly a perception.

Mansel holds that conception (what we call inception or knowledge by reasoning), apart from perception, is possible only under the form of symbolical or verbal representation; that is, we cannot reason from purely ideal conceptions unrepresented by words, etc.

This we hold to be altogether incorrect. It is the purely ideal conception that keeps the representative words right, and not the representative words that keep the pure conception right. The mind always looks beyond the words to the idea or conception itself, else the garbage of words would continually lead astray. As illustrative of this, mark the following. The sun gives light; feathers are light: therefore the sun gives feathers.

Some philosophers insist that knowledge is possible only by relativity or comparison—that is, in order to know an object you must know it in relation or in comparison with other objects. We do not admit this, without some qualification, to be true. We affirm that a thing may be known both in and by itself, and also in relation or in comparison with others. They are two different kinds of knowledge; the first kind simple and confined to the object alone which we wish to know; the second, mutual and extending to the object with which it is to be compared. In regard to knowledge generally, if we know a thing itself, we need to know none of its surroundings. The surroundings are no part of the thing itself, but only its associated phenomena; and therefore the knowledge of its surroundings is no part of the knowledge of the thing.

If we wish, however, to know a thing in the relation of comparison with others, the knowledge which we acquire in this way is more definite only in the sense of mutual relation to the thing compared with it—not more definite in the sense of real absolute knowledge than that which we obtain of a thing independently of all comparison with other things.

That we can definitely know a thing without comparison with others at all is evident from the fact that in all comparison, two things being thought of, the mind has first to possess a known conception of each before it can mentally actually compare. The objects, or points in them, must first be perceived and known before they can be placed alongside one another in the mind in the act of comparison. Real actual knowledge of the objects must therefore exist in the mind before comparison is possible; and the knowledge arising from comparison differs in its character from the former only in being that of mutual comparative relation. It is in no sense more real.

Subjective Sensation, or Feeling; in other words, Subjective Senses, or Feelings.

We have already spoken freely of the nature of objective physical sensation—that particular mental affection due to the nervous organization in connection with the five senses: sight, touch, etc.—by which presentations of outward things flash up objectively in and before the mind as things to be perceived, but not as affecting the internal state of the mind or of the perceiving subject itself. We have also briefly referred to another kind of sensation, called subjective physical sensation, which is absolutely distinct from objective physical sensation, being felt or perceived as a state of the perceiving mind itself, and not as a mere picture or presentation exterior to it. This latter kind of sensation is but a branch of that kind of sensation of which we now intend mainly to speak, and which may in a general manner be called subjective sensation or feeling, because it is always perceived as a state of the perceiving subject itself. Subjective physical sensation, therefore, is but one class of the subjective senses or feelings, differing from the other classes chiefly in having a physical source.

We all know that when we receive a perception (here remember that perception is always equivalent to knowledge, because it produces it) of cold or heat by touch, or of hunger or thirst by appetite, it produces a sensation of pain or pleasure, of attraction or repulsion, in the mind producing it. In like manner the perception of an object in threatening relations, or of horror, in the mind perceiving it. Take, for example, the perception of heat by touch. The heat as objectively perceived produces a peculiar sensation of pain or repulsion in the subjective state of the mind produced by the perception of the heat. The objective heat is not perceived disjunctively from the subjective pain which it produces in the perceiver; but the two come wrapt together in one perception; the heat, as objectively perceived, being swathed in the subjective sensation produced by it, and the mind at the same moment distinctly perceiving the outside heat as contradistinguished from its own subjective sensation or state.

Again, in looking at a beautiful sunset, its perception arouses in the mind, subjectively, the sense of beauty or admiration. The skies as perceived by us are just a mere bed of colour, a compound of its seven elements, easily analyzed by the physicist; but they are of that really inherent in them, but because they are just such in their character that they arouse the subjective sense of beauty or admiration in our minds at the moment of perception. At the moment of perception the whole sky lies steeped in the sentiments produced by it in the mind—both the sky and the sentiments being perceived together, and yet the outside picture and the inside sentiments being perfectly distinguishable from one another.

Take also the case of a beautiful landscape. Here the mind, looking beyond the mere sense presentation by which the landscape reveals itself, forms perceptively or inceptively its conception. The contour of the hills, the sweep of the valleys, the other natural adornments of wood and water, are of that peculiar character that, just at the moment in which the conception of the whole is forming, it swathes itself in the subjective sense of beauty, which it is its peculiarity to arouse in the mind. We call landscapes of that character or harmony of parts, beautiful, because the conceptions they create in the mind stimulate the sense of the beautiful.

It is in the preceding manner also that the perception or inception of a desirable object may awaken love, esteem, or the desire of possession. The object has such qualities that the perception of them arouses subjectively in the mind of the perceiver the desire of acquisition; and in order to perceive our own subjective state, we must at the same moment perceive the outward object that excites it. We thus can never perceive the subjective sense alone. The exciting object is thus like the light, that warms while it illuminates the hand.

So also in the perception of an act of injustice or of goodness; a sense, condemnatory in the one case and approbative in the other, springs up subjectively in the mind in the instant of the perceptive act. We cannot help ourselves; it is in the nature of our constitution that these subjective senses or feelings do arise in the objective perception or inception of things.

These illustrations need not be multiplied at present, as it may be necessary to illustrate more minutely as we go along. There is certainly considerable difference in the character of the various subjective senses or feelings, but these will be more minutely distinguished afterwards.

There are only two ways in which the subjective senses or feelings can be aroused or excited: either (1) by the creation (by perception or inception) of a conception which excites them; or (2) by the remembrance of an exciting conception already in the mind.

The first way may perhaps be reckoned the chief one, as it is by perception or inception that all conceptions are originated and brought before the mind for the first time, and as the conception at its first formation, being entirely new, possesses a greater exciting power over the subjective senses.

The remembrance of an exciting conception will, however, at any time arouse a subjective sense or feeling afresh, and sometimes one entirely new—as, for instance, the recollection of some of our early days often arouses a desire to revisit the scenes of youth.

There are only two ways in which we can become conscious of a subjective sense or feeling: (1) *At its birth*, we can be conscious of it only by remembrance; it comes up in remembrance as connected with that which caused it—as, for example, the recollection of a pain once experienced but not now felt.

(2) *If a subjective sense or feeling is in present exercise*, we can be conscious of it only by perception; the mind immediately perceives its own subjective state in connection with the exciting conception.

We can never be conscious of a subjective sense by inception—that is, we can never know how we feel by reasoning.

As the subjective sense always swatches, at the time, the conception which excites it, it often happens that the conception is remembered and the subjective sense perceived at the same moment. This occurs when a conception is remembered which excites present feeling; thus, the recollection of a past danger may fill me with present horror. Here I remember the past danger with a present perception of my present subjective sense of horror. The remembered conception is swathed in the present subjective feeling, of which I am presently perceptively conscious.

In the same way, enjoyable recollections of the past may fill the mind with present pleasurable subjective senses or feelings. Indeed, much happiness comes to us in this way.

It is scarcely necessary to add here, after what has been said, that when a conception which excites is created by inception, we become conscious of the subjective sense only by perception. In this one respect inception is parallel to memory.

Definition.—A Subjective Sense or Feeling may then be generally defined as that peculiar subjective sensory or emotive state of the mind produced by the perception, inception, or memory, of particular objects, and is always perceived coexistently with the conception of these objects.

The mind possesses as full power to perceive its own states as that which may be presented to it by the five senses. The perception by the mind of its own subjective states is, however, often described as an act of feeling—thus, we feel pain, or a desire to possess, etc. In all cases, perception is knowledge, whether we indicate it by its own or by a different name.

The difference between perception and subjective sense or feeling is very great. You can perceive a sense or feeling, but you cannot feel a perception. The one is an act of the mind, but the other is a subjective state of the mind. Every feeling comes into the consciousness by the door of perception, and the perception photographs it in a conception on the memory. A perception takes notice of everything, and notes it down. A sense starts up on the knowledge or perception of certain facts, but takes no note or record of anything by its own inherent power. It passes away, leaving nothing behind, were it not that the perception has taken notice of it and kept traces of it. Subjective sense is just, in fact, a peculiar sensory or emotional stir of the mind, but entirely destitute of conception or cognitive power. Perception or inception, on the other hand, is pure conceptive or cognitive power, without the least emotional stir or feeling. All subjective senses arise on perception, inception, or knowledge, and are themselves perceived and known.

Man is a creature of intellect, feeling or heart, and volition.

Perception, inception, or knowledge, is just the function of the intellect alone, and is pure conceptive or cognitive power utterly destitute of any principle or spring of action that would make a man good or bad, righteous or unjust, diligent or busy, energetic or feeble, brave or timid.*

Man, merely as a knowing or intellectual creature, neither loves nor hates, approves nor disapproves, desires nor dislikes, admires nor despises, acquits nor condemns, chooses nor rejects, is happy nor is unhappy. But though the intellect, through its perceptive, inceptive, or memory faculties, cannot give man these qualities, it renders all-important aid in shewing objects that call these qualities or subjective feelings into action, and also in making known ways and means by which these objects may be obtained or these feelings gratified.

The intellect, or perceptive powers, for example, by their own inherent power, give us a knowledge of love, approbation or disapproval, right or wrong, etc., when these senses are in operation. These subjective senses or feelings arise of themselves on the perception or inception of things calculated to excite them; and it is only on their being excited that they become objects of perception or knowledge.

By subjective sense alone a man is able to approve or disapprove, acquit or condemn. Without it, he can never, from his own experience (or that of another), know either good or evil, right or injustice. He may form some general idea about them from the general parlance of language, but he can never know them as real subjective senses or feelings.

In contradistinction to the intellectual or cognitive elements of our nature, the subjective feelings may be described generally as the appreciative, estimative, or dictatorial elements of our nature. They set a certain estimation or moral valuation on everything presented to them in cognition, and dictate in relation to it. If the feelings, for instance, are purely moral, their valuation

* We do not forget that subjective sense, as shown elsewhere, is an element of perception or knowledge, as well as of the heart, conscience, volition, etc.; for instance, assurance is a subjective sense of knowledge. But in the above general conception there is no need to take notice of the fact, as we wish to call attention to the marked difference between the feeling functions of the mind and that of intellect.

is the moral character of it. The valuation comes in the form of sense or feeling, and makes itself distinct in the consciousness in the moment of cognition. The eye of an animal may take in all the elements of a landscape, or of an outward act, that the eye of a man can take; but the reason why moral and aesthetic distinctions are perceived in the one case and not in the other is, that man alone is endowed with the subjective senses or feelings that make a moral and aesthetic discrimination. In the mind of man there arises subjectively in the moment of perception or knowledge, a sense (as the case may be) either condemnatory or of beauty, the objective act or thing being swathed in the subjective sense, as perceived together; and we say that we feel that such a thing is wrong, or (as the case may be) that it is beautiful; because to feel a sense is but another way of saying that we perceive a sense. The outward act or thing looked at in its own bare physical elements, presents nothing either moral or aesthetic. It is only when the mind looks at it in the light of its own subjective moral or aesthetic powers, that the moral or aesthetic value of the thing is perceived.

Synoptical Sketch of the Subjective Senses or Feelings.

1. A popular method of dividing man's rational nature is to distinguish his cognitive or perceptive nature as the "Head," and his moral or emotional nature as the "Heart" and "Will."

2. The subjective senses or feelings are divisible into two great classes. (1) The subjective senses or sensations arising from a physical source, which are produced in the perceptive mind, in virtue of its connection with the nervous organization, as pain, hunger, thirst, etc. (2) Those subjective senses or feelings which arise in the perceptive mind from its own essential character, independent of mere physical causes.

The first great class, which was referred to in an early part of this work, and there called Subjective Physical Sensations or Senses, to distinguish them from objective physical sensations, may be divided into two kinds: (1) those arising in connection with the five senses, as the pain of heat, cold, etc.; and (2) those of appetite—hunger, thirst, sexual connection, etc.

The second great class of subjective senses, or feelings, also distinguished as moral, are divisible into five classes: (1) Those of Taste, or the aesthetic—as beauty, harmony, etc.; those of the "Heart," or "disposition"—those emotional propensities or affections which stimulate or seek gratification, attract or repel us, in all our social or moral relations—as love, hatred, grief, sorrow, etc. (observe that the word "Heart" has also a wide meaning in the following Table); (3) those of the Conscience, or of Rectoral Obligation, which seek pacification—as, for instance, a sense of condemnation or acquittal, of approbation or disapproval; (4) those of the Will—as, consent, indecision, etc.; (5) those also of Cognition or Knowledge—as, doubt or assurance.

POPULAR DISTINCTION.		HEART.		WILL.		HEAD.	
Animal.		Emotional.		Volitional.		Cognitive.	
Subjective feelings from a physical source.		Subjective feelings, moral, or from a mental or internal source.				Divisible into.	
1	2	1	2	3	4	5	
Sense feelings.	Appetite feelings.	Taste aesthetic feelings.	Heart propensities or affections.	Conscience or of rectoral obligation.	Will of consent, indecision, etc., etc.	Assurance or doubt.	Conception.

NOTE.—Subjective energy, the other element of will, is omitted from the above Table for convenience.

Though all subjective senses or feelings agree in being states of the mind, they differ considerably in their nature. Those arising from a physical source, we have in common with the brutes. Those of the will and intellect, partake of little or no emotion, have no pain or pleasure, desire or aversion.

Those of Conscience differ from the other emotive feelings in the nature of their promptings: thus, instead of strong desire or aversion, they have a strong sense of "oughtness," of positive or negative obligation. They are in all respects as real as those of desire or aversion, but their function is to point out our duty—not what we would like or dislike. They are the true rectoral part of our nature, and alone ought to be our moral guide. The subjective senses of the heart are attended with most emotion, with greatest desire or aversion, and exercise most influence over the will in our present depraved state. Those of Taste have less

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HEAD.
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of their prompt- "oughtness," of desire or aversion, e. They are the The subjective or aversion, and Taste have less

of the social relation in their production, are attended generally with less emotion, desire, or aversion, than those of the heart, and depend a good deal on the outward physical senses for their excitement or gratification.

All subjective senses or feelings may be classified as Permanent, Periodical, or Occasional.

The Periodical, or Occasional, subjective senses or feelings pass through three stages:— (1) a stage of excitement; (2) a stage of activity; and (3) a stage of subsidence or abatement.

Permanent subjective senses may also be said to possess, in a general way, these three stages; but, being generally in a state of activity, their excitement is less special, and their abatement only partial.

The Excitement of Subjective Senses or Feelings.

We have already spoken freely of the manner in which subjective senses or feelings are produced, by the perception or knowledge of an exciting object. We now call attention to the fact that every exciting object must possess suitable character or relations in order to excite its appropriate feelings. Thus, an object must be of repulsive character to awaken a feeling of repulsion; it must be amiable to awaken love; or, in order to awaken fear, it must be an object in threatening relations.

The exciting or outside object may be either a person or thing; and the relation between it and the sensitive and internal mind is always exact and corresponsive.

It is scarcely necessary to reiterate the fact that it is generally by knowledge (that is, by perception, reasoning, or even memory) of the exciting object that subjective sense or feeling is produced. It is necessary to add, however, that some subjective senses may be excited to a certain extent by a conception vividly imagined (see definition of Imagination) without the assurance with it that constitutes actual knowledge. Thus, I may be able, by the faculty of imagination, to form a conception of colours or forms in my own mind, without the assurance that it represents a fact, which nevertheless excites in me the emotion of beauty.

The chief class of subjective senses, excited in this way, are the æsthetic; we may add, however, that other subjective senses are often excited to a limited extent, by the conceptions of imagination.

Subjective Senses in a State of Activity.

Subjective senses in a state of activity may generally be characterised as partaking of more or less emotion, as attended with pain or pleasure, desire or aversion, impulse of positive or negative obligation, and as benevolent or malevolent in their bearing upon other persons.

Some subjective senses are also, in their very nature, the opposite of certain others; as, fear the opposite of courage, pride the opposite of humility.

Certain subjective senses or feelings, in a state of activity, have a tendency to associate with, or to produce excitement in other feelings. Anger, for example, is associated thus with revenge.

All subjective senses may be moderated or increased, while in a state of excitement, by the withdrawal or repetition of the exciting cause, or by the excitement of diverse interest, through another feeling. It is impossible to keep several diverse feelings in a state of excitement.

All subjective senses or feelings, in a state of activity, are either of the nature of impulses, or they are neutral; that is, they either impel us to put the object of exciting character or relation into that of gratifying character or relation (or to keep it so, if in such already), or they do not.

The impulsive subjective senses or feelings are,

- (1) Those of mere pain or pleasure,
- (2) Those of desire or aversion,
- (3) Those (= "ought" or "ought not") of positive or negative obligation. These all exercise an influence over the will and prompt to volition. Pain and aversion usually go together.

In subjective senses of mere pain, the impulse is to seek abatement, by changing the object of exciting character or relation into that of non-exciting character or relation.

In those of mere pleasure, the impulse is to seek continuance or increase, by maintaining the object in its exciting character or relation.

The subjective senses of desire seek gratification in either one of two ways: (1) When the character or relations which excite the subjective sense, are also those which gratify it, it seeks gratification in that way; we may call this, for want of a better name, "Direct gratification." (2) But if the exciting character or relations are different from those that gratify it, it seeks, of course, gratification in the latter way; we call this "Responsive gratification." Thus, as

illustrative of these two modes of gratification, an object of such character or relation as excites the subjective sense of admiration, may be also of such character or relation as gratifies it. This is a case of Direct gratification.

But a person may present himself in such character or relations as excite my gratitude. Then my gratitude seeks gratification by putting him in the place of the receiver, and myself in the place of the giver; that is, I put him in a different character or relation, in order to gratify my sense of gratitude. This is a case of Responsive gratification.

Subjective feelings of aversion seek gratification also in either of these two ways; for feelings of aversion may be gratified as well as those of desire, though the two are different in their nature; thus, hate, a feeling of aversion, seeks gratification in acts of malice.

It is well, however, to note that nearly all feelings of aversion are gratified responsively. Subjective senses of positive or negative obligation (=ought or ought not), are each of them pacified in one or other of these two ways, namely, directly or responsively. The latter form however, prevails; thus, the knowledge of the character or relations of my brother, may excite in me the subjective feeling, that I ought to help him; that is, that I ought to put him in different character or relations. The impulse, in this case, seeks gratification responsively.

All subjective senses of positive or negative obligation, not only seek pacification either directly or responsively, but they have two modes of doing even this. A subjective sense of obligation prompts me to do direct duty; but if I have failed in doing so, it prompts me to compensate for the neglect of it. From this it follows, that when a subjective sense of obligation cannot obtain pacification either directly or responsively in the character or relation of simple or direct duty, it will seek it responsively in the character or relation of compensative duty. Thus, the knowledge of the relation which a person sustains to me, excites in me the sense or impulse of obligation to help him. My subjective impulse seeks pacification responsively in direct duty. But if I have failed to assist him, it seeks pacification responsively, by prompting me to make him reparation for my injury; that is, it seeks pacification in compensative duty.

It is well to note here, in connection with the gratification or pacification of subjective senses, that not only is knowledge (that is, perception or reasoning) necessary to excite the senses, but it is also necessary to point out or devise means of gratifying or pacifying them. It shows to the mind certain methods of character or relation, by which the sense may be gratified or pacified.

Imagination (see definition), while helpful, by its suggestive function, to perception or reasoning in doing the above, may also by its own power present to the mind characters or relations that may stimulate the impulse or desire; but it wants the certainty or assurance of knowledge, that is needed to satisfy it. The aesthetic feelings, however, spoken of before, and some others, may be regarded as exceptions.

We would also note that the excitement and gratification of a subjective sense, may often be simultaneous, as in the case of a sudden and unexpected vision of a beautiful landscape. It excites and gratifies at the same moment.

Abatement or Subsidence of the Subjective Senses.

All subjective senses or feelings abate or subside on gratification or pacification, except the permanent ones, which still remain active. A feeling, abated on gratification or pacification, is said to be appeased.

The only other method of abatement or subsidence, is the removal of the exciting cause.

We shall now, in the same order as presented in the Table, proceed to discuss with more care, and at greater length, the various classes of the subjective senses of the human mind.

Subjective Senses or Feelings arising from a Physical Source.

This class of subjective senses were first introduced in connection with objective physical sensation (that by the five senses), and have been so frequently referred to since, that it seems unnecessary to occupy much space with their further illustration.

All subjective senses of this order owe their existence to the connection between the nervous organization and the mind. Destroy the appropriate or corresponding nerve, and the sense ceases. If the nerve of touch is destroyed, neither the objective sense of heat, nor the subjective sense of pain which it produces, is felt. Remove the nerve line connecting with the organs of appetite, and the subjective senses of hunger, thirst, sexual connection, forever cease to disturb or give pleasure.

But though this class of subjective feelings arise all alike from the nerves of sensation distributed over the body, there is a difference in the nature of the feelings themselves. We may divide them, (1) into the occasional, those arising from the nerves of sight, hearing,

smell, taste, touch and feeling; as, for instance, pain, fatigue, etc.; (2) the periodical, those arising from the nerves specially representative of hunger, thirst, appetite of sex, etc.

The class arising on the objective presentation of the five senses have no regular periods of occurrence, and are properly called occasional; thus neither the pain of headache, nor the pleasurable sense of warmth in touch, is permanent or periodical, but occurs only on the occasional stimulative presentations of the appropriate nerves.

The other class, arising on the objective presentation of the appropriate nerves of hunger, thirst, etc., are periodical; because, in order to the preservation of being or species, the wants they represent must be periodically supplied.

The mind has no difficulty in distinguishing the purely subjective sense apart from the objective presentation which produces it. Both the objective presentation outward, and the subjective sense inward, are perceived at the same moment together and yet distinct, as has already been frequently shown; the subjective sense being nothing actually in outward nature, but only appetital appreciation of what is presented to it through the nervous organization.

There must be a fitness, however, in the means and in outward things, for producing this effect.

The object attained by the Creator in this adaptation in the case referred to here, is abundantly manifest.

Nor seems it else than barely necessary to reiterate here, the fact so often insisted on heretofore, that the objective physical senses, creative of the subjective sense or feeling, never lead astray, unless when we assume more than they teach. The occasional subjective senses, arising from a physical source, are mainly those of pain or pleasure; the periodical, chiefly of desire or aversion. They are all usually excited by perception, and subside by gratification or removal of the exciting cause.

All subjective senses of this class are lawful, so long as they continue subordinate to the subjective senses of conscience.

We subjoin a few subjective senses of each class.

Periodical.—The feelings in hunger, thirst, drowsiness, etc.

Occasional.—The feelings in headache, weariness, gripes, itchiness, numbness, heat, sweetness, bitterness, fragrance, stink, musical softness, sonorous harshness, etc.

Subjective Senses of the Second Division.

I. *Those of Taste.*—This class of feelings may be said to occupy, to a certain extent, a place between the purely moral senses and those subjectively arising from a physical source. They are generally excited or gratified on perception or knowledge of real facts or things, like other subjective senses; though they are much less dependent in this respect than other classes, being almost the only kind, which fictitious conceptions created by the imagination (see definition) can excite or gratify. The pleasurable order of this class are sometimes called the pleasures of the imagination. They are preeminently the subjective senses of the poet, novelist, etc.; and their full development through a well-trained imagination, is often a source of great pleasure.

When a person, capable of having the æsthetic senses excited, looks at a beautiful object, the object stands before his mind swathed in the subjective sense which its perception produces, namely, beauty. In like manner, the notes of a melody are always heard by the keen æsthetic ear, commingled with the responsive strains of the Æolian harp within. The notes strike the ear, but the melody in which they float throbs from the responsive mind itself. The objective, or outside note, is of such excellent character that it arouses the subjective appreciative sense of enjoyment. So also, when objects presented to the mind are of a nature entirely different or non-attractive, the swathing subjective senses excited by them in the appreciative mind is correspondingly disagreeable. The outside object is of such a character that it arouses the appreciative subjective sense of the derelish of deformity, etc.

In every perception, in which the subjective sense is aroused, there are just two elements blended together, and yet distinct: (1) the objective presentation which arouses the subjective feeling, and (2) the subjective feeling itself. Beauty, for example, in the outward object, is just a peculiar arrangement of forms and colours, consisting merely of certain physical elements. Beauty, in the subjective sense, is that enswathment of feeling which renders the perception of the object pleasing.

The perception of the mere outside object is just a mere cold intellectual conception or vision of colours, black, red and green, or of forms; a body without a spirit. Beauty, in the subjective sense, is not seen in the outside picture at all. It is only when the subjective feeling is aroused, and the outward object is seen through its enswathment, that beauty in the strict sense is perceived, and its keen appreciative enjoyment felt.

The scientist can analyze all the colours and elements that enter into the outside picture.

Looking at it with the sense not excited, you see only certain plain shapes and colours; but looking at it with the subjective sense excited, you just see the same forms and colours, but bathed in all the harmony of excited sense. This harmony or subjective sense is nothing tangible or inherent in the object itself, but æsthetic and native to the mind.

All we can say here, in regard to these truths, is just that God has wisely constituted the human mind with these appreciative subjective senses, and has formed outward objects either so excellently or otherwise, as just to excite, or attract, or repel these appreciative feelings.

From this fact, then, it follows, that a man devoid, for example, of the appreciative sense of beauty, can never see beauty; though he may see all the outward forms and colours, which should arouse it where it exists. To such a person, beauty would only be a suitable word, learned from others, to portray the peculiarities of nature, as green, red, yellow, etc., do in a cold intellectual description.

By this power of the subjective senses to appreciate the order or arrangement of things outside of us, we come to apply the quality of the subjective sense itself to the outside object, and thus speak of objects as pleasant, beautiful, or ugly; all because the one thing excites the subjective sense of appreciative enjoyment, and the other the subjective derelish or ugliness.

That there is a peculiar excellence in the outside thing which excites the corresponding appreciative feeling, is at the same time not to be forgotten.

Every person, familiar with the operations of his own mind, must have marked the power which even the imagination (see definition) has of exciting subjective senses of this kind. The dreamy, and at the same time, fictitious conceptions of the poet as well as the novelist, excite many pleasing senses of this class. To know the fact, one has but to watch the play of his own imagination.

By this active play of the fancy, we can form conceptions of scenes of grandeur or sublimity, or of witty or ludicrous combinations, which, though they have no reality in nature, yet excite and please us. It is observable, however, that in order to excite this class of feelings in this way, the merely imaginative must at least be connected with the possibility of the conception being either real, or made real, in experience. The fictitious conception used as an excitant, must always be compounded with, or rest on a solid substratum of the known. The pictures of Shakespeare and Scott derive enormous power from their historical character; and the knowledge, that an imaginative conception is realizable in no stage of existence, generally at once kills its power of exciting the æsthetic feelings.

Subjective Feelings of this Class are Occasional in their Occurrence.

In a state of activity, some of them are attended with considerable emotion; as, for instance, music or harmony. They are not characterized by strong desire or aversion; the exciting objects being generally things rather than persons. Desire or aversion is usually strongest when the excitant is a person, as in subjective senses of the "heart." The feelings of taste are more strictly those of pain or pleasure, than of desire or aversion. Their impulse is neither strongly benevolent nor malevolent in its bearings on persons. They are usually pure in their moral quality, and in harmony with the subjective feelings of conscience.

Feelings of this class are not unseldom excited and appeased simultaneously; as, for instance, the melody of song may excite and gratify at the same moment. They appease usually as feelings of mere pain or pleasure; the pleasurable do so directly, in the continuance of the exciting object in exciting character or relations; and the disagreeable do so responsively, by its change into non-exciting character or relations.

Note here, that when we use the word "gratified," we mean that the impulse or feeling may be gratified, but not abated; but when we apply the word "appease," we mean that the impulse is both gratified and abated.

The Table (see Table A, pages 20 and 21) contains but a very few of the subjective feelings of taste, thus affording only a specimen, rather than an exhaustive comparison.

We find also that feelings of an entirely different class are sometimes associated, in activity, with the æsthetic.

If there is a general accuracy in the Table, we do not aim at perfectness.

Subjective Feelings of the "Heart."

The subjective feelings of the "Heart" concern themselves more with our social relations than the æsthetic, and are excited by persons rather than things. They are very strongly emotive, and are usually attended with strong desire or aversion. Most of them are either benevolent or malevolent in their bearing on other persons; and their impulses are usually

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less subservient to the rectoral or subjective feelings of conscience. For these reasons they partake strongly of moral quality. They are excited mostly by the actual knowledge of facts or things, and deal in real verities, rather than mere whimsies of the imagination.

The æsthetic feelings are, as a rule, active only in cultivated minds. The subjective feelings of the Heart are alike strong in both educated and uneducated minds; and, as they concern themselves mainly with our social relations, they constitute, next to those of the conscience, the main sources of human happiness. Their impulses, in our depraved state, very frequently overmaster the subjective feelings of the conscience in their influence on the Will. Had man remained in an unfallen state, it might have been said, "that he that had the conscience had the will." In our present depraved state, "he that has the heart has the will." It is only Divine grace that gives the feelings of the conscience their legitimate mastery in man's nature.

Means Whereby the Subjective Feelings of the "Heart" are excited.

We have already remarked, that every conception contains one or more objects or persons presented in a certain character or relation. The object in this character or relation may be capable of exciting the subjective senses, or it may not. There are comparatively few cases, however, in which it does not excite subjective senses of some kind, which in their turn act powerfully upon the will; and thus they constitute motives or springs of action.

Now, I am so constituted, that when I am brought into personal contact with another person of amiable qualities, it follows, of course, that I perceive or obtain knowledge of this person and his lovable traits of character, which arouse in me the subjective sense of love or friendship. This person is then to my subjective feeling an object of exciting character. It was the knowledge of him in this character, that excited my feeling; and in every act of perception, inception or memory, this person, in this character, stands before my mind, swathed at the same moment with the subjective feeling which the knowledge of him has created.

But objects may excite, not only by their character, but also by their relation. For instance, if I come to know that this person rejects my overtures of friendship with contempt, the knowledge of this fact immediately arouses within me the subjective feeling of indignation; so that at that moment, and even afterwards, while the feeling lasts, whenever he comes cognitively or conceptively before my mind, he stands swathed in the subjective feeling which the knowledge of his attitude or relation towards me has created.

This is a case, in which the object is of exciting relation, rather than of exciting character. It should always be borne in mind, that in strict language, it is not the object alone that excites, but the object in that character or relation; that is, it is the whole conception, not a mere part of it.

Most of the subjective feelings are excited by a single act of knowledge or perception; as, anger, etc. Some, however, of less excitable nature, may require stimulation by repeated acts of perception or knowledge, to fully arouse them, as the feeling of love or friendship, etc. The mind thus acquires familiar or more perfect knowledge of them. In every act of perception, in which the object in exciting character or relation is fully presented to the mind, the whole conception is bathed in all the subjective feeling which it is capable of awakening in that mind. This characteristic of the subjective senses has been so frequently pointed out, that it seems almost unnecessary to reiterate it here.

We need hardly say here, what must be evident to all, that so long as the feeling lasts, the re-perception or remembrance of the exciting conception, always brings it before the mind, flooded by the sentiment which it has aroused.

The highwayman presents himself to the wayfarer, and demands his purse or his life. The knowledge of himself in immediate danger of death, may arouse in the mind of the wayfarer the subjective feeling of fear. In this case, then, the thought of himself in danger of immediate death, is the exciting conception; and the moment it presents itself as a reality to his mind, it ensathes itself with the feeling which it has kindled. The knowledge of the highwayman's act, leads the wayfarer to know, by inception, that he himself is in dangerous relations, which is the true excitant.

In the incident above referred to, however, the wayfarer may have feelings of a different sort. The highwayman, in this offensive relation, may excite in his mind the subjective feeling of combativeness or anger; and his perceptive mind will look at the outside highwayman in this offensive relation, through the halo of subjective feeling which ensathes the robber from the mind itself. Both the robber and the feeling are distinctly perceived, but the one as something outside the mind, the other as a state of the mind itself. We do not perceive the subjective feeling in the outward objective presentation; but the mind, perceptive of its own subjective state, looks at the outward objective presentation.

TABLE A.—SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF A FEW OF THE SUBJECTIVE

	BEAUTY.	HARMONY.	ADMIRATION.
CHARACTER OF FEELINGS AS EXCITED.			
Permanent or Occasional....	Occasional.....	Occasional.....	Occasional.....
In nature the opposite of....	Ugliness.....	Discordance.....
Of Desire or Aversion.....	Desire.....	Desire.....	Desire.....
Pleasant, painful or indif- ferent.	Pleasant.....	Pleasant.....	Pleasant.....
Emotion, strong or weak....	Moderate.....	Strong.....	Often strong.....
Desire or Aversion, ener- getic or feeble.	Desire moderate.....	Desire often energetic.	Desire moderate.....
Benevolent or Malevolent in its desire or impulse.	Leaning to Benevo- lence.	Leaning to Benevo- lence.	Leaning to Benevo- lence.....
Associated in activity with what other feelings?	Admiration, Love, Es- teem.	Admiration, Love, all the tender.	Esteem, Love, Beauty.
Renders what other feelings sensitive or excitable?	Towards a person, Love, Esteem, Ad- miration.	All the tender feelings.	Towards a person, Love, Esteem, etc.
Made sensitive itself by what other feelings?	By Beauty, Harmony, etc.
HOW EXCITED.			
How aroused or excited by objects of character or relation?	By objects, in charac- ter of natural or moral beauty.	By sounds, etc., in character of melody.	By presentations, in character of excel- lence.
Is excitant or object a per- son or thing?	Either.....	Sounds or things usu- ally.	Either.....
HOW MODIFIED.			
Will the imagination of ob- ject in exciting character or relations excite it, or needs it the presentation of actual facts?	Imagination will a lit- tle; presentations of actual fact most.	Actual presentation most; imagination a little.	Actual presentation, most; imagination a little.
How modified while in a state of activity?	Increased by contrast, decreased by with- drawal of excitant.	Modified by contrast, etc.	Modified by contrast, repetition or with- drawal.
Is the exciting character or relation of the object the same as the gratifying or different?	The same.....	The same.....	The same.....
HOW GRATIFIED.			
How many ways of gratifi- cation? What are they —direct, responsive, or both?	One; direct gratifica- tion.	One; direct gratifica- tion.	One; direct gratifica- tion.
Is it gratified to appease- ment or still active?	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.....
QUALITY.			
POWER.			
Power of impulse as a mo- tive on the Will.	Moderate.....	Often strong.....	Moderate.....
MORAL QUALITY.	Pure.....	Pure.....	Pure.....

OF THE SUBJECTIVE

FEELINGS OF TASTE, WITH THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

ADMIRATION.	SUBILITY.	WONDER.	UGLINESS.	DISCORDANCE.	LUDICHOUSNESS.
Occasional.....	Occasional.....	Occasional.....	Occasional.....	Occasional.....	Occasional.
Desire.....	Desire.....	Desire.....	Beauty.....	Harmony.....	
Pleasant.....	Pleasant.....	Pleasant.....	Aversion.....	Aversion.....	Desire.
Often strong.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	Painful.....	Painful.....	Pleasant.
Desire moderate.....	Desire variable.....	Aversion variable.....	Moderate.....	Moderate.....	Variable.
Leaning to Benevo- lence.....		Leaning to malevo- lence.	Aversion variable.....	Aversion variable.....	Desire often strong.
all Esteem, Love, Beauty.					
Towards a person, Love, Esteem, etc.	Awe, Solemnity, Reverence.	Awe, Solemnity, Fear.	Dislike, Impatience, etc.	Dislike, Impatience	Disrespect, etc.
By Beauty, Harmony, etc.	Awe, Solemnity, Reverence.	Solemnity, Fear, etc.	Dislike, Impatience	Dislike, Impatience	Disrespect, etc.
By presentations, in character of excel- lence.	By Awe, Reverence.	By awe, etc.....	By Disrespect, etc..		
Either.....	By presentations in character of gran- deur.	By presentations of novel character or relation.	By objects in char- acter of deformi- ty, etc.	By sounds, etc., in character of harshness.	By objects in gro- tesque relations, etc.
Actual presentation, most; imagination a little.	A thing usually.	Either.....	Either.....	Sounds or things usually.	Persons.
Modified by contrast, repetition or with- drawal.	Actual presentation, most.	Actual presenta- tion.	Actual presenta- tion, most.	Actual Presenta- tion, most.	Imagination will do much.
The same.....	Modified by contrast.....	Modified by con- trast, etc.	Modified by con- trast, etc.	Modified by con- trast.	Increased or modi- fied by contrast, etc.
One; direct gratifica- tion.	The same.....	The same.....	Different.....	Different.....	The same.
To appeasement.....	One; direct gratifi- cation.....	One; direct gratifi- cation.....	One; responsive gratification.	One; responsive gratification.	One; direct grati- fication.
Moderate.....	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.....	To appeasement.
Pure.....	Moderate.....	Moderate or vari- able.	Variable.....	Variable.....	Often strong.
	Pure.....	Pure.....	Pure.....	Pure.....	Pure.

Subjective Senses of the "Heart" in Activity.

The subjective feelings of the Heart are distinguished by great desire or aversion, and may be gratified either directly or responsively.

Gratification by response is by no means confined to feelings of mere aversion. For instance, the subjective feeling of love is aroused in a young man by the amiable qualities of a young lady. The sense itself is pleasing; and the young man, for the sake of that alone, may wish for the continuance of the exciting character or relation. This would be direct gratification. But the desire attending love is strong, and its impulse may lead him to seek to change the relation of the exciting object into that of the marriage state. This would be gratification by response.

Again, the relation of beneficence, in which a person has revealed himself to me, may excite my gratitude. The relation of the person in the excitant, in this case also, is pleasing enough; but yet the impulse of desire attending the feeling prompts me to change this relation, and make him that was the giver the recipient of my gratitude.

Neither of the subjective senses referred to here is a feeling of aversion.

Again, feelings of aversion may sometimes be gratified in a like manner by relations of an averted character. My anger may be aroused by the knowledge that a person has injured me. The impulse or aversion of the sense, in this case, would be gratified by placing the offender in relations of vindiction or revenge. This is the natural impulse of the feeling, though I may have grace enough to master it.

Horror, again, as a different example, is a feeling partaking much of pain. The gratifying relation, or character, in this case, is like that of mere pain or pleasure—the change of the object responsively into non-exciting relations or character.

These cases illustrate the working of these subjective feelings, and also show that responsive gratification is not always confined to feelings of aversion.

All these subjective feelings, except the Permanent, subside or abate on gratification—that is, they appease by putting the object into gratifying character or relations. When, however, we speak of certain subjective senses being permanent, we do not mean that they are at all times alike active. Avarice, pride, ambition, etc., are all feelings of this class; and yet, though generally active in some natures, this does not imply that they may not be capable of special stimulation and gratification by the presentation of exciting or gratifying relations to them. Indeed, all subjective senses of the "Heart" may be called occasional; only some of them may be so predominantly and persistently active in certain natures, as very properly to justify the application of the word "permanent" to them.

Love for an individual, for example, represents a class which might be called permanent. Love in the heart of a young man, once fairly excited, for the young woman who afterwards becomes his wife, may continue active so long as he lives; yet it will have its occasions of special stimulation and gratification.

If the feeling lasts but for a few months, it may be called either occasional, as compared with the more enduring feelings; or permanent, as compared with the more evanescent. It is scarcely necessary to say here, that every subjective feeling in a state of activity and impulse is a Propensity.

We have referred, heretofore, very fully, to the service which the imagination renders in pointing out or suggesting to the mind the various relations, or characters, in which the subjective feelings may be gratified. We may add again here, that though the imagination cannot produce the relation, or character, which may gratify the senses, it can produce fictitious conceptions of these relations, or characters, which, by reasoning, we find out the means of reducing to verities; and these verities then gratify the senses. The imagination thus, while it stimulates the feeling, flashes up before the mind at the same time certain fictitious relations of gratification, which reason contrives to realize. Thus, if a person is animated by revenge, his imagination conceives of certain methods in which his revenge may be gratified. At last a method is conceived of, which his reason perceives a way of realizing; and he finally is gratified by making the fancy of his mind a verity in experience.

Many subjective feelings of this class (of the Heart), in common with others, have a marked tendency to associate with, or to produce excitement in, others: for instance, scorn associates with contempt; love, with admiration and esteem: anger excites revenge; hate excites scorn or contempt; curiosity, impatience, etc.

The other peculiarities of this class of subjective senses, or feelings, are added in the accompanying Synoptical Table. (See Table B.) We have not sought to reduce analytically these feelings to the fewest number; for in so doing we should eliminate some compounds which are now generally regarded as simple elements. We trust the Table will be of more service as it is. All the subjective feelings of the heart are not to be supposed to be contained in the Table.

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TABLE B.—SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF SOME OF THE SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS OF THE

CHARACTER OF FEELINGS IN A STATE OF EXCITEMENT.												HOW EXCITED.
	Permanent or occasional.	In nature the opposite of	Of Desire or Aversion.	Pleasant, painful, or indifferent.	Emotion—strong or weak.	Desire or Aversion, energetic or feeble.	Benevolent or Malevolent to its desire or impulse.	Associated in activity with what other feelings.	Reveals what other feelings sensitive or excitable.	Made sensitive itself by what other feelings?	How is it excited or aroused by objects of character or relation?	Is the exciting object a person or thing?
LOVE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Hatred.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Strong.....	Desire energetic.....	Benevolent.....	Beauty, Admiration, Esteem, etc.	Benevolence, Jealousy, Sympathy, etc.	Beauty, Admiration, Esteem, etc.	By objects of beautiful and amiable character.	A person.....
HATRED.....	Occasional or permanent.	Love.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion energetic.....	Malevolent.....	Ugliness, Disrespect, Contempt, etc.	Contempt, Anger, Impatience, etc.	Ugliness, Pride, Antagonism, etc.	By objects of disagreeable character, etc.	A person.....
FEAR.....	Occasional.	Courage.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion energetic.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Horror, Despair, Hatred, etc.	Hatred, Impatience, Revenge, etc.	Antagonism, Awe, Solemnity, etc.	By objects in character, or relations of terror or dread.	Either.....
COURAGE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Fear.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Hope, Anger, Trust, Antagonism, etc.	Hope, Trust, Antagonism, etc.	Anger, Antagonism, Hope, etc.	By objects in relations of encouragement.	Either.....
HORROR.....	Occasional.	Despair.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion energetic.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Hatred, Fear, Despair, etc.	Hatred, Anger, Impatience, etc.	Fear, Despair, etc.	By objects in relations that shock or horrify.	Either.....
HOPE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Despair.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Trust, Courage, etc.	Courage, Patience, etc.	Trust, Joy, Gaiety, etc.	By objects in relations of encouragement.	Either.....
ANGER.....	Occasional.	Despair.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion energetic.....	Malevolent.....	Pride, Vexation, Contempt, Revenge.	Antagonism, Revenge, etc.	Pride, Vexation, etc.	By objects of vexations or antagonistic character.	A person.....
GRATITUDE.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Benevolent.....	Love, Esteem, Trust, etc.	Benevolence, Love, Esteem, etc.	Trust, Hope, Dependence, etc.	By objects in character or relations of love, etc.	A person.....
AMBITION.....	Occasional or permanent.	Humility.....	Desire.....	Indifferent.....	Variable.....	Desire variable.....	Benevolent.....	Pride, Eagerness, Avarice, Hope, etc.	Impatience, Pride, etc.	Avarice, Hope, etc.	By objects in character or relations of avarice, etc.	A thing.....
PRIDE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Humility.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	Desire often strong.	Benevolent.....	Ambition, Avarice, Anger, etc.	Anger, Vexation, Revenge, etc.	Avarice, Ambition, etc.	By objects in relations, stimulative of contrary to self-respect.	A person.....
HUMILITY.....	Occasional or permanent.	Pride.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	Desire often strong.	Benevolent.....	Reverence, Gratitude, Dependence, etc.	Gratitude, Dependence, etc.	Reverence, Dependence, etc.	By objects in relations of contrast with superiority.	Things.....
CURIOSITY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Moderate.....	Often strong.....	Benevolent.....	Eagerness, Hope, Impatience, etc.	Impatience, Vexation, etc.	Gratitude, Vexation, etc.	By objects in relations of novelty or curiosity.	Either.....
JOY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Strong.....	Desire energetic.....	Leaning to Benevolence.	Courage, Gratitude, Love, Hope.	Gratitude, Love, etc.	Hope, Trust, etc.	By objects in gratifying relations.	Either.....
GRIEF.....	Occasional.	Aversion.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion energetic.....	Leaning to Benevolence.	Fear, Impatience, Despair, etc.	Impatience, Despair, etc.	Fear, Love, Distrust, etc.	By objects in relations of bereavement.	Persons.....
REVERENCE.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire often feeble.	Leaning to Benevolence.	Awe, Solemnity, Humility, etc.	Solemnity, Humility, etc.	Fear, Esteem, Love, etc.	By objects in elevated character, etc.	Persons.....
VEHEMENT.....	Occasional.	Aversion.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Moderate.....	Aversion moderate.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Pride, Anger, Fear, etc.	Anger, Impatience, etc.	Pride, Jealousy, Ambition, etc.	By objects in relations of disappointment, etc.	Either.....
PATIENCE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Impatience.....	Desire.....	Indifferent.....	Weak.....	Desire moderate.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Hope, Humility, etc.	Gratitude, Contentment, etc.	Love, Hope, etc.	By objects in relations of hope or comfort.	Things.....
AVARICE.....	Occasional or permanent.	Benevolence.....	Desire.....	Painful.....	Often strong.....	Desire energetic.....	Leaning to Malevolence.	Ambition, Pride, Vexation, etc.	Impatience, Anger.....	Pride, Ambition.....	By objects in attractive character or relations.	Things.....
SYMPATHY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Leaning to Benevolence.	Pity, Love, Grief.....	Pity, Benevolence.....	Love, Esteem.....	By objects in relations of suffering.	Persons.....
ANXIETY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Leaning to Benevolence.	Grief, Anger, Fear.....	Impatience, Anger.....	Fear, etc.....	By objects in relations of uncertainty, etc.	Either.....
JEALOUSY.....	Occasional.	Aversion.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Strong.....	Aversion strong.....	Malevolent.....	Love, Anger, Revenge.....	Anger, Revenge.....	Love, Avarice.....	By objects of relation, as acquisition of persons.	Either.....
ANTAGONISM.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Malevolent.....	Hatred, Courage, Anger.....	Courage, Hope, etc.....	Anger, Impatience.....	By objects in relations of provocation.	Persons.....
IMPATIENCE.....	Occasional.	Patience.....	Desire.....	Painful.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Malevolent.....	Hatred, Anger, Vexation, etc.	Anger, Antagonism, etc.....	Hatred, Pride, Fear, etc.....	By objects in disagreeable character or relations.	Things, etc.....
GAITY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Malevolent.....	Hope, Courage, Joy.....	Contentment, Joy, etc.....	Hope, Courage, etc.....	By objects of cheerful character or relations.	Persons.....
CONTENTMENT.....	Occasional.	Aversion.....	Aversion.....	Painful.....	Moderate.....	Aversion moderate.....	Malevolent.....	Anger, Pride, etc.....	Hatred, Impatience.....	Anger, Pride, etc.....	By objects of hateful character, etc.	Persons.....
REVENGE.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Often strong.....	Desire variable.....	Malevolent.....	Anger, Jealousy.....	Impatience, Scorn.....	Anger, Vexation.....	By objects in relations of injury, etc.	Persons.....
ESTEEM.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Feeble.....	Desire moderate.....	Benevolent.....	Vexation, Love.....	Love, Acquisitiveness, etc.	Beauty, Admiration, etc.....	By objects of excellent character.	Persons.....
PITY.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Variable.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Benevolent.....	Sympathy, Love, etc.....	Benevolence, etc.....	Love, Esteem, etc.....	By objects in relations of distress, etc.	Persons.....
DEPENDENCE.....	Occasional.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Benevolent.....	Love, Hope, Courage.....	Gratitude, Love.....	Hope, etc.....	By objects in relations of beneficence, etc.	Persons.....
CONTENTMENT.....	Occasional or permanent.	Desire.....	Desire.....	Pleasant.....	Moderate.....	Desire moderate.....	Benevolent.....	Hope, Courage, Trust.....	Gratitude, Joy.....	Hope, Trust, etc.....	By objects in relations of happiness, contentment, etc.	Either.....

NOTE.—These feelings are selected just as they occur in the every-day language of the people; so some of them may seem to consist, to a certain extent, the elements of others in the same Table. Our object by this Table is not so much to supply a full list of the elements as to compare with one another, or with those of the conscience, etc.

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Subjective Feelings of the Conscience.

It is well to remark at the outset that some subjective feelings of conscience have in their general character, a very close resemblance to those of the "Heart." All are not strictly feelings of "ought-ness," a class to which we shall specially refer, but all concern themselves with duty or obligation, and they are thus entitled to be classed among the feelings of conscience. Thus, the approbateness, shame, repentance, etc., attending a good or bad act, are instances of this kind.

There is no department of the human mind which has all its subjective feelings precisely uniform; otherwise, the various functions of that department could not be carried on without extraneous help.

It may however be affirmed that generally the subjective feelings of conscience differ widely in their character from those of the Heart, or of mere desire or aversion. Instead of a subjective impulse, attracting us to, or repelling us from, certain things which we love or hate, they come in the nature of "ought-ness," obligation or command.

Though differing in the character of their impulse, they are just as real in our nature as the sensations of heat and pain, while they possess an authoritative power far beyond these.

They are impulses of such a nature that when complied with, it is more correct to say "they are pacified" than that "they are gratified;" and the word pacification is the one which, in reference to them, we adopt in preference to the word gratification.

Every feeling of this class has a reference to duty; and it is clear that the subjective feelings of conscience were intended by our Creator to be the supremely rectoral or governing subjective senses of man's nature. Every other subjective feeling was to find its gratification within the scope which the rectoral or the higher ones permitted. And even now, in man's state of depravity or moral derangement, it is evident that the subjection of all other feelings to the legitimate sway of these, would lift a man into a state of happiness barely conceivable to the human mind, which is now the prey of the misrule and the anarchy produced by the usurpation of supreme power by principles or feelings which properly should have been subordinate.

The reason why this class are called feelings of positive and negative obligation, is because all duty resolves itself in that way. They prompt us, (1) as to what we should do; and (2) as to what we should not do.

It may justly be said that this class of feelings contains the very essence of all morality; conformity with their impulse is "good," violation of it is "evil."

They claim authority over every other class of subjective senses, a claim which, even in the grossest states of barbarism and heathen ignorance, they do not wholly relax.

If their behests are disobeyed, they do not neglect to punish the offender with the lash of their own subjective condemnation and remorse, as well as with the jar and discord of the subjective feelings of other classes. If, on the contrary, their promptings are complied with, they reward richly with their own approval and with the large gleanings from other harvest fields of feelings.

They minutely concern themselves with all the social relations of our being, and extend their authority into every possible ramification of life.

The conscience has correctly, we think, been called God's viceroy. The subjective senses of conscience are just the precepts of God's Law written by Himself, not with pen or graving-tool, but with His creative finger, in sentences of living, palpitating, subjective sense on the clean sheet of human consciousness.

Excitement of the Subjective Feelings of Conscience.

I am so constituted that the moment I know of myself doing a certain malicious act, there arises within my mind a subjective feeling of "ought-not-ness" that I should do so. The perception, inception, or knowledge of myself in this malicious relation, creates in my mind involuntarily at the same moment a subjective feeling of "ought-not-ness," which envelopes the whole conception of myself in this wicked relation. Were the act to be done by another person, my subjective feeling towards him would be precisely similar.

It is not, in this case, a mere feeling of like or dislike, desire or aversion, that influences me, that merely attracts or repels me, but an authoritative and inflexible sense of "ought-not-ness" that I should do so. The impulses of all feelings of mere desire or aversion, though powerful enough, may be made to yield to one another, or their claims be entirely set aside. Their impulse is the stimulus of petition. But the impulse of this subjective "ought-ness" or "ought-not-ness" is one of authoritative and inflexible command, that will neither submit to be set aside nor give precedence to any other.

Again, I hear that one neighbor has vilely slandered the character of another, and that

also without the least provocation. The knowledge of this neighbour in this malicious relation, arouses in my mind a strong subjective "ought-ness," the impulse of which is that he should be punished.

These "ought-nesses" and "ought-not-nesses" have a place in our nature that we may not be able to comprehend. We cannot reason them to silence; far less can we root them out of our nature. God put them there; and they are as surely a part of ourselves as our eyes and ears. Such senses can never be created by habit; for habit can regulate such subjective senses, but never create them.

These feelings of "ought-ness" are associated with every character or social relation possible for us to sustain. Though different in their nature from other subjective senses, they are always excited in the same manner. The exciting conception must always contain an object of particular character or relation, which on being recognized by the mind arouses at the same moment the enswathing subjective feeling of "oughtness." If a person manifests a vicious character, it excites my subjective sense of "oughtness" that he should be a different man. Here would be an excitant of character. The same individual may steal from me or from another person. This would be an excitant of relation; and the moment that the knowledge of each case presented itself to my mind, the excitants would swathe themselves in the subjective senses of "oughtness" which they respectively produce. Whatever conception, then, is of such a nature as to arouse a subjective sense of "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness" in the perceptive or incentive mind, is an object of exciting character or relation; and the impulse of every subjective "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness" thus aroused, always seeks pacification according to its nature, either directly or responsively, by putting the exciting object into pacificatory character or relation. The subjective feelings of conscience, therefore, generally in all respects correspond in their manner of excitation and pacification (equal to gratification) to those of desire or aversion.

The imagination performs substantially the same office, in reference to the subjective feelings of the conscience, as it does for those of the "Heart" and others. We do not always require the presentation of actual facts to excite a subjective sense of "oughtness," etc., in regard to any act. The mere fictitious conception, by the imagination, of a right or wrong act, seldom fails to excite, to a certain extent, some subjective feeling of the conscience in regard to it; so that we can give a verdict on the act from the prevailing sentiment of our conscience at the time, independent, either as to the memory of what our subjective feelings of conscience might be in the past, when coming face to face with the act as a verity, or as to intellectual theories formed on our past experience of the regular operation of these feelings. Thus, the bare conception, however unreal, of one man killing another for his money, will arouse, to a certain extent, a condemnatory feeling in my conscience against the act.

It is, however, by the presentation of actual facts alone, that the subjective feelings of conscience can be brought into active full play, either as to their excitation or pacification; and it is mainly from the operation of the subjective feelings of conscience, in connection with actual facts, that we form our intellectual theories of right, wrong, etc.

As all subjective senses of conscience, or of the rectoral class, are clearly given us as a correct, and as the only correct rule of duty, every one of them takes its rise in the mind, in connection with either the discharge of perfect duty or its violation.

It may be objected here, that in a perfect nature there need be no provision made for violation of duty—that a perfect creature could not be guilty of such violation. In reply to this objection, we have to remark that man is a probatory creature; that his whole nature is so constituted that he may possibly be obedient or disobedient to a Being on whom he is dependent; and that the non-possibility of disobedience, under any stimulus, is to destroy or obliterate one-half of his moral constitution. Man is involved in a system that acknowledges a possibility of obedience or disobedience, well-desert or ill-desert, reward or punishment; and this system or constitution is woven into man's nature in common with that of the angels and all rational or moral creatures under the Divine sway. It is also noteworthy here that all subjective feelings of conscience that arise on the violation of duty, are of a painful or punitive nature; that they all prompt to compensation where possible, giving thereby a certain degree of release; and where not possible, they inflict punishment subjectively on the offender. It is also noticeable, that in all natures in which the subjective feelings of conscience can exercise their legitimate sway, they steer human experience clear of all excitants, whether pertaining to the senses of the "Heart" or themselves, that introduce subjective sense of a painful or disagreeable character into it.

As illustrative of the manner in which the subjective feelings of conscience are excited, and our ideas of right or wrong, good or evil, etc., are formed, we subjoin the following examples:—

In listening to a story that appeals to my sense of justice, as in the case of a man treating his neighbour with great unfairness, the presentation of the man in this relation arouses

in this malicious relation of which is that he

our nature that we may less can we root them out of ourselves as our can regulate such sub-

acter or social relation other subjective senses, on must always contain ed by the mind arouses

If a person manifests it he should be a differential may steal from me the moment that the old swathe themselves duce. Whatever con-oughtness" or "ought-character or relation; thus aroused, always ly, by putting the ex-ellings of conscience, ation and pacification

ness to the subjective a. We do not always "oughtness," etc., in of a right or wrong of the conscience in ing sentiment of our subjective feelings as a verity, or as to on of these feelings. for his money, will not the act.

subjective feelings of tion or pacification; ence, in connection etc.

clearly given us as a else in the mind, in

provision made for ation. In reply to his whole nature is on whom he is lus, is to destroy or stem that acknow- reward or punish- mon with that of is also noteworthy of duty, are of a re possible, giving unishment subjec- the subjective feel- erence clear of all es, that introduce

ence are excited, join the following

se of a man treat- is relation arouses

in my mind a subjective condemnatory feeling or a sense of "ought-not-ness," that he should have done so. The man stands before me, in the conception so created respecting him, swathed with the condemnatory subjective sentiment which he with his act has aroused; and I call his act unjust. If we compare his act with one of a still more flagrant character, the latter excites in us a still stronger condemnatory feeling, and we say the latter is more unjust still. If anyone asks us why this condemnatory feeling is excited within us at such a presentation, we can only answer that we cannot tell. It is just a law of our nature to regard thus appreciatively everything that transpires around us, and we cannot help it. We thus call every thing or act unjust that excites this condemnatory subjective feeling within us.

By comparing a number of cases (that is, a number of objects of exciting character or relation) which excite this condemnatory subjective feeling within us, and, analyzing them, we are able to form a clear intellectual conception of the elements of injustice, as they exist in the external objects; and having thus formed a distinct idea of injustice in the mind, we are able to tell at once what is just or unjust, without even a single appeal to the subjective feeling itself.

In precisely the same way that we form the idea of injustice we form the conception of a just act, from the acquittive subjective sense which it arouses within our minds on cognition; so also of good or evil in outward things, from the approbative or disapprobative subjective sense, aroused within us, by the perception or inception of such things. This principle applies, in like manner, with reference to all the other subjective feelings of conscience.

The subjective feeling is thus the primary source of our conception of injustice, or of any other of these ideas, arising within the sphere of conscience, the "Heart," etc.; and it is thus in the mind of man the first and only guide to the formation of an intellectual standard as to the moral qualities of outward things or acts.

Every man thus carries in his mind two rules or standards, which he may apply at any time: (1) the subjective feeling itself; and (2) the merely intellectual one, that applies to the outward thing, or act, as possessing such character or relation as is known from past experience to excite the subjective feeling. "Rightness" and "wrongness," as subjective feelings or senses, are no part of the outside physical elements constituting an act. Rightness or wrongness, as intellectually seen in the outward act, is just the peculiar relation which it sustains to a moral agent. This peculiar relation, intellectually seen, arouses the appreciative subjective sense, acquittive or condemnatory, that apprehends its moral quality; for we perceive no moral quality in the act till the sense is aroused.

It is evident, then, that there must be a certain excellence, or the contrary, in these outward moral relations, when they arouse these appreciative subjective senses in perception.

We trust that we have said in the foregoing remarks will sufficiently show the manner in which all subjective feelings of conscience are excited, and, also, how cold intellectual conceptions of the moral character, or moral relation of the outside objects are formed, apart from the subjective feelings which are their primary source,

Subjective Feelings of Conscience in Activity.

As shown elsewhere, this class of feelings, like all others, admit of pacification directly or by responsiveness. We call their method of appeasement pacification, instead of gratification, for the reason, that in general their mode of appeasement really partakes more of the nature of pacification than of gratification.

As these subjective senses concern themselves with duty, and are more of the nature of authoritative command than of desire or aversion, whenever an exciting object is put into the relation or character to which their impulse prompts, their method of appeasement in general is correctly described as pacificatory.

As an example of direct pacification, we come to know of an act of disinterested kindness being done by one man to another. A subjective sense of approbateness is aroused within us by the knowledge of it. This man's act being in itself good, of course gratifies or pacifies the impulse of the approbative sentiment which it has kindled; and the impulse tends to no other mode of pacification. This, then, would be a case of direct pacification. If, however, this act of his cost him considerable self-sacrifice, it possibly may arouse within us subjectively a sense of "ought-ness" that he should be rewarded. This would be a clear case of responsiveness.

Both modes of pacification among this class of feelings are common enough; but, as already mentioned elsewhere, all of this class of feelings that are aroused by the violation of duty, seek pacification by putting the exciting object into the relations or character of compensative duty. For instance, the knowledge that a man (with whom I am dealing) is my neighbour, ought to excite in me the subjective feeling that I ought not to injure him. The impulse within me here is non-injury to my neighbour; and if the relation which it suggests

is complied with, the impulse is pacified. This is the direct performance of duty. But if I fail to comply with the impulse, and I do him positive injury (which will not undo), then this is a case of duty violated; and the violation of this duty instantly excites in me a subjective sense or feeling, that I ought to make him reparation by an act of compensative justice; and it is pacified when I put him into the relation which it suggests. If I fail even in doing this, there arises within me a subjective sense of ill-desert, closely followed by another of "oughtness," that I should be punished. Had the conduct of this neighbour toward me been more than simple justice required of him, while my own act towards him was less than simple justice made requisite, the subjective feeling excited by the knowledge of his conduct would have been an "oughtness" that he should be rewarded; while that excited by my own act would have been an "oughtness" that I should be punished.

Both rewards and punishments are thus the offspring of subjective sense or feeling, and are examples of compensative justice. The latter, however, is often called retributive justice. Therefore, subjective feelings of conscience, arising on violation of duty, seek pacification in the relations or character of compensative or retributive justice.

Most of the feelings of conscience are in general so active in religious or well-trained moral natures, that the appellation of permanent or constant is more applicable to them than the term occasional. Many of them are continually in exercise, as the senses of right, wrong, etc.; while others are only occasionally so, as approbateness, remorse, despair, etc.

Their Subdience or Abatement.

As most of the subjective feelings of conscience are constantly active or permanent, most of them abate or subside but temporarily—that is, for the time being—by putting the exciting object into pacificatory relations or character.

As already remarked, all the subjective feelings of conscience may be divided into two general classes: (1) Those relating to the proper discharge of duty or its reward; and (2) those relating to the violation of duty or its direct retributive compensation. These classes might also admit of still more minute subdivision.

The first of these general classes is largely made up of the subjective feelings of "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness," as, indeed, so also is the second.

In everything relating to the proper discharge of duty, these subjective "ought-nesses" and "ought-not-nesses" of the first class are voices within us, plainly marking out our duty, and stimulating us to perform it. Their voice is one of inflexible authority, and they demand perfect obedience. Their impulse is not a begging petition, but an authoritative order that will be quieted only by our putting the exciting object into the pacifying character or relation.

Then, again, as members of the first class, and as stimulatives to duty, we have the subjective senses of acquittiveness and condemnativeness aroused by the perception of right or wrong acts; also, approbateness and disapprobateness, the subjective senses appropriate to the principles of good and evil.

We need not go on particularizing other equally important members of this class, but we can hardly omit to mention, as included among them, and as stimulatives to duty, the Anticipatory subjective senses, such as fear or apprehensiveness of punishment, expectativeness of reward, etc. They all lift their voices alike, as stimulatives to duty, and point out the good or evil consequences of a certain course of conduct.

If the subject obeys all these warning and stimulating voices within himself, and the right act is done, the subjective feelings of well-desert, self-approbateness, or expectativeness of reward, all bring into his experience an amount of felicity which is itself a reward.

If, however, all members of the first class fail in stimulating to the right act, and it is neglected till the chance to perform it is gone, or the wrong act is done, the subject is not yet given up, but given over to those subjective feelings of the Second Class aroused by a violation of duty. The "oughtnesses" or "ought-not-nesses" within his mind still clamour loudly their urgent demands. If direct compensation is possible, they importunately urge him to make it; if wrong is done, they urge him to make amends for it; if right neglected, they insist on immediate compensative rectification. A thousand voices within his brain are still heard by him, commanding, urging, threatening; but if all fail, and the opportunity of direct compensation is gone beyond recall, these and other subjective "oughtnesses" within him of the same class, light fiercer fires, or rather utter harsher voices. They demand retributive compensation; and nothing he can do will allay the torment they create within him till he grants the pacification of their impulse in his own punishment. He becomes the prey of the subjective senses of ill-desert, remorse, or despair, because he has treated their kinder voices with neglect.

As illustrative of their mode of working, in cases like this, we add a simple example.

"Ought-not-ness" is equal to "oughtness," only it refers to the negative side of an act.

formance of duty. But if I
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excites in me a subjective
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IVE DUE.

		APPEASED.	POWER.	QUALITY.
her feel- or excit-	he two ways of moral quality?	Is it pacified to appease- ment or does the feeling still remain active?	What power as an impulse or motive on the Will?	Moral quality.
c.....	B.....	Generally active.....	Variable.....	Pure.
on dem-	B differ in quality.	In special cases to appease- ment, though still active.	Great power.....	Pure.
Well-	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
ss, ill-	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
, etc.....	B.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Pure.
etc.....	B.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Pure.
of re-	B.....	To appeasement.....	Moderate.....	Pure.
negative— ive, Well-	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
e, Disap- to.	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
Well-	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
, etc.....	B.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
	R.....	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
	A pure in quality.	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
c.....	R differ in quality.	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
etc.....	R in quality.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Impure.
etc.....	G.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
etc.....	R.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
iveness, G			Variable.....	
of pun-	G.....		Variable.....	
etc.....	II.....		Variable.....	
feelings				

TABLE C.—SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS OF CONSCIENCE, RECTORAL, AND PERTAINING TO POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DUTY, AS PRECEDING, ATTENDING, A

CHARACTER OF FEELINGS IN A STATE OF EXCITEMENT.											
	Occasional or Permanent.	In nature the opposite of	Positive or Negative.	Pleasant, painful or indifferent.	Emotion, strong or weak.	Impulse, energetic or feeble.	Benevolent or malevolent in bearing of impulse.	Associated in activity with what other feelings.	Readers what other feelings sensitive or excitable?	Rendered sensitive itself by what other feelings?	How is it excited or objects of character?
I. THOSE RELATING TO DUTY AND ITS REWARD.											
1. A sense or feeling that there is a God.....	Oc. high degree.			Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....		Responsibility, etc.....	Responsibility, etc.....	By the oughtnesses, etc.....	By objects in relation sign, dependence, etc.
A sense of Responsibility to God.....	Per. mod. degree.			Variable.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....		Feeling that there is a God, etc.	Acquittiveness, condemnation, etc.	By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relation dependence, etc.
A sense of Acquittiveness towards certain actions, which we call just.....	Oc. high degree.	Condemnativeness.....		Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	Responsibility, Approbation, etc.	Approbation, Well-desert, etc.	By the oughtnesses, etc.....	By objects in relation dependence, etc.
A sense of Condemnativeness towards certain actions, which we call unjust.....	Per. mod. degree.	Acquittiveness.....		Painful.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Malevolent.....	Ill-desert, Disapprobation, etc.	Disapprobation, Ill-desert, etc.	By the oughtnotnesses, etc.	By objects in relation dependence, etc.
A sense of Approbation towards certain actions, which we call good.....	Oc. high degree.	Disapprobation.....		Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	Well-desert, Hope, Acquittiveness, etc.	Well-desert, Hope, etc.	By the oughtnesses, etc.....	By objects in relation dependence, etc.
A sense of Disapprobation towards certain actions, which we call evil.....	Per. mod. degree.	Approbation.....		Painful.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Malevolent.....	Condemnativeness, Ill-desert, etc.	Ill-desert, Shame, etc.	By the oughtnotnesses, etc.	By objects in relation dependence, etc.
A sense of Well-desert towards the doer of what is just and good.....	Oc. high degree.	Ill-desert.....		Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	Approbation, Hope, Acquittiveness, etc.	Expectativeness of reward, etc.	By approbation, etc.	By objects in relation doing, etc.
2. Sense of oughtness to do those things which we call just or good.											
Sense of oughtnotness to do those things which we call unjust or evil.											
Taking these two last classes of senses, separating them, and putting them, for the sake of brevity, in groups, we have:—											
(a) All those senses of oughtness, which are respectively employed in prompting us to Love, to Adore, to Worship, to Obey, to Cultivate just and good feelings towards God.	Oc. high degree.	Oughtnotnesses.....	Positive.....	Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	This class associated with all feelings exercised towards God.	Class renders sensitive—Approbation, Well-desert, etc.	By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relation tive duty towards God.
(b) All those senses of oughtnotness, which are respectively employed in checking Hatred, Dishonour, Disobedience, and other unjust and bad acts and feelings towards God.	Oc. high degree.	Oughtnesses.....	Negative.....	Painful.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	This class associated with all feelings exercised towards God.	Condemnativeness, Disapprobation, etc.	By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relation tive duty towards God.
(c) All those oughtnesses, respectively employed in prompting us to Love our neighbour; to Preserve his Honour, his Life, his Chastity, his Property, his good Name, and to cultivate just and good feelings towards him.	Oc. high degree.	Oughtnotnesses.....	Positive.....	Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	This class associated with all feelings exercised towards man.	Approbation, Well-desert, etc.	By feeling that there is a God, Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relation tive duty towards man.
(d) All those oughtnotnesses, respectively employed in checking Hatred to our neighbour, or whatsoever is injurious to his Life, Interests, Character, etc.	Per. mod. degree.	Oughtnesses.....	Negative.....	Painful.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	This class associated with all feelings exercised towards man.	Condemnativeness, etc.	By feeling that there is a God, Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relation tive duty towards man.
3. Anticipatory senses or feelings.											
Apprehensiveness of punishment.....	Oc. high degree.	Expect. of reward.....		Painful.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....		Feelings of a painful kind.	Shame, etc.....	Responsibility, etc.....	By objects in relation lected duty.
Expectativeness of reward or acquittal.....	Oc. high degree.	Appre. of punishment.....		Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....		Feelings of a pleasant kind.	Hope, Joy, etc.....	Acquittiveness, etc.....	By objects in relation attended to.
II. THOSE RELATING TO THE VIOLATION OF DUTY AND ITS DISROOF AND RETRIBUTIVE COMPENSATION.											
1. Direct Compensation.											
Sense of oughtness to make compensation if still possible.....	Occasional or Permanent.		Positive.....	Pleasant.....	Variable.....	Energetic.....	Benevolent.....	Guilt, Remorse, etc.....	Guilt, Remorse, etc.....	Responsibility, etc.....	By objects in relation
2. Retributive Compensation.											
Sense of Guilt.....	Occasional.....			Painful.....	Variable.....			Shame, Remorse, etc.....	Shame, Remorse, etc.....	Responsibility, etc.....	By objects in relation
Sense of Shame.....	Occasional.....			Painful.....	Variable.....			Guilt, Remorse, etc.....	Remorse, Despair, etc.....	Guilt, etc.....	By objects in relation
Sense of Ill-desert.....	Occasional.....	Well-desert.....		Painful.....	Variable.....			Shame, Remorse, etc.....	Remorse, Despair, etc.....	Responsibility, etc.....	By objects in relation
Sense of Remorse.....	Occasional.....			Painful.....	Strong.....			Ill-desert, Despair, etc.....	Despair, Expectativeness, etc.	Guilt, Shame, etc.....	By objects in relation doing.
Sense of Despair.....	Occasional.....	Hope.....		Painful.....	Strong.....			Remorse, Shame, etc.....	Expectativeness of punishment, etc.	Guilt, Remorse, etc.....	By objects in relation hope.
Sense of Expectativeness of punishment.....	Occasional.....			Painful.....	Strong.....			Remorse, Despair, etc.....	Remorse, Despair, etc.....	Ill-desert, etc.....	By objects in relation neglected.

NOTE.—The remarks, made in note at the bottom of the Table of the subjective feelings of the Heart, more or less apply to the subjective

DUTY, AS PRECEDING, ATTENDING, AND FOLLOWING IT. TABLE NOT TO BE SUPPOSED TO CONTAIN ALL THE SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS OF CONSCIENCE.

	HOW EXCITED.			MODIFIED.	PACIFIED.			APPEARED.	POWER.	QUALITY.
Rendered sensitive itself by what other feelings?	How is it excited or aroused by objects of character or relation?	Is the exciting object persons or thing?	Will the imagination of the object in exciting character or relation excite it, or needs it the presentation of actual fact?	How is its strength modified while in activity?	Is the exciting character or relation the same as the pacificatory or different?	How many ways of pacification; what are they—direct or responsive?	Are the two ways of like moral quality?	Is it pacified to appeasement or does the feeling still remain active?	What power as an impulse or motive on the Will?	Moral quality.
By the oughtnesses, etc.	By objects in relations of design dependence, etc.	Either.....	Imagination will a little; presentation of facts chiefly.	By repetition increased, etc.	Often the same.....			Generally active.....	Variable.....	Pure.
By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relations of dependence, etc.	Persons.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	By repetition of exultant increased, etc.	Often different.....	Often two; direct and responsive.	Often differ in quality.	In special cases to appeasement, though still active.	Great power.....	Pure.
By the oughtnesses, etc.	By objects in relations of justice, etc.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	By repetition, etc.	Often the same.....			To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
By the oughtnotnesses, etc.	By objects in relations of injustice, etc.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	By repetition increased, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
By the oughtnesses, etc.	By objects in relations of good-doing, etc.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	By repetition, contrast, etc.	The same.....	One; direct.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Pure.
By the oughtnotnesses, etc.	By objects in relations of evil-doing, etc.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	By repetition, contrast, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Pure.
By approbateness, etc.	By objects in relations of well-doing, etc.	Persons.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	Increased by repetition, etc.	The same.....	One; direct.....		To appeasement.....	Moderate.....	Pure.
By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relations of positive duty towards God.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts; by imagination a little.	Increased by repetition, etc.	The same.....	One; direct.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
By feeling that there is a God, etc.	By objects in relations of negative duty towards God.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts; by imagination a little.	Increased by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
By feeling that there is a God, Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of positive duty towards man.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts; by imagination a little.	Increased by repetition, etc.	The same.....	One; direct.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
By feeling that there is a God, Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of negative duty towards man.	Persons chiefly.....	Excited chiefly by facts; by imagination a little.	Increased by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of neglected duty.	Either.....	Excited by facts chiefly; also by imagination much.	Increased by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
Acquittiveness, etc.	By objects in relations of duty attended to.	Either.....	Excited by facts chiefly; also by imagination much.	Increased by repetition, etc.	The same or different.....	Either direct or responsive.	Either pure in quality.	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of injury.	Either.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	Increased by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One or two; responsive.....	Often differ in quality.	To appeasement.....	Great power.....	Pure.
Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of injury.	Either.....	Excited by facts.	Modified by repetition, contrast.	Different.....	One or two; responsive.....	Differ in quality.....	To appeasement.....	Variable.....	Impure.
Guilt, etc.	By objects in relations of injury.	Either.....	Excited by facts.	Modified by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
Responsibility, etc.	By objects in relations of evil-doing.	Either.....	Excited by facts.	Modified by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
Guilt, Shame, etc.	By objects in relations of evil-doing.	Either.....	Excited by facts.	Modified by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
Guilt, Remorse, etc.	By objects in relations without hope.	Either.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	Modified by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	
Ill-desert, etc.	By objects in relations of duty neglected.	Either.....	Excited chiefly by facts.	Modified by repetition, etc.	Different.....	One; responsive.....		To appeasement.....	Variable.....	

age of the Heart, more or less apply to the subjective feelings of this Table. Though defective, these Tables are a step in the right direction.

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God demands my obedience, and I have a subjective sense of "oughtness" that I should render it. This sense of the First Class has been aroused within me by the Divine command. I cannot divest myself of its impulse, and it will not be pacified until I comply with its behest and put myself in pacifying relations. But my own relation to the Divine command would not alone arouse this subjective sense of "oughtness" within me; it would be excited in precisely the same manner at the thought of any other creature disobeying God. Then while I am in this state other subjective senses of the First Class may act upon me. The thought of failure on my part arouses a strong condemnatory feeling against such a course—or the thought of compliance, a deep sentiment of approbateness in favour of it. Also, a subjective apprehensiveness of punishment, springing out of the same excitant, may warn me of the fearful consequences. However, this great mental conflict, kept up, it may be, on the one side, by subjective senses of the conscience, and on the other by some strongly insubordinate subjective feeling of the "Heart," may terminate in favour of the latter, and I disobey. Instantly my own conduct arouses within me a strong subjective disapprobateness against myself—a sense of ill-desert, or even that of remorse or despair, so forcibly described by the Apostle Paul, when speaking of the reprobate, "to whom there remaineth no more hope, but a fearful looking for of judgment."

It may be said of subjective senses of the conscience, in common with all others; that some of their number have a greater or less tendency to associate in excitement with certain others, or even to produce it. This is so clear that we need scarcely cite examples.

The work of the Imagination (see Def.) in the excitement or pacification of subjective senses of the conscience, is in general precisely similar to the service it performs in connection with subjective senses of the "Heart."

Its merely fictitious conceptions never produce deep feeling or pacify it. Yet their power is strong enough to make us susceptible of the existence and bent of such feelings, or to suggest relations of pacification which, by reason, we seek means of reducing to verities. Though incapable of arousing much feeling, yet in virtue of the power and readiness of the imagination in creating fictitious conceptions of objects in either exciting or pacifying character or relations, in both ways it does an important service.

For other particulars respecting the subjective feelings or senses of conscience, we refer the reader to the accompanying Table. (See Table C.)

The Subjective Senses or Feelings of the Will.

These senses differ in character considerably from those which we have been discussing in the preceding pages, in the fact that though states of the mind, they are entirely devoid of emotion, and cannot be said to possess either desire or aversion, pain or pleasure, impulse of obligation, or, indeed, impulse of any kind. Their relation to the other subjective feelings is such, that all other feelings seek the gratification or pacification of their impulse through them. And though these feelings in their own nature are immobile or stolid, they are all excited to action through the medium of others.

In discussing the other subjective senses or feelings, we spoke of the two relations which they sustain to outward things (that is, to conceptions of outward things), viz., the relation of excitement and the relation of gratification or pacification.

The subjective feelings of the Will sustain relations to outward things parallel to the other feelings, in this respect; but of course, from the nature of the feelings themselves, somewhat different.

They have their exciting relation and their resolving or consensative relation. The last relation we call "resolving" or "consensative," because, though the feeling, being different in its nature, cannot gratify or pacify, by a conception of a certain character or relation, it can be "resolutive" or "consensative" to it. The subjective feelings of the Will, then, have their relation of excitement and their relation of resolve or consent.

The more important of these subjective feelings or senses of the Will—for the list is very brief—are indecision, consent, and non-consent. But the subjective energy put forth is not one of them, being not a subjective state of the mind at all, but an act (physical or otherwise) which is a mere result of the subjective state of consent, and which will be discussed under the head of Will. The subjective feelings of the Will are just such as they require to be, conservative of their states, cool or devoid of feeling or desire, and will only excite to action by the presentation of the strongest motive.

As the action of these subjective senses will be discussed under the head of Will, no more need be said concerning them at present.

The Subjective Senses or Feelings of the Intellect.

The subjective senses of the Intellect—that is, of knowledge which is obtained by perception or inception—are doubt and assurance, which, like those of the Will, are mental states,

but devoid of emotion, desire, or aversion. They are the constant attendants of all conceptions; and whenever a correct conception merges from the hazy atmosphere of doubt into the clear skies of assurance, it becomes knowledge.

The subjective feelings of the Intellect, like all other subjective senses, sustain two relations to outward things—that is, conceptions of outward things. The nature of these relations, of course, correspond with the nature of the feelings.

The two relations of the subjective feelings of the Intellect are that of excitement and that of assurance. For instance, a thing presented in perception, is in the relation of excitement; and the thing as contained in the conception so formed, is in the relation of assurance. This is all that need be added to what has already been said respecting the subjective feelings of the Intellect, as they are freely discussed in connection with knowledge.

The Will.

The Will is to man's nature what the executive power is to the State. Through it, all the behests, laws, and impulses of our nature are carried into execution. However powerful the impulses of our nature may be within us, they must all seek their appropriate gratification through the medium of the Will; and unless they found vent through this medium, a man would be in the helpless plight of one tied up to be consumed of the raging elements unable to provide their appropriate sustenance.

Were it not that the Will intervenes between every subjective feeling and its appropriate gratification, every subjective impulse would rush to its own gratification, irrespective of the claims or rights of all other subjective feelings. But through the interposition of the Will consent has first to be obtained; and it is a law of the Will that consent can never be obtained till all the rights and claims of contending subjective feelings have been deliberately weighed and a choice made.

The Will thus looks to the general good of the community, and never yields to the suasion of any particular subjective sense or class of senses, till convinced that they have stronger claims than any that oppose them, or that they will not interfere with the general rights of the community.

The Will is thus, in man's moral nature, something more than the mere executive power is in the State. It wields a legislative power along with it. It is, indeed, something of a despot, listening to all the petitions or claims of his subjects, using the assistance of the Intellect in forming his judgments, and giving his consent only to what has the strongest claims. Yet the Will differs in one point of character from the despot. The despot may will capriciously above, or contrary to, the strongest claims set forth by any section of his subjects. The Will can never do this. Though not subservient, perhaps, to a weak motive, or to those in the minority, it must itself be always subject to the strongest motive, or to those in the majority. The Will, then, having no power capriciously to withhold consent from the strongest motive, can never be called a despot. Perhaps, the kind of government which human nature most nearly resembles is a republic, of which the Will, as president, is head. The human will, like him, is invested with executive power. It has liberty of action, but in accordance only with the voices of the commonwealth; and though the head of all, it is yet the servant of all, or rather, of the majority.

Wherever the powers of the will are well developed, and man's nature properly disciplined, the motives for and against a certain course of conduct are well considered before consent is yielded. Where these powers and discipline are defective, consent is too readily accorded under the strong stimulus of some subjective motive, irrespective of the stimulus of others which are unthought of at the time. Persons in whom this method of decision is a prevailing trait are usually characterised as impulsive. They yield at once to the subjective impulse that may be uppermost in their minds; and bearing on the will at the time.

The Will, then, the balance on which all motives must be weighed, a scale with two opposing arms. On the one arm are placed all the motives in favour of a particular course of conduct; on the other, all the motives presenting claims in opposition to it. While the balance remains in perfect equilibrium, the subjective feeling of irresolution or indecision is the one predominant in the ego; but when the balance sways to one side under the influence of one class of motives, the subjective feeling of consent is aroused in the ego or subject in their favour; and to the others is left only the feeling of non-consent, not in all cases, but in this where their claim comes into antagonism with those of more preponderating influence.

Introductory Analysis of the Will.

There are, then, just three subjective states or feelings of the Will possible with reference to an act:—(1) That of indecision or irresolution, when the will is in a subjective state of

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equilibrium; (2) that of non-consent, when the will is in opposition; and (3) that of consent, when the will is propitious.

It is evident, therefore, that no act of the will can ever take place till the subjective feeling of consent or resolution is aroused in the ego or subject. This is just the same as saying, in other words, that no subjective energy will either begin to act, or cease, except by a subjective resolution.

There are then just two stages or changes that occur in the will before an act is carried into effect:—(1) There is the resolution or consent to the act; (2) there is the subjective execution which carries the act into effect. The first, the resolution, or consent, is a subjective state or feeling, in reference to a certain conception; the second is a subjective act, carrying into effect the conception to which the resolution or consent has been yielded, which it does either by putting forth subjective energy or by withdrawing it. The subjective resolution or consent and the subjective execution (or energy put forth) might indeed be regarded as together constituting an act. The subjective resolution or consent originates the act, and the subjective execution (or energy put forth) accomplishes it; the former is the cause, the latter is the effect. The second, the subjective act, can never take place without the first, the subjective resolution or consent, in conjunction with it. The first, the subjective resolution or consent, may often occur without being attended by the subjective act; for we may consent or resolve to an act at the moment of doing it; or we may resolve only to do it at some future time.

Before explaining the difference between the case in which the subjective resolution is attended by the subjective act, and that in which it is not, it is necessary to observe that all subjective energy is so completely under the control of the subjective sense or feeling, that we have only to resolve that energy shall go forth, and it proceeds at once to work out our conception; or, if we resolve that it shall be withdrawn, it instantly returns to rest.

It works out the conception if it is a factor in the conception or object of resolution; if not, it remains inert. The manner in which the subjective energy responds to the subjective sense or resolution, is entirely spontaneous. We are conscious only of resolving that it shall go forth, and immediately we feel the movement, and the drain upon our subjective energies commences without any further interference on our part.

Each of us is endowed with this repository of energy or power; and the key to it is simply the subjective feeling of resolution or consent. "I resolve," is the simple sluice that opens the reservoir, shuts it, or makes it flow as we please. It is evident, then, that in every case in which subjective energy is an agent, it must be a factor in the conception whereunto we consent.

The difference, then, between the case in which we resolve or consent to do an act in future, and the case in which we conjoin the resolution and the act together, is this: in the first case, the consent does not actually include or cover the subjective energy, though it covers the promise of it.

The subjective energy itself is not a factor in the conception resolved on, although the promise of it is. The "I will" to the subjective energy has never been pronounced. It is simply a resolution that it shall be pronounced in the future.

In the second case, namely, that in which the subjective act and the subjective resolution are conjoined, the subjective energy, and not the mere promise of it, is at once a factor in the conception, and is covered by the resolution; so that the Ego or subject can say, "I resolve to put forth energy at this moment to do this act." The result is, that without further interference on his part, the subjective energies immediately come into operation.

It is also most noticeable here, that not only will the subjective energy neither begin to act nor cease except by a subjective resolution which covers it, but it will neither begin to act nor cease at any other moment than that in which the subjective resolution covers it. It commences work with a resolution, or it ceases work with a resolution; but mark, that it never commences to do either except just at the moment of resolution. For instance, if I resolve to put forth energy at this moment, it will respond to me at this moment; but if at this moment I resolve only that I shall put forth energy to-morrow, no energy will respond to me to-morrow, unless I shall resolve it again to-morrow at the very moment when I want it.

From this fact, taken in connection with the preceding ones, it follows that in the second case, namely, that in which the subjective resolution is conjoined with the subjective act, the ego or subject, in his subjective resolution, at once covers or includes the subjective energy in the conception which he wishes to carry into effect, knowing that it will immediately respond, which it certainly does.

In the first case, that in which a subjective resolution occurs without being attended by the subjective act, the ego, or subject, in fact, simply subjectively resolves at one moment that he will subjectively resolve again, at some future moment, to put forth energy to do

that act. His resolution in this case has virtually another resolution within it. He never attempts to make his resolution of to-day cover the subjective energy or to-morrow; because he knows the subjective energy of one moment will not respond to the subjective resolution of another moment. He leaves its response to the resolution of to-morrow—that is, to the one included in his general one of to-day.

It is quite plain, then, that every resolution is carried into effect by the subjective act, whether it precedes the subjective act or is conjoined with it.

In the latter case, the response of the subjective energy is immediate and certain; and in the former case, so long as the main resolution remains unchanged, the resolution included within it, and the response of subjective energy attached to the included resolution, are equally certain.

If the time resolved on for the act is allowed to pass without its being done, it is because either the resolution to do it has been changed or it has been forgotten.

It follows, then, from the foregoing, that when we have gained the subjective resolution we have gained the subjective act, and all that we can really possess. The subjective resolution is thus the key to the act.

There is really little if anything more than what we have already said to describe about the subjective act, so far as it enters the sphere of moral or mental phenomena. The subjective energy is a power that controls alike our mental or our physical operations; and it is a power, in all cases, subject and responsive to the subjective resolution.

The subject or ego has only to resolve that the powers of his mind shall act in a certain way, and they immediately respond by doing as he pleases; so also in regard to the powers of his body: when he resolves that they shall move, they do so immediately and spontaneously in accordance with his behest. Of course this statement holds true only of those powers of mind or body that are under the control of the will.

All the subjective energies of the mind, as well as of the body, are then alike responsive to the subjective resolution; and when we have followed the subjective resolution to its conjunction with the subjective act or energy, we have seen about all of the will and its operations that can be seen.

Having concluded our introductory analysis of the Will, we shall now proceed to discuss more largely the means and methods by which it operates; in other words, the means and methods by which a subjective resolution is aroused to perform a subjective act. Every rational creature resolves or consents from impulses or motives, just as every piece of machinery never goes of itself, but is impelled from some motive power. It is not, however, the impulse of fate that impels the human will; and here the analogy fails between man and the piece of machinery referred to. In the case of the machinery, it is blind compulsive force, irrespective of any resolution or choice in the matter. In man's case, the force is not compulsory at all.

The motive may be persuasive and urgent in its appeals to his resolution or choice, but it never takes the objective energy under its direct control. It can only act and seek its appropriate gratification through the medium of his own resolution. The Ego is still free whether to consent to or refuse its petition, however urgent; unless it is the motive most agreeable to his resolution or choice, which of course he is not able to refuse; for if he were so, he would at once be able to resolve independent of all motives; and this would render him no longer a rational creature.

This would be no liberty at all, but only destruction of man's nature.

We submit the following formula:—

The First refers to the subjective act.

The Ego, or subject, is always free in the sense of having liberty to act in accordance with his resolution or choice—that is, he is free in the sense that his act is the result of his own resolution.

The Second and others refer to the subjective resolution.

The Ego, or subject, is always free in the sense of being able to resolve in accordance with a strong motive when none oppose it, and with the strongest class of motives when another class oppose them—that is, he is always free or able to resolve in accordance with the motives that influence him most.

But he is never free in the sense of being able to resolve against a strong motive with none opposing it, or against the stronger class of motives when opposed to a weaker class—that is, he is never free or able to resolve contrary to the motives that influence him most.

Again, he is never free in the sense of being able to resolve independent of motives.

Still further, as all motives or subjective feelings are of a gratificatory or pacificatory nature, they being strong just as their impulses are desirable or agreeable, it follows, then, that the subject is always free to resolve in accordance with what is desirable or agreeable to

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him.* But the peculiarities of what is desirable or agreeable in the subject constitute what is called his disposition; therefore, the subject is always free to resolve in accordance with his disposition.

It is plain, therefore, from the foregoing, that every rational being subjectively resolves from, and through, the impulse of motives. The subjective feeling of consent, apparently the most sovereign of all subjective feelings, is yet the servant of all—we had almost said the most abject slave of all, at least of the dominant majority. The control of all our subjective energies rests in subjective resolution; and the control of all our subjective resolutions rests in the subjective feelings or motives which constitute the primary sources of volition in man's nature; and were these sources withdrawn, all resolution and voluntary energy would be at a standstill. The primary force which hurries the schoolboy whistling along the street—that makes the merchant jump behind his counter in quick response to the calls of customers, or that drags the farmer ploddingly over his harvest field, is a motive or subjective feeling. He may not be able always to tell you exactly what is the motive or feeling; and he may answer in a general way, that he does so because he loves to do it, or because it is his duty, etc.; but he is never surprised by your question, which supposes him to act so from the influence of some motive.

So much, then, for the fact that all subjective resolution is the result of motives. Let us now look more particularly at the character of motives. What are they? Our answer here is, that all motives are simply reducible to those subjective feelings of the Conscience, Heart, Taste, etc., which we discussed at length in an earlier part of this work. It is vain, therefore, to look for a motive outside of them. We have spoken very freely, in the earlier pages, about the action of these subjective senses, their methods of excitement, their impulses, while in a state of activity, upon the resolution or will, towards their appropriate gratification or pacification. It is now our duty, in discussing the will, to look at subjective resolution more immediately in relation to these subjective senses. In discussing these subjective senses, we showed that most of them are attended, while in a state of activity, with certain impulses towards their appropriate gratification or pacification. We now call special attention to the fact, that the impulses of these subjective senses, in a state of activity, constitute what we call motives or springs of action. It is they, and they alone, that influence the subjective resolution or consent in all its decisions.

In fact, there is no other conceivable power by which the subjective resolution of a creature can be influenced rationally. They first act upon the subjective resolution, then the subjective resolution or feeling acts upon the subjective energy, which accomplishes the deed which is to gratify them. There are in all three forces in volition, and they are the first.

People say falsely "that a man in certain cases resolves from habit." Habit is like inertia in matter; it is only a tendency to continue in states. It can never change its state from one of rest to motion, or from one of motion to rest. It cannot set the resolution in motion any more than it can arrest its progress.

Habit gives a tendency to run in old channels, if the impetus is communicated; but it cannot communicate the impetus. The true impetus to resolution or consent is the impulse of these subjective feelings or senses.

A man may be constrained to do a thing by physical force, but that is an act in which his own voluntary powers have nothing to do. If he were impelled by fear, they would have something to do; but in this case the motive would be the subjective sense of fear; and this would harmonize fully with our affirmation, that all motives or springs of action are purely reducible to these subjective senses of the Heart, Conscience, etc., in a state of activity. It is the impulse of these feelings, acting on the Ego, or subject, that excites the subjective feeling of resolution or consent within him, and sets volition in motion.

The impulses of these senses are called motives, when they are thought of in relation to the resolution, but this is a matter of indifference. They might as well be called "impulses on the resolution" as anything else, because it is on the resolution or consent of the Ego that they, as impulses, continually act. When we use the word motive, therefore, we do it simply in conformity with usage, and for convenience, not because it expresses the philosophical ideas more correctly than the word impulse.

There are, however, two distinct uses of the word motive. We may mean by the word

* Some assert that a man is free to resolve even contrary to the strongest motives; because they say, "he is conscious that he is free to do so." In reply to this, we have only to say that he is also conscious that he never actually does so. As parallel to this, we are also conscious that a stone is just as free to move upward as to fall to the ground, were it not that the gravitating force is there to draw it downward. The gravitating force in the resolution are just the motives. We never saw the resolution resist the motives any more than the stone the gravitating force. Neither of them is free, therefore, to resist the gravitating force. Both yield alike with the influence that is strongest to move them. In like manner, man is never free to resolve contrary either to a strong motive when single, or to the strongest class when others oppose them.

motive, either the subjective impulse or feeling itself, or we may mean by it only the object of such character or relation as excites it, or the object of such character or relation as gratifies it. This might be called three "uses"; but philosophically it is only two methods of use, the first referring to the impulse or feeling itself, the second referring to the exciting or gratifying causes.

These three uses of the word motive are quite common: for instance, on one person enquiring of another what motive led a third individual of their acquaintance to commit suicide, he may be answered that it was "disappointed love." In this case it is the subjective sense itself that is mentioned as the motive. He might also be told that the motive of their friend's suicide was the "slighting treatment which he received from a lady." This would not be giving the subjective feeling itself as a motive, but merely the object of character or relation exciting it. But, again, on asking what motive led their acquaintance to shoot himself in preference to any other mode of death, he may be answered that it was "that his death might be expeditious." In this case, it is the object of gratifying character or relation that is given as a motive, not the subjective feeling itself, which is "fear of pain."

In strict language, however, it is the subjective feeling itself that is the true motive; for it is it alone that is capable of exciting in the Ego the subjective feeling of resolution or consent.

Let us now show the reason why all of these are called motives, and also explain the relations which the objective or outside exciting and gratifying motives sustain to the true or subjective one.

The reason why in each of these cases the word motive has a right to be applied is this: A motive, to be a spring of action, must be a cause.

Though the subjective feeling or impulse is itself the true or real cause, yet, if there were no object of exciting character or relation, there would be no cause to rouse the subjective feeling into a state of activity or impulse; and if there were no object of gratifying character or relation, there would be no cause to attract the stimulus of the subjective feeling, while in a state of activity, towards its natural gratification, there could be no distinct presence, motives. There is first, then, the real or subjective motive; and secondly, the two acts on the subjective resolution or consent, and the subjective resolution or consent acts on the subjective energy. There are thus, in all, five factors in every act of the will. It is important, therefore, to note the relations which these factors bear to one another, and also to make a clear distinction between the objective motives or conceptions and the subjective motive.

There is first, then, the impulse of the subjective feeling itself, which is the true motive, and which we may distinguish as the Subjective Motive Proper. Then, second, there is the conception, or object of gratifying character or relation, which we distinguish as the Objective Motive Proper. It is proper, because it is the outside object, towards which properly the impulse of the subjective feeling presses, through the resolution or consent, for its appropriate gratification; and, third, there is the conception or object of exciting character or relation, which we call the Objective Motive Excitant. It arouses the subjective feeling—in other words, generates the impulse which brings the two motives proper into action.

It is scarcely necessary to remark to those who have heretofore read these pages carefully, that the objective motive proper and the objective motive excitant are often one and the same, because the conception, or object, of such character or relation as excites a subjective feeling, is often that which gratifies it.

Again, another important relation which the objective motive proper (or gratificatory) and the objective motive excitant, sustain to the true or subjective motive proper, is observable in the fact, that it is only by the actual perception, inception, or memory of these objective motives (in other words, by actually thinking of them), that the Ego can at any moment really perceive, or be conscious of, the subjective feeling or true motive within himself, so that he can be either sensible of it or feel its force.

For illustration of this let us look at the history of a subjective feeling. The Ego in the first case, looks at the object of exciting character or relation, which arouses the subjective feeling or impulse into a state of activity; and in the second case, the Ego, then under the force of this impulse, looks at the object in the gratifying character or relation, which the impulse itself suggests, and to which it prompts. At the moment in which he looks at the exciting object, he perceives the ensuving sentiment of his own mind as a subjective feeling, with tension having no outlet or direction. At the moment in which he looks at the gratify-

*The word "look" or "looks" in these and many following sentences, is used in the sense of "thinking of," viz., perceiving, conceiving, or remembering.

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ing object, he perceives the enswathing sentiment of his own mind as a subjective feeling, with
tension pressing forcibly towards the object in the character or relation in which he is looking
at it.

It follows, then, that though we may perceive, or be sensible of the subjective feeling in
a state of tension when we look at the objective excitant, it is only when we look at the objec-
tive gratificatory that we are able to perceive, and feel, or estimate fully, the force or tension
of the subjective feeling towards its natural outlet, namely, the objective gratificatory motive.
We indeed call this motive the objective motive proper, because it is only at the moment when
we look at it that the resolution or consent stands consciously between the subjective impulse
and its gratification, and the Ego is able fully to feel the strength of the stream towards it.

It will then be apparent from the foregoing that in every process of the will in which
subjective resolution or consent has to be aroused to perform a subjective act, these objec-
tive or outside motives perform a very important service in connection with the subjective
motive proper—in other words, the subjective feeling.

(1) As the subjective feeling or impulse is really the true motive, or, at least, the one
which acts directly on the Ego and excites the subjective resolution or consent, it will be
apparent from what has been said, that in order to be able to feel or estimate its force at any
moment on the subjective resolution, we must look at the objective motive proper—that is, at
the object of gratifying character or relation.

(2) But if the subjective feeling or impulse should not happen to be in a state of activity,
we may first require to rouse it by looking at the motive excitant—that is, at the object of
exciting character or relation; then by the use of the objective motive proper, we shall be
able to estimate accurately the amount of gratification arising from the indulgence of that
subjective feeling.

In all those cases, however, in which the exciting and the gratifying relations are one and
the same, the perception or thinking of the same objective motive answers both the purpose
of exciting as well as of estimating the strength of the subjective motive.

While discussing the subjective feelings of the conscience, heart, etc.—in other words,
subjective motives—in the earlier pages of this work, we very fully referred to and illustrated
the exciting and gratifying relations existing between them and objective motives or concep-
tions.

The subjective resolutions of the will, comprehending resolution or consent, non-consent,
and irresolution or indecision, are precisely subjective feelings or states of the Ego like them,
only devoid of impulse. And we must now call attention to the fact that all these subjective
feelings of the will, though devoid of impulse, sustain the same two kinds of relation, as the
subjective motive or feeling itself sustains to its exciting or gratifying objective motive or
conception. They have an exciting relation and also another relation exactly parallel to the
gratificatory or pacificatory of other subjective feelings, which, for want of a better name, we
call the resolving relation. We cannot call the latter relation either gratifying or pacificatory,
because the feeling is devoid of impulse; it is purely resolving. The subjective feelings of the
will, being of a different nature, cannot gratify or pacify by an object of particular character
or relations, but they can resolve or consent to an object of particular character or relations.
In other words, these subjective feelings of the will must always have something of particular
character or relations to excite them; and when they are in a state of activity there must
always be something of particular character or relations which they resolve; resolving or
resolution in the case of these feelings, from the difference in their nature, takes the place of
gratification or pacification.

All subjective feelings of the will, therefore, have their two relations exactly like other
subjective feelings—(1) their exciting relation; (2) their resolving relation.

In the relation of excitement, a subjective feeling of the will sustains the same relation
to the exciting subjective motive or feeling acting on it at the moment through the medium of
an objective conception or motive, as the subjective motive or feeling itself sustains to its
exciting conception or motive; and in the relation of resolving, a subjective feeling of the will
sustains the same relation to the subjective energy in carrying into effect the gratification
of the subjective motive through the medium of the objective conception or motive (conceived of
at the moment), as the subjective motive or feeling itself in its gratifying relation (through
the medium of the gratificatory conception or motive) sustains to the subjective resolution.

The subjective feelings, or states of non-consent and irresolution, which, along with
resolution or consent, make up the subjective feelings of the will, all alike possess their
relations of excitation and resolving, although they represent different states of mind; thus,
the resolve of non-consent towards its correspondent subjective act, is one of non-consent;
and that of irresolution is irresolution, in other words, indecision.

However, as the subjective feeling of resolution or consent is the one which is always

antecedent to a subjective act, we necessarily confine our attention mainly to it. The exciting and resolving relations of the subjective feelings of the will are never the same.

We showed very distinctly in another place, that at the moment in which the subjective resolution or consent covers the subjective energy, it (the subjective energy) acts.

The moment, then, that the subjective energy falls into or becomes a part of the resolving conception, the subjective resolution sustains resolving relations to it, and it (the subjective resolution) is carried into effect. And as we have also shown elsewhere, that all subjective resolution is virtually and truly either a resolution to do an act at the moment, or a resolution that we shall resolve to do it at some future time; it follows, then, that in the first case the subjective energy falls into immediate resolving relations with the primary and only subjective resolution concerned with it; and in the second case it falls into immediate resolving relations with the second resolution concerned with it, namely, the resolution included within the general one. The process of resolution in both cases is so sufficiently the same that the description of one process sufficiently describes all.

In a case, then, where there is a motive to an act with none opposing it, the exciting relation of subjective resolution or consent is just the impulse of the subjective feeling or motive acting on the Ego at the moment, through the medium of the objective gratificatory conception or motive; and the resolving relation of the subjective resolution or consent which has thus been aroused in the Ego, is just that the Ego put forth energy to carry into effect the gratification of the subjective feeling or motive, through the medium of the objective gratificatory conception or motive.

But in a case where opposing motives are concerned with an act, the exciting relation of the subjective resolution or consent are the impulses of the strongest class of subjective feelings or motives, acting on the Ego at the moment, through the medium of the objective gratificatory conceptions or motives, against the impulses of a weaker class acting on the Ego in the same way, whose gratification must be surrendered by the subjective act which gratifies the former class; and the resolving relation of the subjective resolution or consent, which has thus been aroused in the Ego, is just that the Ego put forth energy to carry into effect the gratification of the stronger class of subjective feelings or motives, through the medium of their objective gratificatory conceptions or motives so agreeing.*

Observe that in the preceding cases we have always to think of the objective conception or motive in order to feel (that is, perceive) the subjective feeling or motive; so also in regulating or putting forth subjective energy to carry into effect the gratification of the subjective feeling or motive, we have always to think of the objective gratificatory conception or motive in the same way.

Here again let us recall attention to the truth, that there are in all five factors or causes in a process of the will:—the objective motive excitant, which is a conception, arouses the subjective feeling or motive proper into a state of activity; the objective motive gratificatory, which is also a conception, acts on the subjective motive in a state of activity; the subjective motive acts on the subjective resolution, and the subjective resolution acts on the subjective energy.

Take good note of the fact, also, that the general medium through which all these factors work (not excluding even the subjective energy), is the objective gratificatory conception; while the objective excitant conception arouses the subjective feeling or motive proper, and sets the process in motion.

As we have now very fully unfolded and described the principles on which human volition is performed, it may still be desirable to describe and illustrate more fully these principles in action.

In a case in which we are influenced to an act by a motive or motives, with none opposing them, the process of volition is simply this:—The subject or Ego, under the stimulating influence of a powerful motive or motives, but starting in a subjective state of irresolution or non-consent, makes a survey of the outward objective motives or conceptions for the act, bringing each (that is, the conception of each) objective gratificatory motive before the mind in the object, character or relations which gratify respectively each of the subjective feelings or motives in the Ego (bringing in also the objective motives or conceptions excitant in the same way if any of the subjective feelings or motives are dormant); so that the Ego feeling or perceiving through their medium the strong desire or aversion of the subjective feelings or motives within himself, and estimating therefrom the gratification which they would give, has

* As pacification as a motive is equivalent to gratification, for the sake of brevity and simplicity we imply both under the general term of gratifying or gratificatory motive, conception, etc., in all statements like the above in which we have occasion to refer to them; as gratificatory and pacificatory motives act precisely alike in the will, there is no need for other than the one general term to imply both.

him to immigrate, promising him thereby a great improvement in his circumstances. Improvement of circumstances, arousing within him its appropriate subjective feeling or feelings, is a strong motive to him to emigrate. Under the impulse of great desire he is anxious to emigrate, but is still in a state of irresolution or indecision. He thinks of all the motives in favour of emigration, a splendid climate, a better house, a better farm, a better living, etc., to each of which his subjective feelings respond very cordially. A subjective resolution or consent arises within him to all these; but on the other hand, he shall have to leave his parents, his friends, the land of his fathers, etc., behind: these are motives appealing to his subjective feelings, over which he is yet unable to arouse or obtain the feeling of consent. Knowing that all motives cannot be gratified, he tries to obtain a feeling of consent over such as he should have to lose, by comparing them with such as he should acquire. He succeeds with some, but is unable to do so with others. He is still in a state of subjective irresolution or indecision. Continuing the effort, however, from day to day, weakening the force of some motives by familiarizing himself with the thought of their loss, strengthening the force of others by thinking of them more frequently, he finds the number of those over which he is unable to obtain a feeling of consent in favour of those with which they are compared, gradually becoming fewer or weaker, until at last he is able to arouse in himself the feeling of consent over them all in favour of those which induce him to go to America; and in consequence, he proceeds to regulate his subjective acts in accordance with his subjective resolution.

We need not multiply illustrations of this kind, as every person's experience makes him much more familiar with examples illustrative of this than with the underlying principles of volition, which we have been at some pains to explain.

It is here necessary to remark, that as there are just three subjective states of the will in reference to any particular act, namely, resolution or consent, non-consent, and irresolution or indecision, there are only three conceivable movements of the will:—(1) a movement from a subjective state of irresolution, or from one of non-consent to one of resolution, in other words, consent; (2) a movement from a subjective state of consent, or from one of irresolution, to one of non-consent; (3) or a movement from a subjective state of consent, or from one of non-consent, to one of irresolution.

One might imagine that there would be a difference in the manner in which these three movements are effected. Such is not the case. There is in reality only one mode of operation, namely, that which we have specially described in the preceding pages, and so fully illustrated.

Every movement takes place in a manner precisely uniform, and exactly in accordance with the rules and the illustrations, or examples, which we have given. But we go further than this, and assert that there is virtually and truly, not merely only one mode, but also only one movement, in a process of volition, namely, the first, or that movement which we have specially described and illustrated. For as we have stated from time to time, the Ego invariably, prompted by the impulse of motives, starts in a subjective state of irresolution or non-consent, and seeks to arouse or obtain a subjective resolution or consent to their gratification; consent or resolution being the only subjective feeling that can act on the subjective energy.

The other two movements, then, are only the converse side of this movement. As they never could take place except when there are opposing motives, this truth will be plain from the following facts:—Consent to an act is just non-consent to its opposite, and non-consent to an act is just consent to its opposite; consequently, when we pass from a subjective feeling of non-consent to one class of motives, to one of consent to the same class, it is virtually passing from a subjective feeling of consent to the opposite class of motives, to one of non-consent to the opposite class. The second movement, then, from a subjective feeling of consent to one of non-consent, is the converse side of the regular and general one, namely, that from a subjective feeling of irresolution or of non-consent to one of consent; in other words, it is virtually the same. The third, or the other movement referred to, is also virtually the regular or general one which we have given, with a failure to arouse a subjective feeling of consent to the opposing motives on either of the sides.

In addition to these facts, we need state only further, that as the impulse of motives is always to urge the Ego from a subjective feeling of irresolution or of non-consent to one of consent to their gratification or pacification; and as it is also only the subjective feeling of consent that controls the subjective energy, there is therefore only one movement in the process of volition, namely, the regular and general one which we have been at special pains to describe.

In drawing the discussion of this subject to a termination, we would remark that the process of volition may be carried on entirely by ourselves, or it may be carried on within us by the agency of another person, who seeks to persuade us to a particular line of conduct. We are all familiar with the rhetoric of the lawyer as he strives to obtain a favourable verdict

his circumstances. Impulsive feeling or feelings, at desire he is anxious to think of all the motives in harm, a better living, etc., A subjective resolution or he shall have to leave his motives appealing to him in the feeling of consent. Feeling of consent over such will acquire. He succeeds of subjective irresolution weakening the force of some strengthening the force of of those over which he is they are compared, gradually in himself the feeling of America; and in consequence his subjective resolution, his experience makes him underlying principles of

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from his jury, or the pulpit efforts of the clergyman to stir up his people to good works. A splendid example of this outside agency is Judah pleading with Joseph for the release of his brother Benjamin, as recorded in Genesis.

We close by giving an analysis or explanation of some few words used in connection with the Will:—

"Choice," for instance, is another name for subjective resolution or consent. We choose in favour of a motive when we subjectively resolve in favour of it.

"Rejection," in precisely the same way, may also be called another name for Non-consent.

"Purpose" or "Intention," thought of as a subjective state, is just subjective resolution, thoroughly aroused and resolved, to an act. A plan, purpose or intention, thought of as an object, is just an objective conception to which the subjective resolution has been accorded.

"Resignation" is the subjective consent associated with patience, a subjective feeling of the heart.

"Resolution" is just a different term for Consent; both mean the same subjective feeling.

The same facts may be asserted of Irresolution and Indecision.

Retrospect.

At this stage of the work it is necessary to remark that we have now very fully discussed the various powers of the mind as specified at the commencement of this work. At starting, we made the following popular division of the intellectual and moral powers of men, viz. (1) The Intellect or Intellect; (2) The Heart (including Taste, Heart and Conscience); and (3) The Will; this division being based on the three following propositions: (1) Man is a knowing creature; (2) Man is a feeling creature; (3) Man is a voluntary creature.*

The functions of the Intellect, comprehending latent consciousness, conception, perception, inception, reasoning, imagination, knowledge (equal to a correct conception with the subjective feeling of assurance), and other like powers, were all fully discussed and explained in the first department of this work, the discussion terminating with page 11.

The functions of the Heart (comprehending Taste, the Heart, and the Conscience) were also fully disposed of under the respective heads of the subjective feelings of Taste, of the Heart and of the Conscience, so that the treatment of these functions may be regarded as completed under these heads. They are purely subjective feelings, and their operation in relation to outward motives or conceptions, and also their action as impulses or motives in themselves on the subjective resolution or will towards gratification or pacification being very fully explained, little more remained to be said of them; their action however in these respects, in other words, as motives, is still more elaborately discussed under the head of Will.

The functions of the Will, a no less important department of the human mind, have also been very fully treated. Composed also of subjective feelings, viz., consent, non-consent, and indecision, the operations of these feelings in regard to motives, and also with respect to the subjective energy or action, have been made the subject of minute and careful examination.

While we are not done yet with either of the foregoing subjects, there are certain phases or powers of the human mind to which we may in the first place very profitably direct our attention.

Instincts.

All instincts are supposed to be certain innate tendencies or controlling principles existing in the Ego, which exercise a certain influence over his thoughts and actions. All instincts may be divided into two classes, the Conscious and Unconscious.

The Conscious instincts are those controlling principles of our nature which we can perceive, feel, or be conscious of while they act upon us. They are just those subjective feelings of the Heart, Conscience, etc., in other words, subjective motives of which we have already treated so fully in various places. The term "Conscious instincts" is then but another name for these subjective feelings. We know of no other conscious instincts than these, and we might just as well have omitted saying anything at all about conscious or any other kind of instincts, were it not that the term instincts is often applied to subjective feelings in works of this class. These instincts also might have as well been called sentient as conscious, seeing they are subjective senses.

* While making the above division of man's intellectual and moral powers, we did not overlook a still more simple elementary division of the same powers, viz., that of subjective conception and subjective feeling, to which two elements mostly all these powers may be reduced, and to which we shall again have occasion to refer at a further stage of this work. The above division, however, we have reckoned the most suitable for the treatment of the subjects which we have undertaken,

The Unconscious instincts are just those innate tendencies of our nature which are unconnected with any motive, feeling or principle that we can be conscious of. For instance, every person seems born with an innate tendency to speak the truth, unless under temptation to do otherwise. It may be objected here that this is because men obey the subjective feelings of conscience when there are no subjective feelings of a different class tempting them to disobey them. We admit this, where subjective feelings are sensibly at work; but we think it safe also to affirm that these innate tendencies exist even when the person is not consciously influenced by subjective feelings of any kind either good or bad. This blind facility or tendency cannot be attributed to mere habit, for habit will never enable us to do some things so easily, as habit will enable us to do certain others. There must therefore be a certain tendency or facility independent of all habit. Our own experience, if carefully watched, will supply us with the best proof of this. We observe tendencies or facilities in ourselves in certain directions, even at those times when we are not consciously influenced by habit or by any subjective feeling either good or bad, and that something of the nature of effort is required to overcome or oppose these tendencies. We also observe the same facilities or tendencies in the little child in whom the subjective feelings of either good or evil are scarcely developed; nor are they destroyed wholly even in the case of bad men who are habitually influenced by evil passions.

Now, all these unconscious instincts, we think, are resolvable to two things: (1) to the influence of subjective feelings or motives acting insensibly on us through the Latent Consciousness, and (2) to the make or plan of our mental and moral constitution, by which we are fitted to do some things more easily than we can do certain others.

With regard to the first kind of unconscious instincts, we think there is very good reason to believe that the Ego is affected in the latently conscious way by subjective feelings or motives of which at the time he may not be actually sensible. If what we said on Latent Consciousness at the commencement of this work is believed by the reader, he will have no difficulty in agreeing with us in all that we affirm in this statement. We say then that the first class of unconscious instincts are just the subjective feelings or motives acting on the Ego through the medium of the Latent Consciousness.

With regard to the second class of unconscious instincts, we would say that they are just those innate facilities or tendencies in the make of man's mental and moral nature, which fit him for doing some things more readily than others; that is, for doing those things for which he was created, and not those for which he was never intended. For instance, in man's physical nature it is easier to bend the fingers of the hand over the palm than to bend them backward; it is easier to walk with the face forward than with it backward; it is easier to obtain the sense of touch with the forefinger than with the great toe. As it is in the physical, so it is in the mental and moral. Man's mental and moral nature is so constituted that it enables him to do that for which he was intended with greater facility than that for which he was not intended at all. It is on this principle that it is easier for him to speak the truth than to tell a lie, all motives for it and against it being equal. For the same reason it is easier to be honest than to be a thief, easier to be single-minded or straightforward than to be double-minded or hypocritical. We need not attempt a complete enumeration of these innate facilities or tendencies; they pervade our whole mental and moral nature.

In conclusion, then, it is scarcely necessary to say that none of these instincts, conscious or unconscious, are motives or forces distinct or different from those which have been already introduced and discussed.

(1) Conscious instincts are merely another name for subjective feelings or motives.

(2) And unconscious instincts of the first class are not entitled to be called motives at all, in the proper sense, inasmuch as we are unconscious of their influence; unless we call them so on the ground that they are the ordinary subjective feelings or motives acting insensibly on us through the medium of the Latent Consciousness; in which their method of action must be precisely similar to those of which we are conscious, except in the fact of their being removed beyond the sphere of our knowledge or consciousness. They introduce therefore no new factor in the process of volition, in which the same motives present themselves consciously to the Ego.

(3) Unconscious instincts of the second class are certainly not motives or springs of action in any sense, any more than the facility of the fingers to fold over the palm is the force that folds them, or the tendency of the feet to walk with the toes forward is the force that makes them walk. All instincts of this class are both facilities and tendencies; that is, they give both a facility in doing a thing and also a proneness to do it.

Habit.

We have been speaking of the make or plan of man's mental and moral constitution, which gives him certain greater facilities or tendencies in doing some things than others.

our nature which are unconscious of. For instance, unless under temptation obey the subjective feeling class tempting them to work; but we think it person is not consciously his blind facility or tendency to do some things so therefore be a certain carefully watched, will facilities in ourselves influenced by habit or by the nature of effort is the same facilities or tendency or evil are scarcely who are habitually in-

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moral constitution, things than others.

These tendencies or facilities are natural, because they arise out of the special adaptation of his nature to certain modes of thought and action, for which he was intended. But a facility or tendency that is not strictly natural may be acquired in either of these things. We find by the repeated practice of modes of thought or action, not strictly those for which we may have innate facilities or tendencies, that it is possible, nevertheless, to acquire great facilities and tendencies in them: just as the athlete or gymnast, by the repeated straining of his limbs in peculiar shapes and performances, is able at last to acquire considerable facility in doing so. This acquired facility or tendency is called habit, and it enters largely into all our modes of thought and action. It is both a facility and a tendency, like the unconscious instincts of the second class, giving both facility in doing an act and proneness to doing it, only it differs from them in not being strictly innate, but acquired. Habit will give greater facility and tendency where innate facility and tendency previously exist, and create a certain amount of facility and tendency where none innate may exist previously. Habit extends its power largely over the subjective feelings, as well as over the intellect and the will. As the operations of both the intellect and the will become easier by repetition, so also does the excitement, etc., of the subjective feelings by much exercise; yea, so much so is this the case, that desires and appreciative gratifications, of which heretofore we have almost deemed ourselves incapable, have come to be sensibly felt through its influence. We must, however, beware of imagining that habit can create a subjective feeling. Habit will give facility and tendency in a faculty if it exists, but it never creates a faculty. Habit will give facility in the use of the hand, but it never creates the hand.

In conclusion, then, we may say that habit is the facility in modes of thought or action, or tendencies to them, which the mind acquires by practice; in other words, it is that power of the mind by which it accommodates itself to circumstances and works with facility under them.

Memory.

Memory is that power of the mind by which it is able to retain its conception of things and recall them at pleasure to conscious thought. All our knowledge of things thus stored away in the memory seems to be latently present in our consciousness, even when we are not specially thinking of them; and it seems to be also through this latently conscious power that we are able when we like to recall them to conscious thought; in other words, to bring them out of the shadow into clear light for inspection.

It is doubtful if a conception once lodged in the memory is ever absolutely lost, but the power of recalling it to the attention at pleasure may be lost, of which fact every one's daily experience furnishes ample proof.

This power of recalling conceptions from the memory usually or mainly depends on the following things:—

1. On Habit, the result of repetition, and which gives us facility or tendency in flashing up the desired thought or conception.

2. On the amount of subjective feeling, as excitant or gratificatory, caused by the conception at the time of its first lodgment in the memory.

This is so important an element in things to be remembered that we regard it as the one great essential to easy recollection. Conceptions which generate no subjective feeling of interest, pain, pleasure, etc., are to all minds difficult to recall. For this reason all conceptions involving objects of peculiar combination, character or relations, as contiguity, contrast, opposition, similarity, etc., awaken subjective feelings of interest, etc., and are easily remembered. All such characters and relations as awaken the subjective senses of beauty, admiration, love, fear, hatred, indignation, avarice, pride, approbation or disapproval, condemnation or acquittal, etc., are usually very easy of recollection. The more powerful the subjective feeling which may be caused by the conception at the time of its lodgment in the memory, the more easily is the conception afterwards remembered.

3. On the amount of time which a thing has been before the attention at the time of its lodgment in the memory. For this reason outward physical acts, such as the work or transactions of a day, are generally easily remembered. They are not more transitory conceptions fitting across the mind like a flash of lightning, but, from the circumstances in which they present themselves, are necessarily before the attention for a considerable time.

4. On the intensity of attention given to the thing at the time of its deposition in the memory. For this reason whatever has been observed with laxity of attention is seldom remembered without great effort, and things requiring considerable concentration of thought at the time of their observance are afterwards generally found more easy of recollection.

5. On association with things which from other causes are easily remembered. Things may thus be associated together either in the same conception or in the mind at the same moment by tactual succession.—See article on Tactual Succession of Thought, page 40. All

conceptions in the mind are somewhat like pictures; we cannot fasten the attention upon the central image, in which the chief interest depends, without also being conscious to a certain extent of all its contiguous surroundings. From this cause the recollection of a particular tree will always suggest the remembrance of a certain thought actually associated with the tree at the time of its first inception.

There are other influencing causes in the power of memory, but these we deem to be the chief.

In conclusion, it may here be asserted that the Latent Conscious Power, to which we devoted an article at the commencement of this work, is that kind of mental twilight by means of which everything that has in the past been stored away in memory, as well as everything relating to the present subjective state and environments of the Ego, insensibly acts on the mind at the same moment, and from the shadows of which it is wont from time to time to leap suddenly into clear light. It is hardly necessary, then, to repeat here that the Latent Conscious Power is a faculty altogether distinct from Memory.

SECTION II.

Simplest Analysis of Man's Mental and Moral Powers.

The powers of the conscious mind, reduced to their simplest constituents, may be characterised briefly as consisting of only *two* elements: first, subjective conception; second, subjective feeling. If we please, we might add to these a third power, viz., subjective energy or action. These and compounds of these make up all the departments of the Mind, Intellect, Heart, Conscience, and Will.

Intellect deals with the creation of true or false conceptions, attended with the subjective feeling of assurance, etc., and gives to us knowledge.

The Heart and Conscience deal with subjective feelings and the conceptions exciting or gratifying them, and give to us motives.

The Will deals with the subjective feeling of resolution, etc., as acted on by other subjective feelings or motives towards their gratification or pacification through the medium of conceptions, and gives to us subjective action.

The order in which these elementary principles work and influence one another through the Ego is as follows:—

Sense presentations, etc., act on conception and assurance in the Ego (or Knowledge), which act on subjective feelings of Heart, Conscience, etc., in the Ego, which act on subjective resolution of the Will in the Ego, which acts on subjective energy in the Ego.

All act on the Ego through the medium of conception. Thus a thought presented to the mind begins with the intellect, passes on to the heart, and terminates with the will.

Possible Modes of Thought, Tactual and Non-tactual.

1. Thought is just the act of turning the attention on to a conception; in other words, it is the conscious vision of a conception. Thought is thus but another name for perception, inception, or memory.

2. A conception is all that is consciously covered by the attention in one act of perception or thought. If the contents of the conception are large, the attention is diffused and general; if they are small, it is more condensed and particular.

3. All perception or thinking occupies a certain period of duration, and the attention in covering a conception has always a bright or brightening, and a fading period—that is, two periods.

4. In thought or perception the attention can only consciously cover one conception in one act; consequently, as no two conceptions can ever be thought together in one act, all conceptions must be thought singly and in succession.

5. There can be only two modes of thinking conceptions in succession, the tactual and the non-tactual. We think conceptions in non-tactual succession, when the first conception has completely faded from the attention ^{or} consciousness before the second conception has come into the consciousness. We think conceptions in tactual succession, when the second conception is brought into the consciousness before the first one has had time or power to fade.

* Tactual succession is under the control of the Will.

6. From this it follows that by non-tactual succession there can be no conscious vision (that is, perception, inception, or memory) of two conceptions in the mind at the same moment; and that by tactual succession there may be conscious vision (that is, perception, inception, or memory) of two conceptions in the mind at the same moment. In other words, by tactual succession of thought or conception we possess the power of being able to have two conceptions in the mind at the same moment, while by non-tactual succession we have the power of being able to have only one.

Modification of Thought.

A modification of thought or conception is an origination of new forms of conceptions out of or from the contents of conceptions already existing in the mind. A conception not made out of the materials of existing conceptions would be no modification at all.

1. We may originate new forms of conceptions out of the contents of one or more conceptions, provided we do not inceive them as exactly contained in these conceptions—that is, the new conception must contain the contents of these conceptions in a manner or disposition different from that in which they previously existed.

2. In the origination of new forms of conceptions out of or from the contents of conceptions already in the mind, with the exception of a new conception formed out of the contents of only one conception, there must always be two conceptions in the mind at the same moment, because, as the new conception will always be formed or inceived out of the contents of two or more conceptions, the conception inceived out of the contents of the first conception must always be present in the mind at the same moment with the second conception which is to be compared with it, from the contents of which second conception is inceived a still further modification of the conception which is being formed; for how can we compare one conception with another which is a blank in the mind?

3. It follows, then, that while we are able to inceive a new conception or modification of thought from the contents of one conception by non-tactual thought, we are unable to inceive a new conception or modification of thought from the contents of two or more conceptions, except by tactual thought alone.*

4. As all modification of thought is done either by reasoning or imagination (when the latter inceives at all from the contents of other conceptions, which it often does not), the difference between reasoning and imagination is, that in reasoning we inceive the contents of the new conception as contained in the conceptions from which they are taken, and that in imagination we may inceive the contents of the new conception either as contained or not contained in the conceptions from which they are taken, provided the latter are not known conceptions.

5. It follows from this, that in imagination we may inceive from one or more conceptions, while in reasoning we must inceive from two or more, but never from only one; because to inceive as contained in only one would produce no modification of thought.

Therefore all reasoning must be done by tactual thought; and imagination (when it inceives at all from other conceptions) by non-tactual from one conception, and tactual from two or more.

Process of Thought in Originating New Conceptions from Contents of Others.

Process of thought, tactual or non-tactual, in originating new conceptions from the contents of others; in other words, the process of originating new conceptions, tactually or non-tactually, in reasoning and imagination.

1. From one conception, Non-tactually, we imagine as follows:—Bringing the contents of the one conception before the conscious vision or attention of the mind, we inceive a new conception (modification) out of them—that is, we inceive a new arrangement of these contents.

2. From two or more conceptions, Tactually, we either imagine or reason as follows:—Bringing the contents of the first conception, fading, and the contents of the second, bright or brightening, at the same moment, both under the conscious vision or attention of the mind, we inceive from both their contents a new conception which will contain either whole or in part the contents of both the first and the second. Then thinking in the same way the contents of this newly-formed conception, fading, and the contents of a third conception, bright or brightening, we inceive in like manner a new conception out of the contents of both.

* We think tactually whenever there is the adjustment of the parts of one conception in or with those of another conception with which it is compared. The resultant is a third conception. Consequential thought is not tactual thought. Consequential thought is the case of one conception merely resulting from another antecedent to it, in the same way as a sense presentation is antecedent to the conception made by it. A case of tactual thought occurs whenever two conceptions are compared; the result is the formation of a third. The first two are thought tactually, the third consequentially.

This last formed conception will contain in it the contents of the three originals from which it was taken. In this manner we may originate a new conception from as many originals as we please.

It is thus by the tactual succession or conjunction of two conceptions (one fading and the other bright or brightening) under the conscious vision or attention of the mind at the same moment, that we are able to conceive a new conception out of their united contents; for though we should have one conception in the mind, unless we are able to bring another conception alongside of it in the mind at the same moment, we should have no means of comparing the two, or of adding to the one something out of the other, or of uniting something of both in a third; how can we compare one conception in the mind with another that is a blank? or how add to a conception that is nowhere from the contents of another in the mind? or how unite the contents of two in a third, when one of the two is missing? How should it be possible either to compare, connect, or observe the relations between the contents of two conceptions when the mind or attention, having at any time got hold of the one conception, finds the other persistently absent?

This tactual succession or contact of thought is illustrated by the comparison of two outside objects; for in looking with the eyes at the one object, if the conception so made vanished from the attention at the moment the eyes left the object, there would be nothing left in the mind with which to compare the other object looked at. It would only be trying to compare it with a blank. This carrying a blank from the one object to the other would make all comparison, connection, or modification of conceptions impossible.

We would remark here, in conclusion, that while the mind is capable only of thinking conceptions singly and in succession (one at a time), yet by the power of the attention in tactual succession to retain at the same moment the first conception, fading, and the second conception, bright or brightening, it is able to add indefinitely to the number of our conceptions, known and unknown, from these already in the mind. By non-tactual succession its powers are narrowly limited.

Synoptical Sketch of Conceptions.

1. All possible forms of conceptions are composed of objects of certain character or relation, which also may be subdivided into minute parts.

2. All possible kinds of conceptions are (1) Known (that is, correct with assurance); and (2) Unknown (that is, correct without assurance, or incorrect with or without assurance).

3. The only possible order in which conceptions can come into the conscious vision or attention of the mind is singly (one at a time), and in succession.*

4. All the possible modes in which they can present themselves to the conscious vision or attention of the mind, are, (1) Either as single conceptions, non-tactual at the same moment, or (2) As two, in tactual succession at the same moment.

5. All the possible processes in the mind by which they come into the conscious vision or attention, either as remembered or as originated for the first time, are as follows:—(1) Known and unknown conceptions alike, as old, may come from memory by remembrance. (2) Known conceptions, as new (a), may come by perception; that is, either by the perception of the objective sense presentations of external objects, or by the internal perception of the feelings, states, acts, &c., of the mind itself; (b) or they may come by reasoning, that is, by the inception of objects or things as unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions. (3) Unknown conceptions, as new, may come by imagination; that is, they may come by inception; (a) from the contents of no other conceptions known or unknown; or (b) by inception from the contents of other unknown conceptions, whether conceived as unitedly contained in two or more of them, or as not unitedly contained in them; or (c) by inception from the contents of known conceptions, if not conceived as unitedly contained in two or more of them.

6. From the foregoing propositions it is evident that all conceptions come into the attention of the mind, as old, by the process of memory; and as new, by the processes of perception and inception, the latter of which is equal to reasoning and imagination.

It is also evident that the only processes by which we originate new modifications of thought or conceptions, from the contents of conceptions already in the mind, are reasoning and imagination; the only great instance in these processes which is not a modification originated from old conceptions, being that case of the imagination, in which we conceive a conception from the contents of no other conception.

7. All the possible uses or purposes which conceptions, chiefly known ones, serve in or under the conscious vision or attention of the mind are as follows:—(1) They are the medium between the Ego and the objective world, self and not self; (2) they represent both in

* Remember always, that by conscious vision we mean the attention, not a sense presentation.

memory; (8) they are the medium of knowledge, the form in which it is composed, the materials with which the intellect works; (4) they are the medium of exciting subjective feelings or motives into activity; (5) they are the medium through which the subjective feelings or motives in activity seek their gratification; (6) they are the medium through which the subjective feelings or motives arouse the subjective feeling of resolution or consent in the Will; (7) and they are the medium through which the subjective resolution acts on the subjective energy; that is, the resolution seeks to verify them as gratificatory, and also to direct its energies by conceptions, formed as a plan, to this end.

Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Intellect.

1. The Intellect is that department of man's nature which has the powers of conception and cognition, which is conception with assurance, in other words, knowledge.

2. It possesses the power of thinking conceptions in only two modes, that is, it may either perceive, inceive, or remember them; (1) in non-tactual succession with only one conception consciously before the attention at the same moment, or (2) in tactual succession with two conceptions in the mind at the same moment; that is, with one conception consciously unfaded from the attention, while at the same moment another has been brought consciously before it, as in the case of the comparison of two objects by which we are able to perceive wherein they are alike or different, or the inception of a new conception from the contents of two or more other conceptions already in the mind. By this tactual mode of thought the mind has power to inceive a new conception from the contents of as many old conceptions as we may choose to put into it, but in doing so it is never able to inceive from the contents of more than two conceptions at the same moment.*

3. The Intellect possesses the power of either recalling (remembering) old conceptions already in the mind, or of originating or creating new conceptions in the following modes. Classifying these modes of the mind as non-tactual or tactual, its only possible powers are as follows:—(1) By the non-tactual mode of thought (a) it may recall or remember old conceptions from memory; (b) or it may originate or create them by the perception—of objective sense presentations from outward things—or of the mind's own feelings, states, acts, etc.; (c) or it may originate or create them by inceiving them from the contents of only one conception, or, independent of all foreign help, from the contents of no other conceptions at all. (2) But by the tactual mode of thought only, it can originate or create conceptions by inceiving them from the contents of two or more other conceptions, either as contained in these conceptions or as not contained in them.

Classifying these possible powers or modes of thought on the principle which we have adopted elsewhere, and which is more convenient, (1) We can re-think or recall an old conception from memory. (2) We can originate or create a new conception, (a) by perception; (b) by reasoning, that is, by inceiving it as unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions; (c) or by imagination, that is, by any other mode of inception.

Perception and inception (the latter of which includes both reasoning and imagination) are the only possible modes of creating a conception. A conception to be created or originated has to be one not hitherto in the mind.

4. The Intellect also possesses the power of Knowing, that is, of creating a correct conception with the subjective feeling of assurance that it is correct, in the following only possible modes:—(1) By the non-tactual mode of thought, it can know only by perception. (2) By the tactual mode of thought, it can know only by reasoning. (3) By imagination, though both tactual and non-tactual in its mode of thought, it is impossible to know.

Classifying or putting these powers or modes in a more definite and convenient form, the only possible modes or powers of knowing are as follows:—(1) We can know, in other words, create a known conception by perception, because thereby a correct conception is created with assurance that it is correct.—[See pages 5, 6, etc.] (2) We can know, in other words, create a known conception by reasoning, that is, by inceiving a conception as unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions; because thereby, as was elsewhere shown, a correct conception is created with assurance that it is correct.—[See pages 9, 10, etc.] But, as was also elsewhere shown, we cannot know or reason from only one conception.—[See pages 9, 10, etc.] (3) We cannot know, in other words, create a known conception by imagination; because, supposing a correct conception should happen to be created thereby, we cannot be assured that it is correct.—[See pages 9, 10, etc.] (4) Therefore if the conception which we want to know is unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions, we can know it by reasoning; if not so contained, we can know it only by perception. (5) From the above it then follows that the primary source of all our conceptions or ideas is perception. (6) In the

* The power of thought as tactual or non-tactual is mainly under the control of the Will.

manner detailed in the foregoing propositions the mind has the power of perceiving or knowing either its own acts, states, etc., or the objective world through sense presentations, including also that of perceiving or knowing its own subjective feelings which momentarily enswathe the objective presentation as one conception, and as such, of laying them past in memory.*

The Possible Uses of the Intellect.

1. It is the medium of cognition and connection between the subjective feelings in the Ego and the outer world or itself. The Ego without the Intellect would be merely a bundle of inert subjective feelings without any stimulus from either himself or the outside world to set them in motion, and without any intelligent channel or medium to regulate them while in action. Without consciousness there could be no subjective feeling aroused, felt, or perceived; and consciousness always embodies itself in conception; and both consciousness and conception are functions of the Intellect. The Intellect introduces the conception, which, when backed by subjective assurance, is a sure introduction to all other subjective feelings.

2. Through the medium of conception it shows to the subjective feelings their appropriate exciting causes or stimulus in the outer world; in the same manner it shows their appropriate gratificatory or pacificatory causes or stimulus. It shows to the subjective resolution of the Will the subjective feelings or causes that will afford gratification, or that will afford most gratification, pacification, etc. It shows also by what means the gratification or pacification may best be obtained, and how to regulate the subjective energy so as to secure it.

3. In conclusion, putting the substance of the foregoing in another form, yet equally correct, the Intellect shows to the subjective senses or feelings all it sees in the outside natural and moral world, and learns from the appreciative subjective senses or feelings themselves to discern what is beautiful, what is desirable, what is right or wrong, what is holy and good.

Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Subjective Senses or Feelings.†

1. They are the powers of the mind that make us moral and sentient beings.
2. They always arise in the subject and enswathe the objective presentations or conceptions which excite or gratify them; and it is only at the moment in which the exciting or gratifying conceptions are brought before the attention (whether by perception, inception, or memory) that we can perceive or be conscious of them, that is, of the subjective feelings.
3. It is by the appreciative power of these subjective senses or feelings that we are able to perceive æsthetic or moral qualities in the natural or moral world, as for instance the beautiful, the amiable, the hateful, the right, the wrong, the good.
4. It is by the enjoyable power of these subjective senses or feelings that we are capable of a sense of pain or pleasure, desire or aversion, good or ill-desert, misery or happiness.
5. It is by the impulsive power of these subjective senses or feelings acting as motives proper on the subjective states or senses of the Will, that resolution or consent to an act is aroused.
6. It is by the subjective power of resolution or consent as a subjective sense or feeling, that the subjective energy is regulated in the act as required.
7. And it is by the realizing power of the subjective feeling of assurance, aroused and attached in the Intellect to a conception, that the things pertaining to ourselves and the outside world are recognized as verities and exercise their legitimate influence over our whole nature.

Uses of the Six Classes of Subjective Senses or Feelings.

The first, namely, those of mere Pain, Pleasure, etc., arising from a physical source, discern and provide the means of physical preservation. This class is of two kinds, as stated elsewhere.

The second, those of the Taste, discern and provide æsthetic enjoyment.

The third, those of the Heart, discern and provide social and moral enjoyment.

The fourth, those of the Conscience, discern duty and stimulate to the performance of it. The subjective feelings of Conscience are God's law written in letters of conscious sense, and

* Though a subjective feeling may immediately subside, still it leaves its conception or impression in the memory.

† By the threefold division of man's mental and moral nature into Intellect, Heart, and Will, it will be remembered that the general term "Heart" used here just implies only those classes of subjective feelings which were formerly discussed under the three respective heads of "The subjective feelings of Taste," "The subjective feelings of the Heart" (the term Heart having in this case a more restricted sense), and "The subjective feelings of the Conscience." Of course, the other subjective feelings belong to the Intellect and the Will.

are legible enough even now, in our depraved state, to show an honest reader the true road to holiness and happiness."

The fifth, those of the Intellect give conceptions power over the other subjective senses or feelings.

And the sixth, those of the Will, give the other subjective senses or feelings power over the subjective energy.

Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Will.

1. The Will is that department of our nature which intervenes between the subjective feelings or motives and their appropriate gratification or pacification.

2. Its powers are, (1) its three subjective states or feelings, resolution or consent, non-consent, and indecision; and (2) the subjective energy.

3. Of its three subjective states or feelings, the only one that has power over the subjective energy is resolution or consent.

4. The only mode in which subjective resolution or consent to an act can be aroused, is through the impulse of subjective feelings or motives, acting through the medium of conceptions. (1) It may be aroused by one strong motive with none opposing it; or (2) it may be aroused by the strongest class of motives when two classes of motives oppose one another.

5. The subjective resolution or consent, when aroused, can always act on the subjective energy when it covers it, but even when aroused it can act on the subjective energy in the moment only that it covers it; consequently, (1) when we resolve or consent to do an act at this moment, the subjective resolution covers it at this moment; (2) if we resolve or consent to do an act at some future time, the subjective resolution covers not the subjective energy itself, but only another resolution which will cover the subjective energy at that future time.

6. The subjective energy always acts in accordance with the subjective resolution, and has power to regulate the mental and physical acts and sometimes states of the subject, and also to a certain extent the affairs of the outside world.

7. The Ego is never free to resolve, independent of motives or contrary to the strongest motive; but he is always free to resolve in accordance with the strongest motive or those most agreeable to him.

The Ego is always free to act, do or use the subjective energy as he resolves; but he is never free to act, do, or use the subjective energy but in accordance with his resolves; in other words, the Ego is always free to resolve and to act as he pleases, but never free to do otherwise—that is, he is never free to be bound.

Uses.

1. Were it not that the subjective energy which possesses power to control our physical and mental faculties, and also to a certain extent the affairs of the outside world, is thus hinged on to the subjective resolution, the Ego would be powerless to secure the gratification or pacification of his subjective feelings or impulses however he might resolve.

2. By the intervention of the subjective resolution between the subjective motive and the subjective energy, the same faculty that is influenced by the subjective motives has the power of gratifying or pacifying them.

3. Without the intervention of the subjective resolution between the subjective motive and the subjective energy, the subjective motives would be mutually destructive of the gratification or pacification of each other, or of the greatest amount of gratification and happiness to the Ego, because the motive that happened to be in the consciousness at the moment would control the subjective energy to the neglect of all others out of the consciousness. By the intervention of the subjective resolution or consent every subjective motive or feeling is provided with a bar, before which one and all may plead and secure a conscious hearing ere anything is done that affects their general interests.

4. Through the medium of the subjective resolution, consent is given to those motives that promise the greatest amount of happiness.

5. And through the medium of the subjective energy means are put forth to secure it.

Synoptical Sketch of the Mutual Relations of the Intellectual and Moral Powers.

1. All of these powers are faculties of the one Ego; the Ego thinks, the Ego feels, the Ego wills; and it is in the Ego that all of these faculties act on one another.

2. Man's nature as a conscious, thinking, in other words, as a perceiving, reasoning, imagining and remembering being, lies in his intellect.

* The second, third and fourth classes make up the "Heart" in the threefold division of man's mental and moral nature.

3. Man's nature as an appreciating, valuating, desiring, disliking, loving, hating, good or bad, righteous or unrighteous, miserable or enjoying being, lies in his subjective feelings of Heart, Conscience, Taste, and those from a physical source.—See page 44.

4. Man's nature as a motive appreciating, resolving, acting or energetic being, lies in his will.

5. The intellect shows to the subjective senses or feelings the various objects which they are to appreciate, love, hate, condemn, approve or enjoy, and affords light to the faculties of the will in arriving at its decisions and in carrying them into effect.

6. The subjective senses of the Heart, Conscience, etc., enable the intellect by their subjective appreciative responses of beauty, desire, hate, love, condemnation or approval, etc., to discern also those corresponding objective qualities in the things that excite or gratify them.

7. The subjective feelings of the Heart, Conscience, etc., also, by bringing their impulses to bear on the faculties of the will, make man not only a sentient but an active, energizing being, and secure to him a greater measure of happiness.

8. The subjective senses or feelings of Conscience occupy a supreme place among the subjective feelings. They are the guide or rule of duty, and as befits their office they are inflexible and imperative in their impulses, while all the others are flexible and easily capable of being modified in accordance with those of conscience.

The subjective feelings of Conscience cannot be modified without an outrage to our nature. They are a law which prescribes our duty or obligation to God, secures the rights and the happiness of our fellow-men, and develops the highest degree of happiness in ourselves.

9. The Will regulates all the non-spontaneous functions of the intellect, so that it may act (that is, perceive, reason or imagine) for the general good, and also by its assistance secures the proper material for it (the will) to work upon. Assisted also by the intellect it gives a candid hearing to the impulses of all the subjective feelings; but if a well-ordered will, it is ever infallibly led by those of conscience, and under their domination gives to all the rest such a measure of gratification as shall tend most to the happiness of the whole.

10. In man's three-fold nature, conceptions coming from the outside world, etc., pass in a constant stream of thought through the intellect (appearing there in the form of thought), and arouse in their passage a continuous, varied, and ever-fluctuating tide of subjective sense or feeling in the Heart, Conscience, etc., which in its turn generating impulses, presses on the will and stirs it into earnest, varied, and constant action. Thus man, being acted upon by things external, in turn reacts upon them.

A thought in the soul is like a ray of light; in the intellect it illuminates, in the heart and conscience it heats and expands, and in the will it breaks forth into energetic action.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Acts and States of the Mind.

Every phase of man's intellectual and moral nature is either a subjective state or a subjective act. Perception and volition are subjective acts. Subjective senses or feelings are subjective states. Sense presentations of the five senses may be called "objective subjective states."

Things Unthinkable or Inconceivable, Contradictories, etc.

A thing is unthinkable or inconceivable when it is impossible to form a conception of it, as of a house standing nowhere in space.

A contradiction of thought is an attempt to form a conception, one part of which denies or annihilates another part. It is an attempt to think a thing to be "so and so" and not to be "so and so," with respect to the same quality at the same moment, as a man with a mouth and without a mouth at the same time.

If things are unthinkable or inconceivable, they must be so from only two causes: (1) from their nature, or (2) from their extent.

1. Nothing in the universe, that can present itself to the human mind in any manner in the form of a conception, is unthinkable or inconceivable from its nature, unless it contains a contradiction—that is, one part of its conception cancelling or destroying another part, supposing the thing to be and not to be at the same moment. Such a conception cannot be formed even by the imagination—that is, as an unknown but conceivable conception. Far less can it be formed as a known conception, because in addition to its conceivability we require it to be correct and ourselves to be assured that it is correct, which would enumber it with two more impossibilities.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the universe, that can present itself to the human mind in any manner in the form of a conception, that ever, in its nature, contains a contradiction;

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in other words, that ever is and is not at the same moment, that ever possesses an attribute and does not possess it at the same instant, so that in forming a correct conception of it we require to think a contradiction.

Therefore nothing in the universe, that can present itself to the human mind in any manner in the form of a conception, is unthinkable or inconceivable from its nature, and all contradictions of thought or conception being unthinkable as well as incorrect, are mere violations of thought.

2. Nothing in the universe, that can present itself in any manner to the human mind in the form of a conception, is unthinkable or inconceivable from its extent, except in so far as its limits may extend beyond or without the conceiving capacity of the human intellect—as, for example, the infinite extends beyond the capacity of the finite.

The human intellect can think even infinity itself correctly so far as it goes, but its capacity is limited, and it can think but a finite portion of infinity, just as a vessel can hold but its own capacity of the waters of the ocean. We can then even think infinitude itself, and without a contradiction, only we must do so in limited portions. Thus as God is infinite in all His attributes, whichever of these attributes can be presented to the human mind in the form of a conception contains no contradiction, and is conceivable and thinkable enough to the degree in which the finite conceptive powers of the creature have caught its conception, and as far as they contain it.* There is a way, however, of attempting to think infinity, that involves a contradiction and renders conception impossible. Infinity has no limits, it is a limitless whole; when we try, therefore, to think it as a whole with limits, the conception involves a contradiction, and it is unthinkable. The very attempt to grasp it all into the finite mind gives it limits. For the very same reason, to think of things existing as nowhere in space or duration involves a contradiction and is unthinkable, because the mere conception of existence itself, means to be in both space and duration.

We might also add here that we cannot even negatively modify or change a conception that has been created by accurate perception or correct reasoning without introducing a contradiction, either in the conception itself or between it and other conceptions, and rendering either itself or the others at the same moment both inconceivable and unbelievable.

Let us now remind the reader that with things (which persons may suppose to be in the universe) that cannot be presented to the human mind in any manner in the form of a conception, we have nothing to do. Suppose such things to exist, they are out of human consciousness, and they can never enter it, because it is unfitted to receive them. Such things would be things inconceivable or unthinkable in the strictly true sense.

It is of things that can or do present themselves to the human mind in any manner in the form of conception that we speak, and to which we devote this article on things unthinkable or inconceivable, contradictory, etc. The human capacity of conception is of course limited, but the very fact that a thing is presentable at all to our mind in the form of a conception shows that the human mind is capable of dealing with it, and dealing with it aright.

In regard to things inconceivable or unthinkable in general, it is always well to remember the following facts:—

1. That what is inconceivable to us purely from the limitation of our powers of conception, and not from its containing a contradiction of thought, is never attended with a conscious sense of "it must not," or "it cannot be so;" and we feel free to believe it, though we do not feel able to conceive it.

2. That what is inconceivable to us from its containing a contradiction of thought, is always attended with a conscious sense of "it must not," or "it cannot be so;" and we feel neither able to conceive it nor to believe it without violating some cognitive principle of our nature.

3. The inconceivable from limitation arises then from limitation or defect in the conceptive powers of the mind. The inconceivable from contradiction arises from defect in the conception formed.

4. The conception formed under limitation may be perfectly correct so far as it goes; if attempted beyond the limit of our conceptive power, it would be incorrect. The conception formed with a contradiction is never correct.

Things Thinkable or Conceivable as Knowable, etc.

1. Everything that is thinkable or conceivable by the human mind is also capable of being known by the human mind, provided we have the means of ascertaining by perception or reasoning that the conception we have formed of the thing is correct. Because, if a thing is thinkable or conceivable, it is possible to form a conception of it; and if we have the means

* Of attributes of God that cannot be presented to the human mind in the form of a conception, of course, we know nothing, and have nothing to do with such.

of ascertaining by perception or reasoning that this conception is correct, then we have a correct conception with assurance that it is correct—thus we have all the elements of knowledge.

2. Everything unthinkable or inconceivable by the human mind is not capable of being known by the human mind, because, without adding further proof, no conception of such thing is possible, therefore no knowledge is possible.

3. Every attempted conception of a thing, unthinkable or inconceivable from its involving a contradiction, we do know to be incorrect, because we know that for a thing to be and not to be in the same sense is impossible, and therefore the contradictory conception of it so attempted to be formed is also false.

4. An attempted conception of a thing unthinkable or inconceivable from limitation of our conceptive powers, will not be correct, because the thing is beyond our conceptive powers.

Origin of Ideas or Conceptions.

1. We suppose the mind of an infant at a certain period to be without ideas. How do ideas or conceptions originate as the child advances into conscious thinking power?

2. Of our primary ideas or conceptions:—(1) A large proportion are originated from the mind itself by internal perception of its own subjective states, feelings, acts, etc. (2) And the rest of our primary ideas are originated by external perception of outward things through the five senses.

3. Of our secondary, or modificatory ideas, originated by inception, all are originated by reasoning or imagination from the primary ideas or conceptions which have been derived by perception from the mind itself or from the outside world. (1) Those originated by reasoning coming from the known and distinct primaries; (2) and those originated by imagination coming from vague and unknown primaries.*

4. Though the imagination has power to invent and originate new modifications of ideas, it is doubtful whether it has power to invent in the strictest sense a primary idea or conception, that is, to create out of no conceivable material already in the mind, as, for instance, to conceive of a colour that the mind has never before seen in existence.

5. From the above it follows that all our ideas or conceptions are derived from the mind itself and from the outside world.

Methods in which some of the more important Fundamental, Primary and Secondary Ideas or Conceptions are formed.

Some writers on this subject appear to us to err in limiting our powers of conception too much, others in widening them to too great an extent; yet, on the whole, we think that the greater source of error and the one most prolific of doubt is the too narrow limitation. Adherence here to true principles is of the greatest importance, for if once we get truth and error mixed together the error vitiates and renders uncertain even the truth with which it is alloyed.

Mansel, as we understand him, affirms that both space and time in themselves are not objects of sensible intuition, but are distinctly conceivable only in conjunction with objects related to them.

Now, in the first place, we do most certainly hold that the conception of anything (or even of nothing) as existing out of or apart from both space and time is absolutely impossible, for such a conception would involve a contradiction of thought, because the very idea of existence means to be in both space and time. It follows then that, whenever we think of objects as existing or being at all, we think of them as existing in both time and space.† But, in the second place, though we can by no means think of objects out of or apart from both time and space, it by no means follows that the perceptive consciousness of either time or space apart from objects is impossible. We maintain that we can be directly conscious of either. Every man is directly conscious of the "Now" whenever he thinks of it. That Now is time; and when from memory he thinks of the "Nows" that are past, either as associated with objects or as not associated with them, he is conscious of some "Nows" being near and of others more remote. In a similar manner he can think of the future; the "Nows" that he is conscious of at the present and in the past he can conceive of as being in the future. All these "Nows" of the present, past and future, put together, are adequate in themselves to give a general notion of time. So also in regard to space: every one with his eyes open (or even shut) is conscious of the "Here" and the "There" that are before him. Some "There"s are near, others are remote. He is conscious enough of the unity and

* Of course modifications may in like manner be originated from the secondaries themselves.

† Time and duration are to be understood here as meaning the same thing.

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differences linking all these "Heres" and "Theres" together; and whether occupied by objects or simply vacant, all these "Heres" and "Theres," together constituting space, are tangible enough in themselves to the perceptive powers.

But while we may receive a notion of time and space by either of the preceding methods, we are by no means confined to these sources for the idea or conception of either. The ideas of both time and space lie at the very threshold of consciousness. The very formation of a conception is impossible without them. Every conception formed conceives of either something or nothing to be or exist, but neither something nor nothing can be or exist except in time and space, for its very being or existing is an intrusion into both. "To be," even during a flash of lightning, is an intrusion into both time and space for that period. Even nothing (the negative of something) must be somewhere and at some time as well as something, if it be or exist at all. The ideas or conceptions of both time and space then can be flashed up in the mind from various sources.

While speaking of the origin of our ideas of time and space, we may also add that it furnishes examples of how we may know certain things to be infinite. We know both time and space to be infinite. In proof of this, we would remark that we know both time and space to be of such a nature that they cannot be annihilated. We do not refer merely to experience as furnishing this evidence, although experience certainly does furnish proof. Both duration and space have always been in the past and are now; and we know that nothing within the range of our experience can possibly annihilate them in the future. But the evidence to which we now call attention arises out of the very nature of time and space themselves as revealed to us.

Take time first as an example:—

Time or duration is pure continuance. Now, if duration or continuance were to cease to be or exist, its negative non-duration or non-continuance would at once begin to be or exist in its place; but if even non-duration or non-continuance were to be or exist but for a moment, it would become continuance. The very fact of non-continuance or non-duration being or existing at all transmutates it into continuance, because to be is continuance. There would thus be duration or continuance before non-continuance began to be, continuance while it continued to be, and continuance again after it had ceased to be. There are just two alternatives, continuance or non-continuance; if either of them cease to be, the other must begin to be, and both alike are continuance; thus continuance or duration cannot be destroyed. Time must therefore be infinite, for it is impossible without a contradiction of thought to conceive it possible to annihilate it.

In precisely the same manner we may prove space to be infinite, for, suppose space to be limited or bounded, that something or nothing which bounds it must be or exist; but that something or nothing to be or exist must be or exist somewhere; that somewhere is space. We can never without a contradiction of thought thrust a somewhere out of space.

The above are examples of how we may know both time and space as well as other things to be infinite.

In a manner similar to the foregoing we can know that power exists, and that every effect must have a cause.

Power is energy. When we see energy in action, we know therefore that energy must exist. So also when we see a change take place in an object which we know does not possess self-ability of change, then we know that it must derive that change from the ability of something external to it. Every effect must therefore have a cause, and if a cause be not inherent it must be external. So also we know that every effect must have an adequate cause, and that the properties cognizable in the effect must exist in the cause; that whatever exists must possess attributes and modes; that states, properties, functions, etc., cannot exist except they inhere in substance or subsistence; and that design in the effect must invariably have a designer in the cause.

Notes.—Some philosophers of a certain school ignore the existence of causation and power, and substitute in place of them a something which they unwittingly invest with the same properties. This something they call the antecedent, etc. Cause and effect they call "Antecedent" and "Sequent." They deny either cause, or power, or effect. They say in meaning, if not in so many words, "Postulate certain antecedents and certain sequents will follow." Now we know that a change cannot follow in any object unless the ability to change it exists either in the object itself or in something else which effects the change in it from the outside. If we are told that the change is due to "Antecedence and Sequence," we reply, that "Antecedence" is a nonentity (non-substance), and "Sequence" is a nonentity; but as "Abilities" to produce changes or effects cannot inhere in nonentities (that is, be properties of them), therefore they must inhere in the entities or objects which thus produce effects in one another. The term "Causes" or "Powers" is sometimes applied to the "Abilities" themselves, and sometimes to the objects in which they inhere, of which they are properties; but surely no sensible person can afford to regard as mere myths either the "Abilities" themselves, or the objects in which they inhere. We believe that this denial of the existence of power, cause, etc., arises partly from contradiction of thought, and partly from a mistrust of the cognitive powers of the mind. The apostles of such doctrine doubt everything and believe nothing except that

everything is doubtful. They out-Sadducee even the Sadducees, for they believe neither in a world nor spirit. Instead of harmonising the world by a reign of belief and conviction, they would reduce it to a formless void of doubt and uncertainty, in which every element of our intellectual and moral nature, finding no guiding principle of either intellectual light or of morality, would rush to the chaos of unbridled lust and to sure destruction.

The child probably receives his first notion of vacancy from the apparent vacuities of space around him, from locomotion, movement of the hand, etc. He might form his notion of solidity from many sources; for instance, from shaving a stick with his knife or eating into an apple. He might form his notion of fluidity and its relation to solids from water, ice, etc.; of shape or conformation by sight and touch; of nature of essence or substance by essential or inherent attributes. We believe that all such ideas or conceptions in the mind of the child are of slow growth, and are being repeatedly corrected by experience in childhood.

Extent and Perfection of our Knowledge.

Some minds have apparently difficulty in believing that even the limited knowledge we possess is in any way reliable or perfect. They seem to entertain the opinion that all our conceptions are conceptions of things as they merely appear to us, not of things as they really, absolutely, and essentially are in their own nature. These people doubt everything and believe nothing.

For our part, we believe that as objective truth is a verity and is one, so also subjective truth is a verity and is a unity, or at least is intended to be so, throughout the universe.

To conceive a thing assuredly to be, not what it may appear to be, but what it really and absolutely is, is perfect knowledge. If a thing is conceived of as it really and absolutely is, the conception formed of it will be the same in the minds of all intelligences alike, whether angels or men.

Is our knowledge then real and absolute, perfect so far as it goes? We maintain, that though very limited in its compass and completeness, it is perfect so far as it goes. In evidence of this we call attention to the following facts:—A thing is conceived of as it really and absolutely is when we conceive of it according to its inherent and essential attributes, that is, those that are real. A thing is conceived of only as it may appear to us when we conceive of it according to its merely accidental and extraneous attributes, that is, those that are only apparent.

The question then is, have we always power to know the inherent, essential, or real attributes of things, and do we always form our conceptions of things according to these attributes? The following propositions will distinctly answer these questions in the affirmative:—

1. In perception and reasoning, through which all assured conceptions originate in the mind, we have power always to know, in other words, to distinguish the attributes of a thing that are merely accidental, extraneous, or apparent, and the attributes that are inherent, essential or real. This, by perception and reasoning, mixed or otherwise, we can do even in the most complicated cases. Thus when I perceive with the sense of sight an objective appearance before me, I know that light is no real attribute of that object though it is reflected from it, because the object is not self-luminous. I know that that object is not a mere phantasmal appearance in my own mind, because I get the touch of resistant matter from it by my hand outside of me. I know that pain is no real attribute of that object, because, though the touch of it is cold enough to pain me, I am conscious of pain being a subjective state of myself. I know that solidity is an inherent attribute of that object, because it resists my touch—in other words, gives the touch of solidity. I know that object to be brass, because sight, touch, hearing, etc., give the visual appearance, hardness, resonance, and other essential attributes of that metal.*

Then, as we are able to distinguish the inherent and real properties of matter, so also, by means precisely similar, we can distinguish the essential and real physical, intellectual and moral characteristics of the human beings, etc., around us. We have just as free access to their inherent mental qualities, states and acts, as we have to the essential states and properties of non-organized matter. The subjective feelings or states of the mind reveal themselves on the surface by their impulses.

The intellectual faculties unfailingly indicate their character and power in abundantly

* In the above manner we are able easily to trace and to know the inherent, the essential, and the real of material things in all their modes of existence, and also to distinguish therefrom whatever is merely apparent. Thus solidity itself in one sense may be called a mode of a certain piece of matter, but we know very easily that it is an inherent attribute of that matter to be solid at one given temperature, and to be fluid at another; and it is also very easy for us to distinguish these facts from everything in their methods of presentation, that some minds try to regard as illusory.

open and multifarious ways. It is needless to enumerate instances here, or to make plainer what is already so clear.*

In all such cases, by mixed perception and reasoning, we are able to distinguish between what belongs to the object itself, and what belongs to the mere objective sense presentation by which it reveals itself to our minds.

2. We know that the conception which we always seek, and which we obtain in perception and reasoning, is the conception of the thing according to its inherent real or absolute attributes, not according to the merely accidental or apparent; that is, the conception which we always seek and obtain is the conception of the thing as it really and absolutely is, not what it may merely appear to be. Thus in conceiving of an object that presents itself by sight, we never conceive of colour, the means by which objects are distinguished from one another, as anything else in it than merely the inherent power of its surface in reflecting certain rays of light; nor do we conceive the sensations that come from the object in touch to be inherent qualities of the object, but only objective sense presentations, reflective or representative of cold, heat, hardness, softness, or other inherent and absolute qualities of the object. We do not conceive of the sensation of sound as inherent in the object from which it comes, but simply as sound waves propagated or originated by it.

The mind ever stretches through all that is merely accidental or apparent, and unfeelingly forms its conception in what is real and absolute in the object. If the existence of an object is uncertain by visual perception, then we ascertain it by touch or such of the senses as will reach it. We prove its hardness by touch; its weight by feeling through the muscles; its fluidity, taste, shape, or resonance by one or all of such senses as will reveal the inherent qualities sought after. If these unaided fail to perform the task, then cutting, grinding, weighing or such other mechanical or chemical appliances are resorted to as may render effectual assistance.

We ascertain in a manner precisely similar the essential elements of personality in the beings that surround us. We conceive of the goodness or of the badness of these beings from the feelings, states, acts, etc., that constitute an essentially good or bad man; of their real mental or physical abilities from the inherent power or direction indicated by these powers in a state of activity. So also we do in regard to all the other qualities that really inhere in their characters, taking nothing for granted as real in them except what we find essentially inhering in them, surveying the individual character in varying circumstances, and, as we do with matter, even experimenting upon it, until we are able to attain what we have been seeking after, a conception of the person as he really and essentially is. All such processes as the preceding are invariably made up of mixed reasoning and perception; so the processes we have been describing fully involve both.

Having found then the attributes that are real and inherent in the object, which it certainly does by these means, the mind forms and rests in the conception of the thing that is real and absolute, but not before it has made sure of finding it. That the mind finds the real and absolute conception of things is even quite evident in the case where objective sense presentations intervene between the mind and the object; but wherever objective sense presentations do not intervene, as in the case of internal perception, in which the mind takes cognition of its own feelings, states, acts, etc., and has direct access to the real and absolute in the object; and in the case of pure reasoning, from conceptions already in the mind, the above difficulties to the conception of the real and actual are removed.

In internal perception, the mind never recognizes any intervening medium between itself and the thing conceived of; and it knows its conception of the thing to be, therefore, real and absolute.

In pure reasoning, no misconception of things can ever originate, though it may be perpetuated, if it exists in the conceptions from which we reason. If such misconception does exist, we have only to correct it by the perception of the object in question.

We need scarcely repeat here what we have so often said elsewhere, that there is nothing deceptive in the objective sense presentations. They never lead astray, unless we assume something that they do not affirm.

Here then we may well add, that though we possess only two sources of knowledge, namely, perception and reasoning, yet these means are, nevertheless, adequate to make our knowledge truly marvellously great in extent, and perfect as far as it goes.

3. Lastly, that the conception which we form of things is always the real and the absolute

* Mind has manifoldly more methods of manifestation than matter, and is much more traceable in all its modes, besides interesting us more, and coming nearer to us in all the relations of life. It is true that mind or heart is deceitful enough at times, and has the power of practising deceit before its fellows, but we have just as many methods of tracing it in its deceit as in its truthfulness. Man is untrue only when acting contrary to the Creator's design, and at war with himself.

one, is confirmed by the fact, that our own general experience and the experience of all other intelligences fully accord with one another in regard to it. The real and absolute conception will be the same in the minds of all intelligences alike, and at all times.

Thus, if I know that a stone stood in a certain room during daylight, the fact is confirmed by my stumbling over it in the darkness. The vessel that I perceived to be broken yesterday, I see lying in fragments to-day. The knife that I perceived to be sharp yesterday, I prove to be sharp by its cutting my fingers to-day.

If John's body is crooked or deformed as conceived of by me, his body will be crooked or deformed as conceived of by intelligences everywhere. If John is at London now as conceived of by me, he will be at London now as conceived of by the inhabitants of heaven and earth alike. If John is a bad man, he will be conceived of as bad by every angel in heaven as well as by myself. If he is good, wise, or prudent, he will be conceived of as good, wise, or prudent, by high and low, celestial and terrestrial alike. A ship on the sea will be a ship on the sea, whoever may think of it. A man's nature, as intellectual, sentient and volitional, will always be conceived of as intellectual, sentient and volitional, whether by the mind of men, of angels, or of Divinity itself.*

The External Relations and Surroundings necessary to bring all the Powers of Man's Intellectual and Moral Nature fully into play.

The various subjective senses or feelings of the Heart, Conscience, etc., together with the intellect and the will, with all of which man is constituted, require suitable and corresponding surroundings to give them full scope and development.

Man is a creature fitted by these feelings to love, to esteem, to form social relations of friendship or of obligation, and to find unspeakable enjoyment in them. Without suitable objects on which to exercise these feelings, his nature becomes a perplexed, tortured void. He needs the society of his fellow-men, the presence even of the irrational animals, and all the multifarious things of the world, to give him the surroundings that his nature requires.

But man as a creature is also fitted by these senses or feelings to revere, to adore, to worship, to trust, to feel a sense of responsibility or obligation to a Being immeasurably greater than himself.

The existence of God is, therefore, as necessary to his nature as the existence of his fellow-men. The feelings and faculties that need God, are just as real in his nature as the feelings and faculties that need man. What man would be without a fellow-creature to esteem or love? He would be without a God to revere and adore,—a creature endowed with faculties that were eternally to lie idle,—a creature with desires that were never to be gratified.

1. But as we cannot love, esteem, or form friendship with a man of whose existence we know nothing; so no more can we revere, adore, or obey a God that has never been revealed to us. It was, therefore, necessary that God should be revealed to us as well as man; so that the class of faculties pertaining to each might be put fully into exercise.

This fact leads us to expect such a revelation of God at man's creation, as the book of Genesis records. Man's nature would have been an enigma without it.

2. Then, that all the subjective feelings of the Heart and Conscience, either those that pertain to God or those that pertain to man, might have full scope and development, it was necessary, in order to give this, that God, as well as man, should present suitable phases of character, and also present Himself in suitable relations to us.

(1) Thus in regard to the senses or feelings of the Heart:—The presentation of God's character as holy, just, and good, is required to excite my feelings of veneration, adoration, etc., just as the presentation of what I value in the character of my fellow-man is needed to arouse my sentiment of esteem. The presentation of God in the relation of my Creator and Preserver, is just as necessary to awaken in me the sentiments of creature trust and dependence, as acts of kindness on the part of a fellow-man to arouse in me the sentiment of friendship.

(2) So also in regard to the subjective senses or feelings of Conscience:—If relations of trust and obligation had never been established between man and his fellows, it would have been impossible to give scope and exercise to the subjective senses of obligation which pertain to fellow-men. For this end it was necessary that the race should all spring from the same

* Some minds seem to imagine that knowledge, as a fact conceived of and believed, must be a different thing to one order of creatures from that in another. How can this be so? If a thing is what it is, then the conception of that thing as it is must be the same in all minds alike, just to the extent in which each mind is capable of conceiving of it. To know a thing as it is, even to a limited extent, is absolute knowledge just to the extent in which it includes fact. This is the knowledge that human beings understand. Knowledge that we do not understand should be called by a different name.

family, be of the same brotherhood, and be formed alike in the image of God. As the senses of obligation are varied, it is necessary that the relations which give them activity should also be varied and suitable, which they are.

And it is so also with reference to those subjective senses of the Conscience which pertain to God:—It was necessary that God should reveal Himself in the relations of Creator, Preserver, and Sovereign Lord, to impart the proper stimulus to the corresponding subjective sense of dependence and subjection in the creature,—that some divine command or injunction should be given to impart distinct activity to the subjective sense of individual obligation,—that both promise and threatening should be held out as stimulative of the anticipatory senses, namely, expectancy of reward or expectancy of punishment, and that a prohibitory test of obedience should be demanded, that the individual might fully recognize his own distinct moral agency, and have the proper degree of quickening to his sense of responsibility. Such a revelation of God would have many sides; and it would be absolutely necessary in order to afford the corresponding and suitable stimulus and pacification, not only to those senses of conscience which pertain to God, but to them all.

8. Though each external relations as the foregoing are perhaps most eminently necessary on the part of the subjective senses or feelings, they are, nevertheless, absolutely needful on the part of the intellect and the will.

(1) Take away from man's intellect the revelation of God alone, and man finds himself endowed with powers of conception far beyond the limits of his field of vision. He is as a man shut up within prison walls, to whom his jailor has given a telescope of far-reaching power, without any opportunity of using it. Finding no God within the range of his experience, he conceives of one according to his fancy. The position of a man without God would be exactly similar to that of a man without a fellow-man, who would be to himself a mystery, and who would invent men of the creatures or objects around him, and invest them with men's attributes. It is thus that the heathen invent gods of the creatures or objects that excite their fear or veneration, and invest them with attributes of divinity.

(2) So also with reference to the will; finding no supreme will in the universe, around which his own may revolve as the planets around the sun, all a man's actions are but the erratic wanderings of a planet without its gravitating centre. As the absence of a revelation of God would leave the subjective feelings of Conscience out of balance, so also it would cause the subjective resolution or consent of the will to become but as the helpless plaything of a disorganized and unregulated rabble, and be absolutely destructive of the end for which man was created.

4. With the preceding suitable relations, all man's intellectual and moral nature can be in harmony with itself. The Intellect, the Heart, the Conscience, the Will, can exercise each its functions properly; without suitable relations neither of them can do so. In the case of those nations that have no knowledge of the true God, the subjective senses that pertain to Him are exercised on idol substitutes, which the conceptive intellect has endowed with the necessary attributes, and which the Will obeys or disobeys capriciously, as suits best the whim of the moment.

To me there seems no evidence more impressively corroborative of the testimony of the first chapters of Genesis, than that afforded by the approach to them from this side of intellectual and moral philosophy.

The Effects of Man's Fall in Eden, as they are at Present Found in our Intellectual and Moral Nature.

That a causality, mutation, fall, or something equivalent to it, has occurred to disturb the order and harmony of our intellectual and moral nature, is abundantly evident from the presence of moral evil, from the antagonism prevailing in man's own nature in the subjective feelings of conscience always demanding what the other parts of our nature concede to be only their just requirement, while we are conscious of being unable fully to meet their requirements in practice.

The same truth is evident also from the fact that a better and more harmonious order of things is not only quite conceivable as possible, but that in many cases it is attainable to a certain degree by persons living in our midst. It is only in degree, however, that we find any approach now to the perfect standard which the subjective senses of the Conscience demand. Christ however is an example of the attainment of that perfect standard; and supposing Christ had never lived, His written history (granting it could have been written) is unanswerable proof of such perfect attainment being possible to man's mental and moral constitution. There is nothing of the nature of a jar in the mind of Christ; every part acts in harmony with the others, and yet that life on the human side of it is perfectly human and natural.

It is quite plain therefore that a better order of things in man's nature is not only conceivable, but it might also be quite attainable but for a certain disorganization or want of balance somewhere, notably in the subjective senses or feelings of the Heart and Conscience.

The Intellect no doubt suffers, though our conceptive ideal is on the whole correct; so also may the Will, though we cannot see that much hurt has been done there, for the Will is always true to the subjective feelings or motives, whatever they may be. We find the kernel of the whole mischief lying mainly in the subjective feelings or motives, and of these, chiefly in the subjective feelings of the Heart. The subjective feelings of the Conscience, which are the true rule of duty, have had their power weakened by constant violation, and the subjective feelings of the Heart have been corrupted or unduly strengthened by pernicious or over-indulgence. The withdrawal of Divine influences at the Fall, and the exposure to evil influences supervening, no doubt, tended mainly to produce these results in the subjective feelings of both the Conscience and the Heart. The subjective feelings of the Conscience now need to be strengthened by Divine influences, and those of the Heart purified.

As the subjective feelings can be affected only through the intellect, the medium through which this moral derangement came was doubtless conception with assurance. We cannot see that a correct conception with assurance could in any case do harm; an incorrect conception with assurance would do harm.

As it is evident that the greatest part of the evil in man's case lies in the insubordination of the feelings of the Heart to those of Conscience, it is easy to see, from the constitution of man's mind as being evidently framed to be in harmony with itself and with its moral and physical surroundings generally, that the greatest amount of gratification to the feelings of the Heart lies in their subordination to those of Conscience; nothing therefore but a "conceptive lie" introduced into the mind could be the means of provoking antagonism between them. The lie, believed, by representing things falsely in a matter in which the subjective feelings of the Heart and Conscience were alike concerned, would present man's outward natural and moral surroundings out of harmony with his mind, and so put his mind out of harmony with itself, that is, his subjective feelings of the Heart, out of harmony with those of Conscience. A conceptive lie therefore, such as Satan introduced into the minds of our first parents in Eden, is just such means as we might expect to be alone capable of producing that insubordination on the part of the feelings of the Heart to those of Conscience, which we find now existing.

The tendency of the lie, believed, in a case diversely affecting the Heart and Conscience, would be to produce antagonism between them, and to corrupt and strengthen the feelings of the Heart, while it weakened and broke down the legitimate authority of those of Conscience over those of the Heart and indeed over the whole nature. The authority of Conscience once broken, disorder and lawlessness is at once introduced, divine influences and favour withdrawn, and man left a prey to his own error. This, from a philosophical standpoint, must certainly have been the manner in which the disorder in our nature was introduced. Add to the above the fact that the lie of Satan was not one the truth of which our first parents had no means of calling in question, it was preceded by a command and a statement from God asserting the contrary; also that the subjective feelings of their Conscience represented and asserted God's law in their soul. The moment therefore that they yielded to Satan's temptation, they violated the subjective laws of their Conscience, disbelieved and disobeyed God, and became morally guilty, while a subjective sense of blame and ill-desert supervened. Here then we have the only theory that will adequately explain the origin of the disorder and anarchy which we find in our nature. To be candid, from the philosophical standpoint, the theory of the Bible is the only one that will do so.

The object of any remedy for this state, really fully meeting the necessities of man's case, would be, first, to restore the subjective feelings of Conscience to their legitimate power and authority; and second, to subordinate and purify the subjective feelings of the Heart.

The scheme by which this must be accomplished must on no account violate any subjective sense of Conscience, but pacify and honour it; any other method would at once weaken and destroy the feelings that require to be restored and strengthened.

The Conscience could never be upheld and strengthened by a scheme in which it found any part or any actor violating its claims.

The substitutive redemptive scheme of Christ, by satisfying perfect justice (for the Conscience makes no allowance for slips, though the Heart may) in the place of the sinner, handing over new life as a favour, and providing divine means for a perfect regeneration of the Heart, Conscience—the whole nature, indeed, moral and intellectual—is the only means capable of restoring man's nature to that order and harmony which it originally possessed; and we positively defy any close student of man's moral and intellectual nature to suggest and devise any other means of even the remotest practical feasibility.

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As everything which is done by God can only be but right and perfect, so every thing and every actor in this plan of redemption legitimately and fully upholds and satisfies all the subjective feelings of the Conscience as well as those of the Heart; while the result of the plan is to correct, purify, and bring into legitimate order all that is wrong in man's moral and mental nature. Had the plan failed in either of these things it had been inadequate.

Still further as to the mode in which all this restoration can be effected, part of the means employed must operate through man's consciousness, and part operate outside of it.

With regard to the first part of the means, as it is not possible to reach the subjective senses or feelings, where the evil mainly lies, in any other way than through the medium of conception; and as a conception, to have the desired subjective result, must not only be correct but be attended with assurance or faith: it follows that the remedial scheme, in so far as it works on man through his own consciousness, must approach him through the intellect in the form of a conception attended with assurance of faith; and this is just the method of the Gospel, viz., "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved."

Then the nature of the conception itself must be suitable. As man cannot otherwise help or deliver himself, the conception demands of him only simple acceptance of, and trust in, Christ for salvation, which the external means, God's Holy Spirit acting on him at the same moment, enables him to yield.

Then harmony being thus established between the mind and its chief outward environment (just at the point where it was first interrupted), the restoration is begun; and as begun by conceptive truth acting through the consciousness on the subjective feelings, etc., and by the Holy Spirit acting outside of it; so in like manner, by these means, it must be carried on in stimulation through the consciousness and renovation from outside of it. The subjective feelings as motives, the intellect, and the will, acting under new forces and new circumstances, of course need exercise, and grow thereby, just as the diseased functions of a sickly invalid restore and invigorate under the influence of wholesome physical exercise. O, what profound philosophy is under the words of Scripture, "Father, sanctify them through Thy truth;" "Faith without works is dead."

Conscience.

That the feelings or senses of Conscience are as much a fact in our nature as those of the Heart, nothing but the sheerest ignorance of himself will give a man hardihood to deny. The fool who treats Conscience as a mere imaginary ghost or myth, will find, like Voltaire, that Conscience carries too sharp a whip and strikes too heavy a blow to be set down as an idle creation of childhood. That I have a sense of "oughtness," of right or wrong, of good or of ill desert, is just as certain as that I have a sense of love, of friendship, or of esteem. If I can ignore the existence of the subjective feelings of Conscience, I can ignore the fact of my having feelings of any kind, or even a faculty of knowledge.

We have already said that the subjective feelings of Conscience are the Law of God written in man's soul in letters of living subjective sense; that they are the clear and unfailing guide to duty; and that they differ in their nature from all other subjective feelings, being inflexible and imperative in their demands, at the same time allowing large scope within their fixed limits for the play of all the other social and enjoyable feelings—in fact furnishing a guide to them. Thus Conscience itself is the law of Love, allowing a certain compensative freedom under mutual engagements, but punishing the transgressor of its code with terrible retribution, and that, too, with a rod of its own manufacture, and from which there is no escape.

That the perfect obedience which the subjective feelings of Conscience require is no bare conjectural hypothesis unattainable in practice, and that it involves nothing impossible to the intellectual and moral constitution of man, is evident from the example of perfect obedience furnished by Christ. We see in His history the full play of all the other social and moral subjective feelings, without a single instance in all His career of any that were contrary to, or fell under the requirements of, a perfectly-developed Conscience; and yet He was a perfectly natural man.

We say, then, that the subjective feelings of Conscience, where perfectly developed and legible, are a sure and infallible guide. That in our present depraved state they are not perfectly developed and legible, is not denied; and yet if such a Conscience as we have were implicitly followed, we do not know that we should fall into much sin. Nevertheless, since this law has in some measure been obliterated in man's nature, God has been pleased to give a conceptional transcript of it in the Decalogue. The subjective feelings of Conscience thus revived in the light of the Decalogue, should regulate all other feelings and faculties of our nature, (1) by meting out justly all our obligations to others as well as to ourselves, and (2) conferring on ourselves and on others the highest amount of happiness.

In conclusion, while we proclaim the adequacy of the Conscience as a guide to duty, we must not be supposed as maintaining that the mere light of Conscience, without any other revelation from God, is all that is necessary to enable a man both to see his duty and to do it. Man must be made acquainted with the Beings that environ him, as well as with their character and relations, before the Conscience can give any definite decree respecting them. How shall we worship a God of whom we know nothing, unless, like the heathen, "we worship we know not what?" We must therefore know something of the God we are to worship and obey, as well as of the man we are to love and care for. Conscience can never be a substitute for such a revelation as we need, and which is conceded in Scripture.

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